A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Truth, Object, and Actuality

History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):259-275 (2008)
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Abstract

Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object.

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