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Braido, Valentina (2017) The Notion of Truth through Dialetheism, Deflationism and Fictionalism. [Ph.D. thesis]

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Abstract (english)

In the present work three different areas about the truth predicate coexist: the semantic area, whose focus is on theories dealing with the solution to the semantic paradoxes that involve the truth predicate; the ontological area, which covers the theories investigating the nature of truth; and the area of discourse, in which the focus is on those theories that analyse how the discourse about the truth predicate has to be understood. The aim of this work is to analyze the consequences arising from certain specific ways in which these areas can interact with each other. The first three chapters expose the main features of the theories corresponding to the three areas about the truth predicate, respectively dialetheism, deflationism and fictionalism. The possible combinations between those theories are the focus of the two following chapters. Finally, a new attempt to account for the liar paradox is provided.

Abstract (italian)

Il presente lavoro interseca tre diversi ambiti concernenti il predicato di verità: l’ambito semantico, che vede al centro le teorie che si occupano della risoluzione dei paradossi semantici che coinvolgono il predicato di verità; quello ontologico, nel quale sono interessate le teorie che si interrogano su quale sia la natura della verità; e l’ambito, per così dire, del discorso, all’interno del quale si muovono le teorie che analizzano in che modo debba essere inteso il discorso riguardo al predicato di verità. Lo scopo di questo lavoro è analizzare le conseguenze che emergono da alcuni specifici modi in cui questi tre ambiti possono interagire tra di loro. Nei primi tre capitoli sono esposte le caratteristiche peculiari delle teorie corrispondenti alle tre aree del predicato di verità, rispettivamente dialeteismo, deflazionismo e finzionalismo. Le possibili combinazioni tra queste teorie saranno l’argomento dei due capitoli successivi. Infine, il lavoro si conclude con un nuovo tentativo di rendere conto del paradosso del mentitore.

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EPrint type:Ph.D. thesis
Tutor:Giaretta, Pierdaniele
Ph.D. course:Ciclo 29 > Corsi 29 > FILOSOFIA
Data di deposito della tesi:31 January 2017
Anno di Pubblicazione:31 January 2017
Key Words:truth, dialetheism, deflationism, fictionalism, aboutness, subject matter, partial truth, liar, priest, field, yablo, beall, paracompleteness, paraconsistency, T-schema, tarski
Settori scientifico-disciplinari MIUR:Area 11 - Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e psicologiche > M-FIL/02 Logica e filosofia della scienza
Struttura di riferimento:Dipartimenti > Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata
Codice ID:10309
Depositato il:15 Nov 2017 10:09
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