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MUSICA TEXTUALIS

WORD-MADE MUSIC IN PROSE AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

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Abstract (English)

Can music be done with words alone, artistically arranged? Can music be part of a novel or a short story? Can a novella realize a musical form, and does it mean it is a musical piece? Is being a piece of literature incompatible with being a piece of music as well? If so – in what way or ways? If not, for what reason?

These simple questions are the conceptual starting point of the research developed in the present dissertation. It investigates the essential interrelation between music and artistic prose in cases of imitation of music within the latter. Musica textualis, its central concept, is introduced in the first part as a meeting point of two distinct traditions of study, namely Philosophy of Music, on one hand, and the Word and Music Studies, on the other. It is an aporetic field emerging organically in the course of the historical development and dissolution of the system of the arts. Mutual intermedial imitations on the level of artistic creation and appreciation are continuously counterpointed by parallel processes within the history of aesthetic thought, metaphysics of art and musico-literary criticism, influencing greatly ways of perceiving and understanding distinct artforms and the aesthetic experiences they elicit.

One of the main aims of the present research was to establish the actual status of the literary incarnations of music in artistic prose. The initial hypothesis was that there are some special cases, where music is not only represented in words by means of description, evocation, allusion and other standard literary techniques, but is actually there in the text, strictly speaking. Such local cases are possible and instantiated: the paradigm example is (Mann, 1967) with its model interpretation in (Scher, 1967), but there are also antecedent cases such as (Woolf, 1921) interpreted in (Harmat, 2008) or very recent artistically outstanding realizations as (Libera, 2013), interpreted here. What emerges as a positive theory from this research is the category of musica textualis. It denotes a mixed form which unites word-made-music with literary prose in a compound whole sui generis. It is conceptually symmetrical to programme music, where the real presence of music and literature in a compound structure perceptually made solely of musical sounds without words is not contested. Through its complex nature and fragile statute, it functions as a regulative ideal for the above-mentioned eponymous aporetic field.
The explanatory force, methodological and interpretative implications of this theory are significant. Especially, the very process of its historical emergence through the aesthetics of Romanticism, the development of programme music and R. Wagner’s musical drama technique and the “intermedia turn” characterizing Modernism, unveil its necessary place in the conceptual map of the complex interrelation of these two temporal allographic arts: epics and music.

The dissertation takes into account the vast and problematic discussion internal to the Word and Music studies and similar branches of intermodal/interart/transdisciplinary studies in their classical Anglophone version cf. (Scher, 1970; Wolf, 1999; Petermann, 2014), as well as in their Polish counterpart, anticipated critically in the work of Tadeusz Szulc (1937), and recently developed in, e.g. (Balbus, 2004; Hejmej, 2008, 2012). Also French and other studies are taken into consideration, cf. e.g. (Pautrot, 2004; Picard, 2008, 2010). It can potentially contribute to some significant clarifications in these controversial fields, but it is methodologically autonomous. It combines some elements of conceptual analysis and argumentation typical of analytic Philosophy of Art with a broader “continental” contextual horizon and interpretative ambitions. The main source of its insight comes from the immediate aesthetic experience of prose containing crucial instantiations of what can be interpreted as musica textualis. These insights are confronted with the achievements of the classical Philosophy of Music on one hand and the Word and Music practice on the other. As far as it is known, this is a novel approach within Philosophy.

This method, intended as facilitating future mutual dialogue between the disciplines, is potentially beneficial for both (and open for further dialogue with musicology, which today is keen on borrowing research tools from Literary Theory). For the philosophers of music it discovers a neglected area of study, through a meticulous polemics with the conceptualizations of music at hand in the analytic tradition. It shows that works of musica textualis are, at least in part (like operas or Lieder, for that matter) works of music, and that there are no substantial grounds for excluding them from philosophical scrutiny of music. It shows that only the most anti-essentialist, accidentalist philosopher could find a coherent reason to reject a work of musica textualis from the realm of music on contingent grounds of the communis opinio; even his reasoning, though, is ultimately proven fallacious.
Other philosophers are invited to rethink the way they localize essential features of the phenomenon in question.

For the literary scholars interested in the practices described as *musicalization of fiction, intermedial transposition / translation / transfer, the musical novel, music in the words* within the venerated tradition of the comparison of the arts on the axis Music – Literature and especially in the 20th Century born Word and Music Studies – *musica textualis* can become a helpful tool in the on-going methodological dispute. It helps to distinguish genuine problems of method within the Word and Music Studies from what emerges as the vital aporetical core of interart phenomena such as Mann’s *Doctor Faustus*. This core confronts us with questions which cannot be resolved through some consensus within the scholarly community, but are better accepted and cherished as fertile sources of artistic and intellectual inspiration.

The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the concept of *musica textualis*, and places it within the contemporary philosophical discussion on music, explaining in detail its Boethian pedigree as well as its relation to the state of the art within Word and Music studies, as discussed in the Introduction. In the chapter *Music Beyond the Senses* it offers some novel arguments against definitions of music that would exclude *musica textualis* a priori; it defends a slight modification of the definition of music advanced by (Kania, 2011). Problematic cases of *silent music* are discussed extensively and the notion of *intentional calibration* – inspired by stances taken by Husserl, Ingarden, Iser, Wittgenstein, Wollheim, Scruton and others – is introduced. The second part consists of three chapters consecrated to three Polish authors (Iwaszkiewicz, Libera, Bartnicki) whose work is interpreted as displaying three radically different modes of *musica textualis*. This choice, by no means exhaustive, is intended to illustrate the introduced concept at work in dissimilar cases, sharing though one property: all have been paid little or no attention by the international musico-literary scholarship (not to mention the philosophers of music). The third and conclusive part shows *musica textualis* as a genuine aporetic field.
Abstract (Italian)

Al centro della ricerca presenata nella dissertazione si pone la domanda se la musica possa essere parte di un romanzo o un racconto breve o, in altri termini, se il fatto che un’opera sia letteraria sia (in)compatibile con il suo essere anche un’opera musicale. Si può far musica con le parole? E se sì, in che modo? Se invece la risposta è “no”, per quali ragioni?


Il mio lavoro prende in considerazione l’ampia discussione interna ai Word and Music studies e agli analoghi filoni di studio sull’intermodalità sia nella classica versione anglofonà (Scher, 1970; Wolf, 1999; Prieto, 2002; Shockley, 2009; Petermann, 2014), sia nella controparte di lingua polacca, anticipata nei lavori di Tadeusz Szulc (1937) e sviluppata in anni più recenti ad esempio (Hejmej e Głowiński). Anche contributi provenienti dall’area linguistica francese sono presi in considerazione (Pautrot, Picard).

Nei tre capitoli della seconda parte del lavoro mi rivolgo a tre autori polacchi (Iwaszkiewicz, Libera, Bartnicki), interpretandone le opere come esempi di tre modi radicalmente diversi di musica textualis. La scelta di questi autori, in nessun modo esaustiva, è volta a illustrare come i concetti precedentemente introdotti
operino in casi diversi che, tuttavia, condividono una proprietà: tutti hanno prestato poca o nessuna attenzione alla scholarship musicale-letteraria internazionale (per non menzionare la filosofia della musica).

Nella terza e ultima parte della dissertazione offro ulteriori riflessioni sulla musica textualis in quanto nozione che fa sorgere un genuino campo aporetico.

La dissertazione mostra come il complesso campo d’indagine della musica textualis emerga dallo sviluppo e dalla dissoluzione del sistema delle arti. Reciproche imitazioni intermediali a livello della creazione e dell’apprezzamento artistico trovano riscontro in processi paralleli nell’estetica, nella metafisica dell’arte e sul piano della critica musicale e letteraria, influenzando il modo di percepire e comprendere forme d’arte diverse e l’esperienza estetica che occasionalano.

Uno degli scopi principali della ricerca è stato di stabilire lo status attuale dell’incarnazione della musica nella prosa artistica. L’ipotesi iniziale è stata quella di una presenza della musica nel testo, inteso come spartito per un’interpretazione musicale, e non tanto in descrizioni, evocazioni e attraverso altre tecniche letterarie. Al riguardo l’esempio paradigmatico è il Doktor Faustus di Thomas Mann, ma vi sono anche antecedenti come Monday or Tuesday di Virginia Woolf ed esempi più recenti come lo straordinario Toccata in do maggiore di Antoni Libera (trad. it. 2015), di cui la dissertazione offre un’interpretazione. Alla luce dell’analisi di questi casi, un risultato della ricerca è di mostrare che la categoria di musica textualis denota una forma mista che unisce musica-fatta-con-le-parole e prosa letteraria in un tutto sui generis. Si tratta di una realizzazione concettualmente simmetrica alla musica a programma, nella quale la presenza reale di musica e letteratura in una struttura composta, percettivamente costituita solo da suoni musicali senza parole, pur essendo contestabile da parte dei formalisti estremi, rimane pur sempre chiaramente concettualizzata.

Nel mio lavoro metto in luce la forza esplicativa e le implicazioni metodologiche e interpretative di questa prospettiva teorica, il cui luogo nella mappa concettuale delle relazioni complesse delle due arti allografiche temporalì – l’epica e la musica – è del resto rivelato già dal processo della sua emergenza storica nell’estetica romantica, nello sviluppo della musica a programma, nel dramma musicale wagneriano e nell’“intermedia turn” modernista.
La dissertazione combina elementi di analisi concettuale tipici della filosofia analitica con le più ampie ambizioni interpretative “continentali”. La fonte principale delle sue intuizioni deriva comunque dall’esperienza (estetica) di una prosa contenente esemplificazioni cruciali di ciò che può essere interpretato come musica textualis. Tali intuizioni sono confrontate da un lato con i risultati della classica filosofia della musica, dall’altro, con la pratica della Word and Music. Si tratta di un approccio filosofico che apre, per la filosofia della musica, un campo di studio trascurato dalle teorie sulla musica presenti nella tradizione analitica. Mostro che le opere di musica textualis sono, almeno in parte, opere musicali, e che non vi sono ragioni sostanziali per escluderle dall’indagine filosofica della musica.

La ricerca mostra inoltre come, per gli studiosi di letteratura interessati alla pratica descritta come musicalization of fiction, trasposizione intermediale o music in the words, all’interno della tradizione del paragone fra le arti lungo l’asse musica-letteratura, l’ipotesi musica textualis possa essere uno strumento utile nella continua disputa metodologica. Essa aiuta a distinguere i genuini problemi di metodo interni ai Word and Music Studies da quanto emerge come il vitale nucleo aporetico di fenomeni inter-artistici come il Doktor Faustus di Mann. Questo nucleo presenta questioni che, secondo me, vanno accettate e coltivate come fertili fonti di ispirazione artistica e intellettuale.
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Introduction

‘ὦ Σώκρατες,’ ἔφη, ‘μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου’

Plat. Phaedo 60e

Transgressive attempts to imitate music within the means traditionally proper to other temporal arts, since Romanticism, through Modernism and Post-Modernism have been constantly gaining importance in Western Literature. The stream of musicalized fiction includes, among many others, Thomas De Quincey with his Dream Fugue, Virginia Woolf with her String Quartet, then it reaches its opus magnum in Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus flowing down to numerous Jazz novels and novels imitating Bach’s Goldberg Variations published in the nineties and after 2000. Musical fiction by imitating mechanisms and features of music on all levels (structure, performance, reception) seeks to transcend the limits of the literary medium. In the present thesis, I reflect on these intermedial attempts at realizing music beyond what apparently are its traditional means: “sounds regarded primarily, or in significant measure, as sounds” (from the definition of music by Jerrold Levinson). While some writers overtly speak of making music with words (Huxley, Mann, Iwaszkiewicz), some express skepticism on the very possibility of such an enterprise (Burgess). Many leave us with their musicalized texts alone.

1. Philosophy of Music

This thesis is designed strictly as a thesis in Philosophy of Music. Therefore, it is to be read and understood within the primary context of this discipline (both it its Analytic and Continental branch, subdivided in Metaphysics, Ethics, Epistemology and Aesthetics of Music). If we live in an epoch of few solid certainties, one thing is less unsure than many others: Philosophy of Music is as old as Philosophy tout court. The concept of musical harmony as a metaphysical principle was central to the Pythagorean thought; Socrates was called in a dream recurring throughout his whole life to “make and cultivate Music”, and this encouragement was repeated when his hour was come (note the resonance of this passage of Plato’s dialogue with the otherwise completely amusical Gospels: the last thing Christ does together with all his Disciples is to sing the prescribed Pesach hymn, before they live for Gethsemane, cf. Matthew 26,29-31, Mark 14,25-27). For Plato and Aristotle music was primarily a matter of Paideia, of public affairs and of moral impact, though mysterious in its core and offering no easy explanations as to the inner mechanism of its workings. The Middle Ages, contrary to many prejudices of illuminist descendance, which still are often unthinkingly repeated, were a millennium full of musical and intellectual diversity, within the unifying framework of Latin universalistic culture, nurtured in monasteries, cathedral schools and universities. This period, to be sure, is indeed characterized by an articulate depreciation of the musical practice from the perspective of the writers. They favor theological and philosophical knowledge of music’s abstract rules over its sensuous exercise in the form of what we are accustomed to call making music. This intellectualistic climate marginalizing actual singing and playing instruments by no means corresponded to any real underdevelopment of musica practica of the period, which, quite the contrary, flourished all over Europe both in its many liturgical and profane forms. It flourished especially from the 13th C. onwards as a developing innovative practice, despite the abyss separating the elevated musicus from the uneducated and unautonomous cantores whose herd he had to lead⁴, but it

⁴ Cf. Guido d’Arezzo’s opinion on singers reported in Chapter One infra.
flourished also earlier as a living tradition. We find a polemics against the doctrine of the Pythagorean inaudible harmony of the spheres in St. Thomas’s commentary to Arist. *De Cael.* On the other hand, the traditional picture is defended with dedication by Jacques de Liège in his *Speculum musicae.* The great Humanists, Mei, Galilei, Zarlino, Cardano, Ficino, still under the preponderant influence of Boethius, discussed passionately about the place of music in the human world, applying also experimental methods of investigation within the acoustics, a practice which was not neglected by the Pythagoreans despite their theoretical orientation. For Schopenhauer and Nietzsche music is the apex of all arts, with an incredible potential of energy and liberating force (even within the pessimistic system of the philosopher from Danzig; in fact, he says, music would continue to exist even if the whole world lacked). Nietzsche’s first work, which gives him a university cathedra in Classical Philology and such a severe criticism from the part of fellow philologists that he gains autonomy as a philosopher, is perhaps the closest great philosophical text to the path we are stepping on in the present humble *essai* of a dissertation: it exposes the vital principles of music, the necessary tension between the Apollonian cool, clear-cut proportionate order and the unruly élan of ecstatic Dionysian commotion which are the arch (first bow instrument) of every music. Adorno’s role of the “musical consultant” of the Old Master from Lübeck strikes us with maybe even greater power, as it is not “dead letter” but vibrant crystalline form embodied in Mann’s last tremendous masterpiece. Wagner and Hanslick are

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5 What I mean here is that there is no intrinsic reason for which we should regard traditional liturgical music based not on innovation but on continuity as a form of stagnation. Quite strikingly we see a revival of these musical practices and ideas on music in the last several decades, where they seem to respond to a profound dissatisfaction with at least certain aspects engendered by the “organic development”, to borrow Schonberg’s phrase, of the new music (Cf. These “archaic” non expressive and non progress-oriented music making forms (conserved to this day in certain traditional communities preserved in the local European and global South) are concentrated not at producing aesthetic effects or expressing any sort of meaning (be it theological or emotional) but anchored in the everyday practice of prayer within the traditional monastic community.


figures which till now provoke violent disputes among the philosophers of music and musicologists engaged in an interdisciplinary dialogue. Works of Eggebrecht and Dahlhaus, written from the musicological perspective, offer pages of unrivalled philosophical profundity and musical relevance\(^9\). This is a tradition which continues in today’s philosophy and philosophical musicology, with excellent minds dedicated to its cultivation: Guzalski, Dankowska, Chęćka, Brożek, Jadacki, Jabłoński, Moraczewski, Baranowski, Berger, Gołaszewska, Skowron, Szyszowska, Kurylewicz, Lipka, Nakoneczny in Poland, following the great Ingarden, as well as Lissa, Twardowski, Regamey and Pociej; in France Sève, Accaoui, Nancy, following the great Jankélévitch, Brelet, Boucureclhiev, de Schloezer and Sartre, in the tradition of Rousseau and Rameau, not to mention Descartes; in Italy, which after the humanistic secolo d’oro of the Camerata Fiorentina gave us in the recent times the fundamental historical syntheses of Fubini: Arbo, Bertinetto, Giordanetti and Lisciani-Petrini; and in the Anglophone globalized philosophical agora: Levinson, Kivy, Scruton, Ridley, Goehr, Davies, Dodd, Kania and Zangwill to quote only the few most eminent.

Philosophy investigates music in its ways of existence, conducts axiological disputes on the values of music, both intrinsic (aesthetic) and extrinsic (social, educational, moral, life-enhancing\(^10\)), comments on music’s impact (or its lack) on our moral lives\(^11\), continues the endless and fascinating disagreements on musical

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\(^11\) Philodemus’s criticism of the theory of ethos can be seen as the great ancestry of the recent polemics on the topic of music’s moral force. Kivy, the advocate of music alone, argues against the existence of such a force, quoting the famous scene with Wehrmacht soldiers playing and discussing music while plundering and burning a household in Warsaw in the search of hiding Jews from the *Pianist* by Roman Polański. Levinson revisits Kivy’s argument in the chapter *Popular Song as a Moral Microcosm* of his latest book quoted above, arguing that music can have durable impact on our lives, if regularly frequented, just as “good” and “bad” influences in our social and relational life. It is better “to spend time with music of sincerity, subtlety, honesty,
meaning and the meaning of music, in contrast or in analogy to language\textsuperscript{12}. These many ways in which music becomes an object of philosophical inquiry are the reason for which one could cede to the illusion that philosophy is somehow epistemically superior to music as its reflexive organ, as the residue of its deeper meditation and more rigorous cognition unavailable to music itself and for herself, due to the limitations of music’s purportedly a-logical medium\textsuperscript{13}. Or at least that the only possible relation between philosophy and music is that of music being the subject field of philosophy. Nothing less accurate than that.

2. Musica magistra philosophiae

In fact – relations between these two branches of human spiritual and social activity are far more complex and less evident, than those typically binding an academic discipline and its subject matter. Music can also exercise power over philosophy, can teach it how to think. In a word: can be magistra philosophiae. Music can provide interpretational models which help philosophy, her younger and yet far too often condescending sister, understand better herself and her own workings. Both, thus, can be treated more democratically, leaving space not only for philosophical intellectualistic takes on the deliciously ineffable charm of the secretive workings of music, but also for the musical perspective to be accepted as


\textsuperscript{13} It is Philodemus’ famous defense of music as a-logos – as free of any sort of servitude to the logos of ethos, in his polemics against the Stoics, Aristotle and the followers of Plato, which provides us this powerful term. Cf. L.P. Wilkinson, Philodemus on Ethos in Music, „The Classical Quarterly”, 1938, t.32, no 3–4, pp. 174–181. See also the concise and very dense synthesis by Martinelli, which was useful to me on more occasions: R. Martinelli, I filosofi e la musica, Il Mulino, Bologna 2012, p. 34.
a way of interpreting philosophical texts. Just as it is possible to read music as discourse – it is as well possible to see formal interplay typical of music and efficiently analyzable and understandable in musical terms in classical works of philosophy. The subtitle of Bernard Sève’s capital work L’Altération musicale is, most eloquently: ce que la musique apprend au philosophe – “[on] what music teaches the philosopher”. In the following chapters, we will return frequently to this humble (and wise) revision of the relations between music and philosophy, characterizing eminently also the ways of Vladimir Jankélévitch who learned from music how to listen. His philosophy is a repeated exercise of how to draw back the intellectualistic prejudices and open up to the extraordinary epiphanies offered by the immanence, on the condition that the philosopher decides to abandon safe terrains of the already known and orderly, in line with petrifying concepts. In this way Jankélévitch can be said to have learned the method of his Philosophie première from music, no less than from the ambiguous, elliptic formulations of the mystics and from the obscure clarity of Neoplatonic philosophers. Another contemporary model, where music is shown as mistress and the musical initiation has existential and metaphysical value, is to be found in Pascal Quignard, who, also trained as an academic philosopher in France, much more radically than Jankélévitch decided to depart from the academic style in his prose. From his Lesson of music we learn something profound on music, to be sure, but even more

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16 His lesson of music is not limited to the little book bearing this title: P. Quignard, La leçon de musique, [Hachette 1987], Gallimard, Paris 2010. See also his other exceptional pieces of prose, engaging with music in various ways: P. Quignard, Tous les matins du monde, Gallimard, Paris 1991; P. Quignard, La Haine de la musique, [in:] La Haine de la musique, 1996, pp. 213–256; P. Quignard, Villa Amalia, Gallimard, Paris 2007. The intricate role of music in Quignard’s work was analysed by, inter alios, J.-L. Pautrot, De ‘La Leçon de musique’ à ‘La Haine de la musique’: Pascal Quignard, le structuralisme et le postmoderne, „French Forum”.
importantly, we learn from its music, which is the musique silencieuse of M. de Sainte-Colombe and of Tch’eng Yen. What we learn is something fundamental on the wise proportion between what can be said and taught with words and what must be understood and transmitted otherwise. Music can be thus explored not only as a formal model for philosophy, but as well as a source of metaphysical and existential wisdom, tracing back the origins of philosophy as the love and striving for wisdom. This can help the philosopher to reorient his attitudes towards the “objects” of his thought which, thanks to the illuminating example of music, become less “objects” and more “acts” or “doings”, inviting forms of engagement and understanding radically different from that those at hand within discursive philosophy.

This reasoning is part of a broader tendency to regard music as an autonomous form of thought, which not being linguistic or discursive in nature, operates primarily with immanent senses, as opposed to transcendent referential meanings. As such music becomes worthy of serious reconsideration as a partner in inspiring dialogue for other disciplines, so seemingly distant from music as for instance law. In this perspective music becomes so much more than just a mute beauty,

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17 P. Quignard, Tous les matins du monde ..., op. cit. This little book was congenially realized in the beautiful 1991 film by Alain Corneau, with music performed and directed by Jordi Savall.


19 Such inspiring and successful applications to law, for example, are to be found in several publications by Prof. Ewa Łętowska, expert in constitutional law and former Judge of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland (cf. E. Łętowska, Communicare et humanum, et nescere est – o komunikacyjnej misji muzyków i prawników,
from whom the philosopher has nothing to learn, to say it with reversed subtitle of Sève’s book.

The present work aspires to citizenship in this democratically musical and philosophical polis; it identifies with this multi-streamed tradition and its reflexive love for music.

It does, however, as it is evident from even a brief survey of the Works analyzed in the Second Part, take as its objects artifacts which hardly could be accepted as works of music within the currently dominating framework. The state of the art is thus put into question with respect to a fundamental element: its very Object Field. In other words – this dissertation takes polemic stances with respect to the extension of the Concept of Music, as understood by most contemporary philosophers, letting apart the question of its explicit analysis. In this way, its workings are twofold: on the one hand, it provides some humbly philosophical interpretations of a set of contemporary textual artworks; on the other hand, the way it is done calls for a reevaluation of our fundamental conceptualizations of both the sister arts in question. The arguments provided throughout the following chapters which sum up for a defense of this approach fall, roughly, into three classes: 1. *pars destruens* – where current definitions of music are shown inadequate on the very grounds that permitted their formulation, and, as in a mirror, theories which sustain or assume an unproblematic inclusion of the analyzed works into the realm of Literature are put in question; 2. *pars construens* – where some positive account of the new category of music is advanced (in such a way as to salvage as much as possible from what appears to be the philosophical consensus on music today and yet permit the inclusion of the new kind into scrutiny); 3. *pars ostensiva* – where the phenomena described and tentatively theorized in *pars construens* are shown in

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their concrete instantiations. This last class, needless to say, requires the Reader’s cooperation, as it is her \textit{aisthesis} that they must take body.

3. Word and Music Studies / Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature

To ground such a thorough revision of the reigning philosophical paradigm, it was necessary to take into account studies published across the disciplines, from History of Literature, through Literary Criticism, Musicology to Comparative Literature, Word and Music Studies and Translation Studies. This makes the Secondary Literature Corpus utterly disparate and makes the theoretic material selection decisions difficult. Thus, I chose to limit this non-philosophical interdisciplinary literature overview to a necessary minimum, especially where other Authors have accomplished this task elsewhere, and to evoke them in detail when it is operative in the course of the analyses in the second part. This permits me to concentrate directly on the aspects immediately relevant for the present argument, without distracting my Reader by an infinity of problems such a discussion would necessarily lead to.

Literature and Music: Studies in Poland

My starting point will be a brief overview of the state of the art in Poland, my native country and home to a rich autonomous tradition of critical research in the field which in the English-speaking world we are accustomed to call the Word and Music Studies. My intellectual formation and thus the shape of the theory I defend in the present dissertation are much more indebted in this tradition that I can possibly advert. In Poland, this discipline is called \textit{komparatystyka muzyczno-literacka} and is usually conceived of as a branch of the \textit{interdisciplinary comparative literature}, where the \textit{comparanda} are artefacts from literature and music respectively. The focus is often placed on the question of different types of \textit{filiations} that can issue in artefacts placed somewhere in between the two arts, or rather – within works of literature informed in their structure and implied perceptive model by the usual means and models of music.
Just as elsewhere – these theoretical strivings cannot be understood if not in the context of preceding omnipresence of music in the Romantic culture. Literary critics and writers in Poland have always been very keen on drawing musical parallels and playing with musical themes. Mickiewicz placed an unforgettable ear-catching musical ekphrasis of Jankiel’s Cymbalom Concert in the XII (final) book of the national epic poem Pan Tadeusz\(^{20}\) (first published in Paris in 1834). This is a true *tour de force* of musical romantic intermediality, as the Jewish virtuoso’s spectacular performance is understood by the audience in both musical and narrative terms. This purely instrumental concert, described as *music*, is invested with great expressive and symbolic force; the cymbalist is depicted as a bard, as an alter ego of the poet himself. Mickiewicz uses technical musical nuance in this *finale brillante*, letting the chords of climax of the national epopee to music. The repeated discord, produced by touching “that traitorous string” in the middle part of Jankiel’s great improvisation, is met with the audience’s mixed reaction, but “Warden understood the master, covered his face in his hands, and cried, “I know, I know those notes; that is Targowica”\(^{21}\)\(^{22}\). Subtle phenomenology of musical perception is at work here, too: thanks to Jankiel’s mastery people hear different instruments (trumpets, bells, drums) within what he plays. We will see on more occasions in this thesis, how such *fictionalizing music* becomes one of the primordial devices of *musicalizing fiction*.

Chopin, who himself wrote two songs to Mickiewicz’s poems (*Precz z moich oczu, Moja pieszczotka*), has been “translated” back into verse by the poet Kornel Ujejski in his 1866 *Tłumaczenia Szopena [Translations from Chopin]*\(^{23}\). Apocryphal programmatic interpretations of his piano ballads as musical renditions

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\(^{21}\) Targowica (Konfederacja targowicka) – the infamous confederation against the Polish Constitution of 3rd May 1791; the glorious Constitution itself is symbolised in a brighter passage of Jankiel’s improvisation by the eponymous *Polonaise of the Third May*.


\(^{23}\) There seems to be virtually no limit to Romantic intermedial variations, interpretations and violations of Chopin’s art. Consider
of Mickiewicz’s ballads, and of his epic poem *Konrad Wallenrod*, were numerous\(^{24}\). Some of these readings were suggested by Chopin himself, as is the case with “Gładkowska’s portrait” in the *Larghetto* of the *F Minor Piano Concerto*, evoked in Iwaszkiewicz’s *Fourth Symphony*\(^ {25}\) and used there as one of the means of musicalization\(^ {26}\). This romantic-driven verbal musicophilia was wide-spread in critical and academic writing way into the thirties. In 1937 the situation changed abruptly when after a press polemics on the “musical tendency in literature” a book-long merciless critique of these practices was published by Tadeusz Szulc\(^ {27}\). He systematically refuted them as abusive, metaphorical use of vaguely intended musical terminology to supplant proper terms of the art. He denounced such a practice as imprecise, terminologically inflationary and thus – unacceptable in serious literary scholarship. He concluded his series of “negativist”\(^ {28}\) arguments saying that “Music can be only an object within the scope of the literary artwork’s world, a world created by the peculiar literary material and directives. That is: just what it is in *Jean Christophe*, in *Tristan*, in *The Magic Mountain*, *The Buddenbrooks*…”\(^ {29}\). This little quote shows how radically points of view have actually changed ever since, for the very same texts, which for Szulc are clear examples of “mere thematization”, where music is to be seen as any other object of literary description – today seem all but obvious examples to back his theses. For the perspective of the present study they exemplify much more ambiguous interrelations between music and literature. Hanno’s death in *The Buddenbrooks* in


\(^{25}\) Czwarta symfonia, p. 242.

\(^{26}\) This textual piece is analyzed in the second part of the present thesis.

\(^{27}\) T. Szulc, *Muzyka w dziele literackim*, Warszawa 1937. The quoted phrase is translated from the p. 31 of this monograph (by myself – J.C.).

\(^{28}\) Label for the supporters of such extreme skepticism used by S. Dąbrowski, ‘*Muzyka w literaturze*’. (Próba przeglądu zagadnień), „Poezja”, 1980, no 3, p. 23.

my interpretation, to make just one example, is one of the cardinal instantiations of musical agency, which is one of the *modi of musica textualis*.\(^\text{30}\)

This pre-war skepticism prevented serious literary scholars from approaching musical contexts of literature in their complexity for nearly half a century\(^\text{31}\), with some significant exceptions in the postwar essays of Tadeusz Makowiecki\(^\text{32}\) and Michał Głowiński\(^\text{33}\), both great literary authorities in their

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\(^{30}\) The musical *finale* of the novel: verbally instantiated piano improvisation by the little Hanno is violently clashed with the medical (and specular with respect to the musical) description of typhoid fever. The illness is presented as the vest of death, as the outer side of the decision, which has taken place in the last Buddenbrook on an entirely different plane, epitomized in Mann’s symbolic poetics by music. T. Mann, *Buddenbrooks. Verfall einer Familie*, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2002, 52. Aufl.

\(^{31}\) It can be observed that even in a much younger branch of musico-literary studies, the one engaged with jazz novels, “dilettantish and impressionistic” use of musical terms in literary criticism is also under attack, see A. Munton, *Misreading Morrison, Mishearing Jazz: A Response to Toni Morisson’s Jazz Critics*, *Journal of American Studies*, 1997, t.31, no 2, pp. 235–51 mentioned by Petermann (p.41). Of course by noting this similarity I do not intend to embrace all musicalizing interpretations, even those which are musically incompetent and otherwise nonsensical. On many occasions these anathemas against dilettantish “musical impressionism” express the general fear of admitting musical metaphors in literary criticism as being unscientific. The necessity of such a critical awareness, though, is constantly proved in popular literary criticism. The recent novel R. Tremain, *The Gustav sonata*, Chatto & Windus, London 2016, has received enthusiastic reviews and was awarded prizes (for reasons quite unintelligible to me). What strikes, however, is the unbearable banality of the remarks enthusiastic critics duped by the novel’s title had to offer on its purported affinity with music: „The “sonata” title is apt, too, in that, like the great classical composers, Tremain shows happiness and sorrow can collide – there are moments when the two are interchangeable” K. Kellaway, *The Gustav Sonata review – the wrong trait at the wrong time*, „The Guardian”, 26.05.2016. or „The Gustav Sonata is a powerful, profound and unexpected love story about the enduring damage of unrequited love. It is a masterful, meditative novel in which Tremain plays with themes and motifs as a composer plays with musical refrains” H. Beckerman, *The Gustav Sonata by Rose Tremain review – a masterful tale of envy and love*, „The Guardian”, 29.01.2017.


homeland, Józef Opalski\textsuperscript{34}, Konrad Górski\textsuperscript{35} and several other important scholars, and younger researchers such as Anna Tenczyńska\textsuperscript{36} and Aleksandra Riemann, who developed Głowiński’s conception of “musical reception style” in her study \textit{Muzyczny styl odbioru tekstów literackich}\textsuperscript{37}. A systematic revival of these musicological studies in Poland in the past two decades has his great advocate in the person of Andrzej Hejmej from the Jagellonian University in Kraków, who published numerous articles in the field, and offered a systematic account of the complex possibilities of literature–music interrelations in his monographs: \textit{Muzyczność dzieła literackiego}\textsuperscript{38} and the earlier \textit{Muzyka w literaturze}\textsuperscript{39}, which recently appeared in an English version as \textit{Music in Literature}\textsuperscript{40}. His work is characterized by an extensive effort at summarizing the past proposals in Polish musicological criticism, as well as a competent survey of the state of the art in francophone contexts and in the core tradition of the Word and Music Studies, from their beginnings in the seminal writings of Steven Paul Scher and Calvin S. Brown\textsuperscript{41}. Apart from systemizing these areas Hejmej offers his own framework operating with the tripartite concept of musicality\textsuperscript{I–III} inspired by the three Scherian categories of “word music” “musical techniques and structures” and “verbal music”. He differentiates between the \textit{sensu largo} use of the term ‘score’ with respect to literary texts, as to be found in the writings of Roland Barthes, Paul Ricoeur and Michel

\textsuperscript{40} A. Hejmej, \textit{Music in Literature: Perspectives of Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature}, trans by. L. Davidson, Peter Lang 2014.
Butor, from the strict sense in which this would imply a musical score, as defined in musicology. The latter, called by him the “literary score”, is defined in the following terms:

The literary score is nothing but a score for the use of literature; the score is as a parent interpretative context of a literary text, or rather in another way, a score is a somewhat (far?) modified musical intertext function in literature. One could quite easily say that this is a score lying in wait for a literary recipient; in this case, it would be a score in the hands of the literature researcher. There are generally two basic formulae that have a polar sense of disclosure or signaling in a literary text: explicite, through musical quotation (examples of this can be found in S. Barańczak, J. Iwaszkiewicz, M. Kuncewiczowa, R. Rolland, A. Schnitzler, M. Kundera, G. Compère, M. Roche) or implicite, through either a description of a musical composition, or other operations of music thematization. Musical quotation in literature is always – by the nature of things – evident, and therefore does not cause trouble during the initial examination as an emblem of literary scores. Undoubtedly, much more difficulty is caused by implied score (genologically founding text, hidden, determined at the time of reading), because everything depends not only on the finesse of artistic interpretation, but also on perception by the interpreter and correct reading.

In addition to these thorough theoretical discussions, he offered many valuable interpretations from the international musico-literary repertoire. He analyzed Polish authors, such as the witty and most challenging poet Stanisław Barańczak (Aria-Awaria, playing with a humorous verbal imitation of the sound of Donna Elvira’s Ah, chi mi dice mai! aria from Don Giovanni, rather than its sense, and Podróż zimowa – a cycle of poems “to the music of Franz Schubert” in musical dialogue with his Winterreise) or the less known Karol Hubert Rostworowski with

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42 A. Hejmej, Music in Literature: Perspectives of Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature..., op. cit. See also: A. Hejmej, Partytura literacka. Przedmiot badań komparatystyki interdyscyplinarnej, „Teksty Drugie”, 2003, t.4, pp. 34–46. This specific use of the term as defined by Hejmej should not be confused with the considerations on the analogies between the literary text and the musical score. An example of such divagations based on Bolesław Prus’s unpublished notes can be found in: A. Martuszewska, Tekst dzieła literackiego jako partytura, „Przestrzenie Teorii”, 2005, no 5, pp. 39–52.
his 1913 drama *Judasz z Kariothu*, containing a polyphonic quarrel between the priests notated on musical staves within the drama’s text\(^{43}\), but also, to quote some examples from foreign literatures, Philippe Sollers’s novel, *Le Coeur absolu*, literary fugues by Umberto Saba and Paul Celan or Michel Butor’s *Dialogue avec 33 variations de Ludwig van Beethoven sur une valse de Diabelli*. The latest word of the younger generation of scholars working under the auspices of the cracovian comparatist is to be found in the volume A. Hejmej and T. Górny, *Transpozycje. Muzyka w nowoczesnej literaturze europejskiej*, Universitas, Kraków 2016.

**Word and Music Studies Worldwide**

Steven Paul Scher’s influential writings still inspire reflection and have influenced greatly my own approach to verbal music in German literature, shaping thus many of the ideas expressed in this thesis\(^{44}\). Because the following chapters contain more detailed discussions and applications of the theories advanced by the Word and Music scholars (see especially the studies contained in the Second Part), instead of a more general overview\(^{45}\) I propose a focused discussion\(^{46}\) of the latest book publication in the field relevant directly to our topic, the musicalized prose.

Emily Petermann’s *The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in Contemporary Fiction* (2014) is of significant interest not only to the literary scholar but also to the philosopher of art. Music and


\(^{44}\) Scher, of course, is not responsible for what I have to say here. See in particular his: *Thomas Mann’s ‘Verbal Score’: Adrian Leverkühn’s Symbolic Confession*, „MNL”, 1967, t.82, no 4, pp. 403–420, a paper which had a capital influence on my understanding of Mann’s textual musicality; S.P. Scher, *Notes Toward a Theory of Verbal Music*, „Comparative Literature”, 1970, t.22, no 2, pp. 147–156.

\(^{45}\) This task is more than sufficiently realized by other authors, see, once again, Hejmej’s monographs and review articles, as well as the whole “Word and Music Studies” editorial series published by Rodopi and containing the evergreen section “Surveying the Field”. I would like to credit here only one recent work, staying institutionally apart from the WMS current, and yet most valuable: A. Shockley, *Music in the Words: Musical Form and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century Novel*, Routledge 2009.

\(^{46}\) This brief section is a revised version of my review of the book published in: „Universa. Recensioni di filosofia”, 2016, t.5, no 2.
literature are intimately entwined in interart phenomena categorized here as musical novels. Petermann’s exploration of this literary subgenre, defined as “musical not primarily in terms of its content, but in its very form” (p. 2) invites us to rethink a series of classical problems – the essence of music, boundaries of art forms, musical sense and meaning, the relation between music and language – through the lens of these peculiar textual artworks. Petermann’s monograph is not merely the latest study on music as described in novels: it is an attempt to theorize the presence of music in artistic prose in terms of “imitation of musical structure, performance, and reception”. The book, thus, deals with topics of interest in the current philosophical debate on music: performance situation and its specificity (both in jazz, and in authentic performances of baroque music); improvisation; various ways of listening treated democratically, including both the performer’s and the audience’s perspectives; music and literature as temporal arts; the question of formalism. Petermann theorizes the musical novel through the key philosophical concept of imitation. In doing so, she evokes the ancient theory of μίμησις with its rich legacy. It is hard not to hear in it also an echo of the polyphonic imitation technique; this second reading, if not encouraged by the author, can be meaningful in light of the conclusive remarks of this review. Thematization of music and explicit considerations of the philosophical problems mentioned above, are often diegetic features of the musical novels discussed. For instance, N. Huston’s Les variations Goldberg can be read as a rich repertory of such divagations. According to Petermann, however, thematizing music is vital only to the extent in which it makes the reader attentive to the formal musical features exhibited by the text.

In sum, the distinct elements that emerge from Petermann’s work are of highest interest for the present study: the theoretical framework of the book, the class of intermedially involved artworks it delineates, the distinctive artistic features of these artworks, and the explicit considerations on music that some of them contain.

The monograph is divided into two parts devoted to two groups of novels (Jazz-Novels and Goldberg-Novels, see below) which are preceded by an important chapter on Theorizing the Musical Novel, all framed by an Introduction and a
Conclusion. An Appendix schematically illustrates the new model of intermediality advanced by Petermann and applied to two of the musical novels discussed. I use it and propose modifications in the study of Antoni Libera’s *Toccata C-Dur* (Chapter 4 below) and in the Annex, where I reproduce a diagram-analysis of this literary toccata within the framework proposed by Petermann.

Word and Music Studies provide a primary context for her work. She mentions the still influential writings by C.S. Brown and S.P. Scher, and reviews the most recent studies on music in prose, such as A. Shockley (2009), but she skillfully resists the temptation of overcharging the theoretical part with meticulous discussions of terminological distinctions and internal nuances of the approach: this field of study is relatively young and still methodologically unstable. Instead, having provided the necessary background, Petermann seeks to give a pragmatically clear framework for her own research, a “tool for analysis rather than a philosophical interpretation of intermediality per se” (p. 21). Here Petermann draws most extensively on the definition of medium and the models of intermediality advanced by W. Wolf (1999) and I. Rajewsky (2002). She defines intermedial imitation as the use of “techniques of the medium that is materially present […] to metaphorically suggest the presence of a foreign medium” (p. 24). For heuristic purposes, she advances an open catalogue of aspects of the “foreign medium product” (n.b. not a very elegant phrase to my taste) that may be imitated or thematized: effect – “real or perceived” impression made “on its audiences”; surface – “immediately perceptible elements” thereof; structure – “formal elements on the micro or macro levels”; inherent qualities – e.g. “the spatial nature of sculpture or the temporal nature of music” (p. 25); context and content – intended as subject matter of narration or representation. Petermann makes use of selected semiotic terms and concepts, adopting the Saussurean duality of *signifiant* and *signifié* in a sign. She justly emphasizes the abstract nature of both as well as the non-identity of *signifié* and a referent. Most important for her general approach to music, as disclosed in the Conclusion, is Petermann’s assertion that the “referent need not be extrinsic to the sign system but can be intrinsic, yielding meaning that is self-referential” (p. 30). She adopts J.J. Nattiez’s distinction between the *poietic,*
esthesis and immanent levels of semiotic communication in order to show that musical novels result from both esthesis, as “interpretations of and responses to music” (p. 213) and poiesis, or the creative processes of text making.

In the first part Petermann interprets how the following eleven novels imitate the genre of jazz (and blues): Albert Murray’s Train Whistle Guitar, 1975; The Spyglass Tree, 1991; The Seven-League Boots, 1995; The Magic Keys, 2005; Michael Ondaatje’s Coming Through Slaughter, 1976, Xam Wilson Cartié’s Be-Bop, Re-Bop, 1987; Muse-Echo Blues, 1991; Toni Morrison’s Jazz, 1992; Christian Gailly’s Be-bop, 1995; Stanley Crouch’s Don’t the Moon Look Lonesome, 2000; and The Best of Jackson Payne by Jack Fuller (2000). Petermann focuses on the aesthetic and formal aspects of jazz, as imitated in these texts, rather than on its extramusical (political, social, racial) significance. Such an aesthetic interest in verbal jazz resounds well with the increasing attention paid to jazz and its stylistic and performative specificity in the current philosophical debate on music. Petermann distinguishes various levels of textual imitation of music according to the musical element involved: sound (rhythm and timbre – Chapter 2), structural patterns (riff, lick, chorus, greatest-hits album, call-and-response – Chapter 3) and the performance situation (Chapter 4). While adaptation strategies such as the use of gossip-style or second-person address to render the reading experience akin to the spontaneous and direct jazz audience interaction seem merely analogous to the imitated performative situation, the structural and rhythmic operations, as well as the “technique of motivic improvisation” (p. 134) permit a significant degree of substantial affinity with the imitated music itself.

Petermann’s chapters follow the overall method of introducing, first, the musical elements in their native context (in jazz and classical music technical terms) and, second, the strategies of their adaptation in prose. These include the use of poetic devices such as alliteration, rhyme, rhythm, meter and various ways of loosening the referential aspect of verbal structures in order to emphasize their sonic qualities. Now it is crucial to clarify that these emphatic operations on the prosodic and semantic level are not foreign to the medium of literature (if unusual, to such an extent, in prose) – in fact, they can be fully analyzed in terms proper to traditional
poetics. One is tempted to say that they constitute the *matter*, just as the physical sounds in standard cases of music that must be intentionally *formed* through the artistic process (B. Sève would say: altered) in order to become music (or its textual imitation, accordingly). What enable these devices to imitate music are their distinct functions within the novels. On most occasions, explicit references to music attune the reader’s attention and prepare her to perceive these devices as (imitations of) music rather than instances of poetic prose or poet’s novel. At times, this is a more complex matter, calling for a firmly justified interpretation of the text as a whole (for instance Cusk’s novel never mentions Bach’s *Goldberg Variations* and still is convincingly considered by Petermann as yet a further “literary variation” on this cycle).

The second part focuses on five novels that imitate a single masterpiece of baroque keyboard polyphony – Johann Sebastian Bach’s *Goldberg Variations* BWV 988. There are more novels, plays and films evoking Bach’s cycle, but the following five, however different in style and plot, derive from it their overall structure (with the exception of *Der Untergeher*) as well as many significant details: Nancy Huston’s *Les Variations Goldberg*, 1981 (English translation by Huston 1996); Thomas Bernhard’s *Der Untergeher*, 1983; Richard Powers’ *The Gold Bug Variations*, 1991; Gabriel Josipovici’s *Goldberg: Variations*, 2002; and Rachel Cusk’s *The Bradshaw Variations*, 2009. This asymmetrical approach (genre imitation *versus* imitation of a particular musical work) is by no means accidental, as it faithfully reflects the central role of the musical work as *opus perfectum et absolutum* in classical music contrasted with musical idioms, rules of improvisation and the predominance of audience interaction in jazz music. Despite the significant differences between these two musical traditions, Petermann highlights the similarities in literary techniques involved in their textual rendition. Chapter 5 analyzes the structural patterns in the *Goldberg*-Novels (theme and variations form, canon, numerical symmetry of the cycle’s architecture), and Chapter 6 considers the aspects of composition, performance, and reception as imitated by them. In her analyses she refers to tempo markings, and metric and tonal aspects of the “hypotext”, such as the minor key used in the variations XV, XXI and XXV, and
their textual counterparts, such as the “strong state of loss” on the diegetic level in Huston’s respective *variationes*.

If Petermann studies in detail the elements of music used and imitated in these texts, she emphasizes that the musical novel is “valuable in itself” (p.1) and interprets its musical “hypotexts” within the Genettian metaphor of palimpsest. Petermann’s approach to the aspects of the works relevant to her inquiry can be qualified as broadly formalist, matching the position her study takes on music, as she stresses “the intrinsic references of music within its own closed system, through the establishment of patterns, repetitions, breaches with conventions, etc., which make connections to other parts of the piece or to forms and patterns shared by other pieces of music” (p.213). Such a position is not arbitrary: as she acknowledges, Hanslick’s view on music (even if he cannot reasonably be “considered the first to make a scientific study of music” (p.2)) appealed particularly to the modernist writers, offering a stimulating paradigm to transgress. It is precisely the “anti-literary”, purely immanent conception of musical sense that motivates the modernist experiments with prose writing *more musico* (Joyce, Huxley). Petermann studies in depth the post-modern continuation of this line in contemporary fiction. On this account sense and aesthetic value are produced in two different ways in music and in literature. If text can successfully imitate music, the resulting musical prose has the capacity to broaden the scope of fiction to encompass both musical and literary modes of signification and beauty.

Hence, we return to the first defining characteristic of the musical novel: it “contains a musical presence not primarily on the level of content, but rather on that of form” (p.3 – italics J.C.) This presence is achieved most prominently by textual imitation rather than by intersemiotic juxtaposition (typical of the graphic novel, where words and images co-exist in print), as in the case of musical epigraphs which are considered a marginal phenomenon.
Much has been done in the past century to mitigate the uncritical usage of musical metaphors in literary criticism47, and Petermann chooses to be very clear on the point that being ‘musical’ does not mean for her that a novel qualified as such becomes music, nor even aspires to it. This sober assumption, even if cardinal, remains just an assumption of her work and should not be mistaken for its outcome. It cannot be verified on the basis of the study alone, as it necessarily touches upon what music really is – a question explicitly excluded from scrutiny by Petermann herself – and thus calls for a philosophical interpretation.

The present dissertation is one such attempt.

47 There is a dissenting positive account, which emphasises that a search for „appropriateness“ and „rigour“ misses the point of metaphors, which are a valuable tool of imaginative cognition, and should not be descarded, nor „critically regulated“ in order to become scientific. Quite the contrary, the more unusual a metaphor is, the more it can imaginatively show, providing thus valuable insight. Cf. E. Prieto, *Metaphor and Methodology in Word and Music Studies*, „Word and Music Studies“, 2002, t.4, pp. 49–67; E. Prieto, *Listening in: music, mind, and the modernist narrative*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 2002. Metaphors are also something inevitably inscribed in the very nature of musical hearing (cf. e.g. R. Scruton, *Musical Movement: A Reply to Budd*, „The British Journal of Aesthetics“, 2004, t.44, no 2, pp. 184–187.), and ineliminable from our ordinary and scientific discourses on music (Zangwill disputes the metaphorical nature of musical hearing itself, arguing – against Scruton and Levinson – that what we hear in music are not metaphorically intended movements, commotions or personas, but directly aesthetic properties of the musical soundstructures; we cannot, however, do without metaphors, if we want to speak of such aesthetic experiences, because they are ineffable; N. Zangwill, *Music, Emotion and Metaphor*, „Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism“, 2007; N. Zangwill, *Music, Metaphor and Aesthetic Concepts*, „Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism“, 2014; N. Zangwill, *Music and Aesthetic Reality. Formalism and the Limits of Description..., op. cit...*).
PART I. *Verbis litterisque scripta Musica*

An unapparent connection (harmonia) is stronger than an apparent one.

Heracl. fragm. B54

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music […] the object of the great *Anders-streben* of all art, of all that is artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities.

*All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.*

For while in all other kinds of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it.

Walter Pater⁴⁹

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Chapter 1. Music Beyond the Senses

Perhaps, said Kretschmar, it was music’s deepest wish not to be heard at all, nor even seen, nor yet felt; but only—if that were possible—in some Beyond, the other side of sense and sentiment, to be perceived and contemplated as pure mind, pure spirit.

*Doctor Faustus*, Chapter VIII


*Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus. Roman eines Romans*

Introduction

My task here is far from obvious: this introductory chapter is about *musica textualis*, a special case of inaudible music, of music Beyond the Senses. I shall try to show how music can be effectively present in prose and why we should consider seriously such cases as uncommon (perhaps) and extreme (for sure) cases of *music*, rather than merely linguistic descriptions thereof. In other words, I shall try to argue that we have no profound philosophical reasons to doubt that a number


51 Ibid., pp. 706–707. Italics in original, further emphasis on the words Realisierung and Exakhtheit added – J. C.
of volumes silently standing on the shelves of our libraries may contain some 
**extraordinary instantiations of the musical art**; ones that enter in significant 
causal and epistemic relations with standard cases of music.

From classical Antiquity throughout the Middle Ages what we usually call 
**Music** today – the **human art of audible sounds** – was philosophically considered, 
at best, as the last and **least important sphere of Music**, under the Boethian name 
of **musica instrumentalis**. The higher kinds of music, mentioned by Boethius in his 
*De institutione musica*\(^52\), but not treated there extensively (perhaps the other books 
were lost, but there is not much ground to believe this, probably he did not manage 
to write them before his execution in Pavia on the order of Theodoric c. 525/6\(^53\)) 
included holistically the harmony of the spheres and natural elements and seasons 
(\textit{musica mundana}\(^54\)), and the consonance of bodily and spiritual elements in us 
(\textit{musica humana}). This is why music was first and foremost considered science, as 
rigorous meditation of these inaudible harmonies, proportions of metaphysical 
order and the science of well arranging sounds according to these universal laws 
(\textit{scientia bene modulandi}). By consequence this learned speculative aspect becomes 
a necessary element of the definition of music in Augustine’s *De Musica*\(^55\). Guido 
d’Arezzo, if sensible to the impractical character of Boethian theory, maintains the 
strict distinction between \textit{musicus} (i.e. the philosopher, the theoretician) and \textit{cantor} 


\(^{54}\) This theory was a compilation of views held by antient authors, based on the lost *Introduction* of Nicomachus of Gerasa and *Harmonics* by Ptolemy, cf. J. Marenbon, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, Cambridge 2009, p. 303. It is symptomatic, that this *Companion* has no chapter dedicated to *De Mus.* at all and mentions the work briefly in the section consecrated to mathematical works (also not treated extensively).

(i.e. the practitioner of musica instrumentalis, or, in to-day terms: musician) in truly
delightful celebrated invective against the unlearned cantores:

Musicorum et cantorum magna est distantia,

isti dicunt, illi sciunt quae componit musica.

Nam qui facit, quod non sapit, diffinitur bestia.

These social aspects of the division of musical labor, and the privileged
position of the musicus over the cantor reflect the primordial fact, that for the people
of that time, as Fubini puts it:

La musica mundana è l’unica vera musica e gli altri tipi di musica lo
sono solamente di riflesso o nella misura in cui partecipano o ricordano
l’armonia del cosmo56.

[Musica mundana is the only true music, and other types of music are
music only as reflections thereof, or to the extent in which they
participate in or remind of the cosmic harmony].

The Pythagorean intellectualistic reduction of music to eternal proportion
of numbers dominates Western philosophy way into the 18th and 19th centuries
(if at this point it is already very distinct form music theory): music is interpreted
as the unconscious exercise of arithmetic (Leibniz) or metaphysics (Schopenhauer),
incorporating and prefiguring sensibly the invisible essence of things. This is, of
course, not to downplay the role of the ever more important “empiricist” current in
musical reflections, present there from Antiquity through all the epochs.

Music’s direct effects on the body are treated with suspicion within the
broader Platonic tradition, even if authors such as Aristotle’s pupil Aristoxenus of
Tarentum in 4th C. B.C. and the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara in the 1st C. B.C.
defended the crucial role of the musical ear. It is also striking that Europe’s
philosophy of music for about a thousand years was based on a theoretical vision
of the idealized music of the Greeks, that, in terms of musical practice, was at that
time in complete oblivion. Jacques Chailley insists on the fact that the musical

theory of Boethius, being compiled from the writings of the ancient authors had nothing to do with the actual musical practice of its own time, the Greek music being fallen into oblivion\textsuperscript{57}, not to mention the medieval and modern music. Sève, as we will see in a while, considers Pythagoreanism simply an error: a (philosophically influential) theory radically inadequate to its field.

1. The concrete turn: listen, first! then philosophize

Today things are different. What philosophers are primarily interested in is \textbf{the sounding practice of musicians} and our \textbf{sensitive experience} thereof. It is this practice and this experience that come first and constitute the valuable starting point for any considerable reflexion on music today. They provide, too, its ultimate criterion of adequacy. This is true both of the analytic and continental tradition. For us, being \textbf{audible}, seems a \textit{prima facie condition} on being \textbf{music} (cf. \textbf{definitions} by Levinson\textsuperscript{58} and Kania\textsuperscript{59}). For them, \textbf{the real music was essentially inaudible}. The \textbf{objects} in question \textbf{must}, therefore, be \textbf{different}\textsuperscript{60}.

While the “turn” to the sounding concrete of music is quite obviously the universally accepted option for the analytic philosophers (think of Levinson’s concatenationism as the theory of basic musical understanding), let us consider briefly two of its significant continental exponents: Vladimir Jankélévitch and Bernard Sève.

\hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{57} J. Chailley, \textit{Expliquer l’harmonie}, Editions d’Aujourd’hui 1985, pp. 23–24. apud B. Sève, \textit{L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe}, Seuil, Paris 2013, p. 49. Sève is very severe here, as he says that « la philosophie a été successivement victime de son asservissement à un discours de \textit{theorie de la musique}, celui du pythagorisme, qui s’est révélé stérile et stérilisant. […] Ce long asservissement volontaire et séparation s’expliquent par une double fascination : par le mathématisme et par le visible. L’œil et l’entendement mathématisant ont desservi l’oreille, et la philosophie s’en est rendue sourde » (p.47) and, further on : « Le discours philosophique sur la musique a été bloqué durant deux millénaires par le discours mort du pythagorisme » (p.49).

\textsuperscript{58} J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{60} This serious problem must be addressed, in order to exclude equivocation from the very core of the philosophical study of music. For further considerations see: \textit{On defining music, infra.}
Jankélévitch’s complex and rich musico-philosophical writings\textsuperscript{61} can be characterized by his manifest reluctance to the metaphysical philodoxy of music. Denouncing the misleading uses of metaphors and false parallels with rhetoric, Jankélévitch draws our attention to the nude musical act in its immediate sonic splendor. Being seduced by the other-worldly visions of music’s presumed hermetic meanings, we turn a deaf ear to its this-worldly immanent rewards. This apophatic attitude, symmetrical with his negative views in metaphysics, make his thought entirely subordinated to the sensual appreciation of music. First, the critical moment removes both the rationalist and obscurantist obstacles to the purity of perception. Second, the deictic\textsuperscript{62} moment draws the attention of the listener to what cannot be described\textsuperscript{63} and must be aurally experienced.

Sève’s position, in contrast to Jankélévitch’s musico-philosophical via negativa, offers some sound positive account on the nature of music through the concept of altération. He accepts fully the need of describing and conceptualizing our complex and rewarding interactions with music. What he has in common, however, with his radical compatriot, is the sense of profound discontinuity between what we can philosophically state about music and music itself. His remarkable book L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe reminds us that “the musical experience is beyond these pages [hors de ces pages]: it is in your ear, not before your eyes; perhaps you should [now] close


this book in order to (re-)listen to, say, the *Ninth Quartet* of Beethoven.”

Sève’s preliminary standpoint is well articulated: his philosophy must derive from the pre-existent musical facts and artworks and rely on their actual sensitive perception. For “for the art philosopher [...] the artistic object is always in the first place”:

La philosophie de l’art est toujours seconde par rapport aux inventions des artistes. Si les artistes n’avaient inventé ni formes ni objets, le philosophe de l’art n’aurait rien à penser. Les questions du philosophe de l’art proviennent de différentes sources ; certaines son issues d’une interrogation philosophique générale, ensuite appliquée aux objets et formes artistiques ; d’autres sont au contraire suscitées par ces formes et ces objets inventés par les artistes, formes et objets qui peuvent parfois sembler aussi surprenants et énigmatiques qu’un phénomène naturel, comme une éclipse […]

To sum up: philosophers of music “after the turn” reject speculation and (1) what they want to understand is the actual music. They privilege (2) the aesthetic experience thereof, which they assume to be essentially aural.

These two points, however, are correlated, but not equivalent.

2. Silent music

Now I shall consider one capital case – the case of silent music – that makes their interrelation challenging, because it responds to the first point, while escaping

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64 B. Sève, *L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe...*, op. cit., p. 17. Not surprisingly, at the very end, the reader will be once more reminded that the “beyond the book [le hors-livre], for this book, it’s music” and, once more, invited to “return [...] to the live experience of music: to sing, to listen, to play” Ibid., p. 330.


66 Ibid., pp. 18–19. The image of eclipse is a clear reference to Arist. in *Metaph.*, *Analit. Post.* et al. (passim).


68 „I was interested […] in listening to music as a sensuous experience that engages the man as a whole” A. Chećka-Gotkowcz, *Ucho i umysł*, słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2012, p. 27.

69 The other, apparently similar, but in fact completely different, would be that of organised sound structures made of inaudible frequencies.
the second. Silent music is something composed by acknowledged composers like Erwin Schulhoff, John Cage, Sir Malcolm Arnold or György Ligeti and performed by musicians in modern concert halls but, apparently, cannot be “heard” and is not made of sounds.

Silence in music

In fact, silence is not only a crucial element of any music but it is also its external condition. This truth, perhaps obvious to any reflexive music-lover, may yet seem paradoxical: if we define music as humanly organized sound, how can we admit as its constitutive element the radical opposite of sound – silence? Well, one may respond in Hegelian terms, interpreting silence as the Limit (die Grenze), the contradictory point where music is and is not at once, which constitutes its boundaries and thus is its necessary modal condition. Music, as organized sound, presupposes silence (negation of sound) and noise (negation of sonic organization).

I would like to emphasize that musical silence is (1) a matter of intentional hearing rather than physical absence of soundwaves; and if we concentrate on it separately (2) we can tell its peculiar aurally perceivable quality (depending on the acoustic space, presence or absence of the audience, background sounds and so forth). Furthermore (3) the musical signs that abstractly signify it – the rests – strictly speaking indicate the voice in question not to resound, which may result in silence as well as in harmonies produced thanks to the reverberation.

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70 Think also of some electronic and electroacoustic music using soundwaves out of the hearing spectrum. It is a different considerable case: non-audible humanly organised sound. This does not mean that this sound does not engage our sensorium; to the contrary: it is purposefully used in such a way as to elicit bodily reactions and perhaps thereby also emotional reactions (as in the case of very low frequencies inducing anxiety through the effect they have on our bodily tissues).

71 Cf. A. Chęćka-Gotkowcz, Ucho i umysł..., op. cit. Splendid first chapter „Wymiary ciszy” pp. 29-60. Sounds tend to silence – Barenboim to Edward Said. Silence is a structural principle of all actual musics - J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit.

72 For who does not define it so – the present argumentation may be well superfluous, for she understands music as unthinkable without silence.

73 On the same basis medieval Church music is not rightly considered linear; in fact, linearly produced sounds created complex consonances in virtue of the default considerable reverberation.
As Pascal Quignard\textsuperscript{74} underlines eloquently, the audiences’ silence, the intense sonic vacuum preceding the first chord to be played, is the performers’ prey. Anna Chęćka-Gotkowicz dedicates most significantly the first chapter of her excellent book on experiencing music (\textit{The Ear and the Mind}\textsuperscript{75}) to silence. She reflects with grand finesse (along with D. Barenboim, Gisèle Brelet\textsuperscript{76} and others\textsuperscript{77}) not only on the musicological and aesthetic aspects of musical silence, but also on its existential and metaphysical dimensions (in the broader prospective of the musical experience as a vanitative \textit{meditatio temporis} radicated in the natural evanescence of musical sounds\textsuperscript{78}).

Not only thinkers emphasize the indispensable character of silence for music. We mentioned already Barenboim’s reflection on the sound’s \textit{Sein zur Stille}, to paraphrase it with the musically transposed famous Heideggerian formula: sounds tend to silence and it is only the musician’s effort that maintains them in their ephemeral existence. This musical mirroring of existential questions is further developed according to the line of comparison between the semelfactive, irreversible constitution of a concert and of a human life. The cellist Mario Brunello consecrated a whole little book to the musical meditation of silence, the “amniotic liquid of music” as he likes to call it\textsuperscript{79}. He says:

\textsuperscript{74} P. Quignard, „La Haine de la musique“, op. cit., p. 269.
\textsuperscript{75} A. Chęćka-Gotkowicz, \textit{Ucho i umysł...}, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{76} „Music is born, develops and consummates in silence. The musical work, as all sounding things, extends between two sorts of silence, the silence of its birth and the silence of its accomplishment” G. Brelet, \textit{Musique et Silence}, „Revue Musicale“, 1946, no 200, p. 169. And further on: (p. 181) “the sounds have to die to give birth to the work of music”.
\textsuperscript{77} V. Jankélévitch, P. Quignard, B. Sève, S. Davies, J. Levinson, K. Lipka, R. Ingarden.
\textsuperscript{78} Note that it’s not by accident that the organ is the church instrument \textit{par excellence}: its sound is continuous, potentially prolongeable \textit{ad infinitum}, supported by flow of air coming from the bellows. The full biblical symbolism of wind and breath is at work here. And musically speaking this capacity of the organ is in continuity with purely vocal a cappella liturgical music of the Eastern Church. Think of the bourdon voice in church monody and the „continuous quality” of the psalmody with metaphysical space opening in the great pauses in the middle of the psalm verse.
\textsuperscript{79} M. Brunello, \textit{Silenzio}, Il Mulino, Bologna 2014. I say “musical meditation of silence” and not “meditation of musical silence” most consciously. Brunello’s text is designed to make us ruminating musically (in the musical way) on silence, both musical and extra-musical. Brunello’s book, at least in its explicit program expressed in
La musica fa ascoltare il silenzio, oltre che essere ascoltata in silenzio.

[Music makes you listen to the silence, apart from being listened to in silence].

Brunello argues that music, among other human truths\(^80\) intimately related to silence, is the modality which results the most successful of all in “organizing silence” (p.13). Even more importantly for our present argument, he affirms:

La musica addirittura del silenzio ne fa materia prima. Il silenzio che precede la prima nota e il silenzio dopo l’ultima sono indispensabili affinché la musica si rivelì ed esista. […] la musica degli uomini\(^81\) usa il silenzio, lo manipola, lo elabora, lo posiziona e ne decide la precisa durata. Il silenzio diventa una materia, o meglio un materiale, come la creta nelle mani dello scultore […] oppure […] come un colore nella tavolozza del pittore […]. Ma questa materia è silenzio. Non lo si può toccare o vedere e talvolta neanche sentire\(^82\).

[Music makes of silence its materia prima. The silence preceding the first note and the silence following the last one are indispensable for music to manifest itself and exist. […] the music of humans uses silence, manipulates it, elaborates it, positions it and decides its precise length. Silence becomes a matter, or better, a material, like clay in the sculptor’s hands […] or […] a color on the painter’s palette […]. But this matter is silence. You cannot touch it, nor see it, nor even, at times, even hear it].

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its *Premise* tends itself to the condition of *musica textualis*: “Ho immaginato di offrire un momento di «ascolto» piu che una lettura. Una serie di riflessioni «lente» che, come la musica, hanno bisogno di tempo. Il libro è suddiviso in quattro movimenti, de «ascoltare» come una Sonata: il primo movimento in forma sonata nella sua tipica struttura di esposizione, sviluppo, ripresa e coda, il secondo in forma di Lied, il terzo uno Scherzo, e un Finale con Tema e Variazioni. Come dire « il silenzio non si legge, si «ascolta» (p. 11).

\(^{80}\) This is the exact term he uses: *verità*.

\(^{81}\) Brunello repeats this epithet – music of the humans – with striking consistency, as if he had in mind some other musics, of which, though, he remains silent.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., pp. 14–15.
This passage seems a résumé of our considerations on silence up to this point, touching both on what I called the internal principle and external condition of music. I quote it therefore not because of its originality, but to show that these are not abstract constructions, but something essential to the practitioners of music: the author, like Barenboim, is a musician, not a philosopher, and it is his musical practice that he follows in his reflections.

Considering silence in the performed music Judkins\(^83\) distinguishes correctly the measured (noted as rests and breaths) from the unmeasured silences. The latter category comprises of silences (a) internal to a piece (such us the general rest, fermata, caesura, expressive un-noted silences and silences between the movements of larger forms) and those which (b) frame it. She underlines the articulating and framing function of the unmeasured silence (especially in Western classical music) and its eminent role in live performances. From a very different methodological perspective, she arrives at conclusions strikingly similar to Gisèle Brelet’s, when she acknowledges the role of musical silences in “actually enlarging our sense of time (echoing Christian Accaoui’s élargissement du présent) and our own existence”\(^84\). Roman Ingarden\(^85\) recognizes the crucial role of rests in the aesthetic experience of music and perhaps would agree with Brelet\(^86\) that it is in the dense moment of silence following the last chord that music is most fully present in the


\(^84\) “Sometimes a lack of sensory information – she writes most significantly – actually enhances our awareness of the passage or directedness of time, and even without sensory change or variation we still experience its passage (a phenomenon certainly crucial to appreciation of the repetitive, minimalist works of Steve Reich and Philip Glass). Music may be one of the only ways in which we truly engage the present, especially when musical time is crystallized in musical silence. [...] Consider the quality of the silences between verses of a carol or madrigal, or after the magnificent opening of the Bach D-minor organ toccata. These silences are musical silences, not ordinary silences, whose character is determined by the musical materials around them, their edges”. Ibid., p. 22.


act of synthetic recollection. We may conclude that silence, by no means less, and in some respects – more than sound, is a necessary musical element, and a standard ingredient in every composer’s palette.

But, suppose the composer chooses to limit himself only to this ingredient of his palette? Can there be a purely silent piece of music? What underlies this question is the conviction that, even if we accept silence as a full-blown ingredient of music, we do so only considering its interrelation with musical sounds. The problem is: what sort of interrelation? Do the musical sounds in question have to appear in the temporal arch of the performance or can they be suggested in other ways?

One possible solution is that of Andrew Kania⁸⁷, concentrating not on the material sensitive input, but on the intentional calibration⁸⁸ of aural attention we pay to it. If it is of the musical kind, broadly speaking, even complete silence will do as music: silence intended to be perceived as music. Now this is a crucial point to the whole edifice of our argumentation. If art in general often plays with metaphoric substitutions and transfers, making typically one perceivable form stand for some other entity, music embodies this paradigm in the purest form, as it is the art of substitution and equivalence of the non-identic. Repetition and variation (which equals repetition plus modification of the repeated) are the most rudimentary

⁸⁸ By calibration I mean shaping of the subject’s intentionality in order to make it perceive / experience so-and-so and such-and-such intentional objects. Intentional calibrators can be internal or external to the work, individual or over-individual, intended or implicit in underlying structures (contexts, languages, cultures). An art theory recurring to this concept analyses the works with respect to what do they make the subject perceive, how are they designed with regards to this function, how external factor influence its workings. This thought is obviously present in many works of criticism and scholarship, even if the term is not used explicitly. The theory of the Great Divide in music, for instance, is a theory which shows how the rise of the institution of the public concert hall changed perceptive paradigms (changed the poetics of reception), giving issue not only to new ways of appreciating music, but as well the rise of new musical forms and respective forms of understanding.
elements of music, which – to be sure, frequent also within other artforms – in music can well be the unique device of alteration⁸⁹.

There are a number of candidates for a silent piece of music. The most notorious is, of course, John Cage’s 4′33″, even if philosophers such as Davies and Kania tend not to regard it as a piece of music⁹⁰. Take, though, a more evident example: In futurum by Erwin Schulhoff (1919)⁹¹. It is the middle piece of a set of five piano miniatures entitled Fünf Pittoresken⁹², dedicated to the Dadaist painter George Groß (sic!) and preceded by a full quote from his 1914 text published in Neue Jugend in 1917⁹³. This severe social-satiric explosive intertext provides guidance for the interpretation of Schulhoff composition and its tone. Socio-political critical engagement, harshly attacking the bourgeois values and religion (cf. the blasphemous conclusive line of Grosz’s text) is combined with energetic unconventional, witty and caustically direct style. If the four surrounding pieces are stylizations of bourgeois dances (Tempos: I – Foxtrott, II – Ragtime, III – Zeitlos

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⁸⁹ I consciously construe a cluster of heterogenous ideas – that of Shklovsky and that of Sève – to point out to an untrivial affinity between them.

⁹⁰ S. Davies, John Cage’s 4′33″: Is it Music?, [in:] Themes in the Philosophy of Music, Oxford University Press, New York 2003. and A. Kania, Silent Music..., op. cit., p. 348. The latter argues that Cage did intend “the sounds audible at its performances not to be listened under traditional musical concepts”.

⁹¹ Consider some other problematic examples: Marche funèbre composée pour les funérailles d’un grand homme sourd, Alphonse Allais (1897); In futurum, Erwin Schulhoff (1919); Symphonie Monoton Silence, Yves Klein (1949); 4′33″, John Cage (1952); Chiroptera op. 75 Nr 6, Malcolm Arnold (1960); Three Bagatelles for David Tudor, György Ligeti (1961); 4′33″ No. 2, John Cage (1962).


[No Time], IV – One Step, V – Maxixe) – the middle silent one’s title (wordlessly) speaks for itself with quite merciless eloquence.
In sum: silence is not only a (1) **necessary condition of music** (2) its **full-blooded ingredient** but also (3) may be the **unique element** used in a number of non-identical compositions. And this all was said of concert-performed music as it appears in its audition.

Now, obviously, musical works have a range of non-audible formal properties (in the architectonic sense), describable in musicological analytical terms. More interestingly, some composers throughout the history of music formed their compositions intentionally in vision of these aspects. Consider the „Netherland tricks” such as to be found in Ockeghem’s music: question marks instead of musical key, chess-like or spiral canon notation, melodic palindromes, note-anagrams and ciphers for the composers’ or patron’s names (soggetto cavato in Josquin des Prez Missa Hercules Dux Ferrariae, B-A-C-H, F-E♭-C-B for Schubert, D-E♭-C-B for Shostakovich etc. and... H-E-A-E-Es / B-E-A-E-E♭).

The **non-audible is inherent to music** both as (a) **performance** and as (b) **composed structure**.

Having in mind the results of this discussion of silent music in the ear-centered context, I find it insightful and refreshing to **rethink music** in terms that situate it in a **relation to sound more subtle than mere physical conditio sine qua non**. If it is true that music universally is associated with the art of sounds (Tonkunst), it is also true that depending on this as a simple definitional feature is

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94 This identity is guaranteed by the different aesthetic and artistic properties of the works – Leibniz’s law – and could be questioned at best on extreme formalist grounds.

95 Levinson, following Gurney, insists that the actual attentive perception of music-quasi hearing - covers several seconds and is sufficient to the basic musical understanding. J. Levinson, Music in the moment, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1997, p. 70. This means that these properties are not audible, at least not necessarily audible, in the proper experience of music.

96 Among many other examples of the use of this motif, including a number of Bach’s own compositions, such as, most famously, the last unfinished contrapunctus of Die Kunst Der Fuge BWV 1080 and hundreds of other composers’ works, such as Liszt’s Prelude and Fugue on the name of Bach, Schumann’s Six Preludes and Fugues on the name of Bach or Schnittke’s Sonata quasi una fantasia – there is also bar 7 of my most humble arrangement of Joyce’s text (La ci darem la mano in FW) to be found in the Appendix to Chapter 5 – see for score and a recording p. 143 below.
not very illuminating. “The sounding” and “the audible” in music is only one part of the story. One that delights us frequently, one which modally conditions the aesthetics of music, certainly. But the other part of the story is also worth of being told and appreciated. My intentions are not secretly neo-Platonic; I do not want to promote anti-corporeal and anti-sensual prejudices against music which have a rich and colorful tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, the Middle Ages; Jankélévitch: *rancune contre la musique*, black magic, Sirens, temptation, illicit maneuvers, anti-intellectual powers; Quignard: *haine de musique*; Brelet: angelism and moralism). Neither do I want to stand for metaphysical speculations on music in the Jena style.

What I want, instead, is to **explore the potential of the elements of the musical machinery that are collocated beyond the reach of the physical ear**. I want to examine whether and on what conditions could they perform on their own, outside of the audible, embedded in some other material than sounds. And in this striving, surprisingly, I find an ally in Kania, as his definition relies no more on the physical presence of sounds but on the way they are intentionally heard[^97]. Most surprisingly, in the last section of his essay this distinguished philosopher advances a little marvelous piece of *musica textualis*. Let us cite the complete score of Kania’s *Composition 2009 #3*, as printed in his article: „Indicate a length of silence, using the usual cues with which you would signal the beginning & end of a single movement, song, etc. (The content of this work is the silence you frame, not any ambient noise)”[^98].

This verbal score[^99] is a very simple one, much simpler than, say, Virginia Woolf’s 1921 *String Quartet[^100]*, but also a highly determined one: it indicates exhaustively the musical features of the piece of music in question. Now, this score, fitting perfectly the contemporary critical concept of music, is also an **exquisite example of musica textualis**, namely, a verbal piece of music.

[^97]: Even though, in order to advance in the reasoning, one would substitute ‘hear’ with ‘perceive’, ‘attend to’ or some other broader qualification that wouldn’t presuppose the ear as the actual organ physically involved.


[^99]: Cf. S.P. Scher, *Thomas Mann’s ‘Verbal Score’: Adrian Leverkühn’s Symbolic Confession...*, op. cit.

Consider one legitimate objection: yes, it is a verbal determination of a piece of music, but it is so in virtue of being a performative instruction: the actions described are to be realized on stage as to produce a musical event. Only in virtue of this relation to a projected performance it is a true piece of music. Words used are a non-standard, but nonetheless perfectly adequate, equivalent of a musical score composed of what Ingarden dubbed the “imperative” symbols. Standard cases of musica textualis, however, involve no such relation to a musical performance; therefore, they are no real music.

Now, one way to address this point is to say, following Peter Kivy, that reading (some) prose is a one-person, silent performance. The object of the aesthetic experience is constituted in literature by the “inner-ear” act of reading; and this act is an execution of the text, intended as a long performance instruction (recipe). Now – if we share Scruton’s view that “Music belongs uniquely to the intentional sphere, and not to the material realm”, then we have no reason not to follow a text’s suggestion that it is to be interpreted more musico, that it commands the reader to perform it in his “inner ear” as music, just as in the standard cases it commands audible performances involving producing actual sounds. How this suggestion is to be realized, is a matter of systematic intermedial study and interpretation. The philosopher’s task is to recognize it as a condition for the real presence of music in a text.

3. Conclusion

In the previous parts of our reasoning we were forced to exclude some of the traditionally pre-determined materials of music, such as tone, sound and even silence from its enumerative definition. We agreed that it is rather the character of the perception involved that determines an experience of music as such;

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furthermore, following Ingarden, Scruton, Levinson, Sève and Kania\textsuperscript{104}, we escaped the trap of subjectivism by the introduction of the intentional clause\textsuperscript{105}. And now, I believe, we have no grounds to refuse the status of music to texts that function as instructions for musical experiences, even if silent ones and even if dealing with another artistic medium. Therefore, we allow to emerge in literature a concept symmetrical to program music and vocal music. Just as some musical sound structures are arranged as narrations and are intended to be performed and understood as such, some texts of prose are meant to be experienced as music and this feature is crucial to their interpretation as literature. They appear as compound, mixed forms, that combine music and literature in a way less evident than song or drama, but by no means: less real. We may quarrel on the precise nature of the interrelation of the heterogeneous elements involved, but as a starting point we should agree that the musical element in such cases of intermodal prose is not a mere representation: it is real, if silent, music.

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Just as with program music, serious doubts on its workings and true nature are permissible\textsuperscript{106}; the status of particular musical works is usually oscillating between pure and program music, or between different programs associated with the same sound structure. This instability within program music, corresponding to the common baroque practice of setting different texts to the same music, is also typical of musica textualis. At times, it is explicitly present as a direct suggestion (Quarles’s musicalization of fiction in Huxley, Mann’s Exaktheit realized within the ostensive union of music and life, of musical matter and narrative matter in Doktor

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit., B. Sève, L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit. and A. Kania, Silent Music..., op. cit.

\textsuperscript{105} The question of musical intentionality is further discussed in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{106} The extreme formalist will, for instance, disregard any program suggestions, even if explicitly given by the composer, following his general views on musical beauty and the perceptive attitudes it normatively demands.
Faustus, Iwaszkiewicz’s this short story of mine has a certain musical form – on his Martwa Pasieka...). These suggestions remain however sometimes unfulfilled, as ambiguous artistic mystifications, sometimes – as perhaps in the case of Martwa Pasieka – motivated in part politically. On other occasions no direct authorial suggestion, nor even a documentable intention are at stake; it is the text’s internal formation that gives rise to musical interpretations. Every time it happens it depends on the interpreter, on how convincing his reading is. Music history provides abundant examples of programs which come and go (withdrawn or restituted by the composers themselves), making every single candidate for program music a puzzle to solve in cautious interpretation. However, this instability and dubiousness does not harm at all the clarity of the concept of program music itself: it is perfectly understandable, even if never obviously and problemlessly applicable. The same can be stated of musica textualis, music knowledgeably perceivable in artistically arranged word structures alone.
Chapter 2. **Musica textualis. Remarks on Aesthetic Experience of Music in Prose**

Let me start with a quote from Jacobus of Liège (Jacques de Liège, 13-14th C.)

Non est enim musica generaliter sumpta de numero sonorum vel de sonis numeratis invicem comparatis solum, sed de numero rerum quaecumque simul collatarum, prout inter illas attendi potest quaedam habitudo cuiusdam proportionis, concordiae, ordinis vel connexionis, ut per harmonicam modulationem generaliter sumptam intelligatur habitudo sumpta, ut dictum est.

Et secundum hoc, **musica ad omnia extendere se videtur**.107

1. **Two levels of intentionality foregrounding music**

*Musica textualis* is music made of linguistic primary material. Like other musics, it organizes its material *more music*o and it requires a musical interpretation.108 It fits well some of the celebrated historical definitions of music (*ars bene movendi, ars bene modulandi, exercitium arithmeticae vel metaphysicae occultum se numerare nescientis animi, l'art du temps par excellence* etc.) with the only exclusion of those requiring necessarily that its primary material be the **physical sound** and its necessary mode of perception – **actual hearing**. This condition is typical of the most recent philosophy of music “after the turn”109 or of earlier approaches regarding cantus, cantilena but not musica. In contrast to these accounts, as Roger Scruton powerfully sustains: “**Music belongs uniquely to the**

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108 At least in terms of performance (even if limited to the act of reading for oneself) and appreciation. Critical interpretation naturally complements this set.

intentional sphere, and not to the material realm\textsuperscript{110}. He doesn’t mean to exclude sound from the reflection on music, but he emphasizes that all musical functions and values, if grounded in sounds, are of intentional nature. One may distinguish two levels of intentionality here: (1) the spontaneous structuring of sensations in larger shapes (aspect hearing\textsuperscript{111}) and (2) intentionality bound by the musical system of reference (for example: tonal devices governed by tensions and resolutions within a temporal span). Any higher levels of making sense musically necessarily presuppose at least these two levels of intentionality as a base. No music can be aesthetically experienced outside of this framework, even if sometimes our ear can be literally tricked into hearing music in purely verbal input, as relatively recent empirical research has shown\textsuperscript{112}.

We are all used to music that draws on air-vibrations within the hearing range of the human ear which we perceive as rhythmic, tonal, melodious, harmonic, legato, staccato, andante, vivace and so on. We are all used to music whose typical

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\begin{music}
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was, after it was presented in a recording loop, this:

The spoken phrase appeared to be sung. The researchers summarize their discovery saying that it is a “perceptual transformation effect, in which a spoken phrase comes to be heard as sung rather than spoken, simply as a result of repetition. This effect is not just one of interpretation, since listeners upon hearing several repetitions of the phrase sing it back with the pitches distorted so as to give rise to a well-formed melody” D. Deutsch, T. Henthorn, and R. Lapidis, \textit{Illusory transformation from speech to song}, „The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America”, 2011, t.129, no 4, pp. 2245–2252, emphasis mine - J.C. Originally described by Deutsch in 1995 and 2003. By interpretation here the authors mean some active process, as contrasted with immediate perception-as, which is the case here. For the recorded audio material to this illusion, see: deutsch.ucsd.edu/psychology/pages.php?i=212.

\textsuperscript{112} Cf. “this is no music to my ears” at a performance of Neumeyer-Ligeti’s \textit{Midsummer Night’s Dream}.

\textsuperscript{110} R. Scruton, „Understanding Music”, op. cit.. See also: P. Kivy, \textit{Authorial intention and the pure musical parameters}, [in:] Sounding Off, 2012, pp. 191–209..

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. the notions of Geastalt-Psychologie, Wittgenstein’s aspect perception, and experimental psychology of aural perception. The “speech to song illusion” discovered by Diana Deutsch in 1995 has been corroborated in empirical tests, and shows that subjects perceive a spoken phrase as sung, when it is repeated several times. What all the subjects tested heard in the end of the phrase: “The sounds as they appear to you are not only different from those that are really present, but they sometimes behave so strangely as to seem quite impossible”

\textsuperscript{112} Cf. “this is no music to my ears” at a performance of Neumeyer-Ligeti’s \textit{Midsummer Night’s Dream}. 

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examples – Beethoven’s symphonies and Schubert’s Lieder coexist here with more humble specimens such as Prince Ogiński’s Polonaises (some of which actually really grand) and even Andrew Lloyd Webber’s tunes, not to mention Lady Gaga – are all composed of these “intentional entities” such as modulations, developments and cadenzas to which people with amusia are famously deaf. We conceive of the eternal forms creatively indicated by geniuses like Mozart – as of types intended to produce delightful tokens (just think of the last night’s performance of Die Zauberflöte) which charm our senses and challenge our skill, intelligence and erudition. These tokens, of course, are such only in virtue of the intentional (on both levels) acts of musical hearing-as and hearing-for. Last, we all, presumably, are aware of the ways in which works of contemporary music such as Yves Klein’s Monotone-Silence Symphony (1949), Ligeti’s Atmospheres (1961) or Cage’s infamous Tacet 4’33 (1952) trouble us (un-)aesthetically and challenge our concepts. All these aspects support clearly the claim that musical objects and

113 These perceptual effects described from the aesthetic point of view by the philosophers I quote above can be innate and can be absent in pathological cases caused by cerebral lesions leading to amusia, that is: lack of musical aspect-hearing which is not due to loss of auditory capacity, but to the lack of musical ordering of the perceived aural stimuli, cf. O. Sacks, *Musicophilia: tales of music and the brain*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2007, 1st ed. This line of observations leads to hypotheses on musical culture-independent universals among which this “first level of intentionality” or aspect-ordering of stimuli seems to be well documented. This shows that music’s belonging to the intentional realm goes far beyond the conscious and will-dependent and is inscribed in the very mechanisms governing our sensorium, at a basic level.

114 We all accept the compound structure of the musical life including scores, performances, improvisations, performers, audiences, critics, institutions and means of mechanical reproduction. Some of us who are musicians know best that music in the first place means practice, pain and patience and a whole range of everyday choices and actions that shape the musicians’ body and mind throughout the years – instrumentalizing it without mercy; all for the sake of these precious performative momenta where music has its inexhaustibly ephemeral epiphanies – in aeternum. Chapter 5 discusses Antoni Libera’s novella whose protagonist Professor Plater makes his pupils hear Schumann’s Toccata in C major as a piece about these aspects of the pianist’s life; it has vital consequences for their respective fates, in quite an unexpected way, as you will see. And Anna Chęcka-Gotkowicz, philosopher and pianist from Gdańsk, in her book *Ear and the Mind* reflects with great philosophical refinement on the practical-existential aspects of the performer’s life. In her reflection they become, and rightly so, an integral part of the consideration of music, and not merely collateral, contingent, pragmatic, psychological aspects of the purportedly essentially musical in se. Cf. A. Chęcka-Gotkowicz, *Ucho i umysl...*, op. cit.
properties are intentional entities. Even if for many analytic ontologists of music, such as Levinson, musical works are abstract structures (non-intentional in the sense that they have existence independent of anybody’s psychical acts towards them), still these abstract structures are by their very nature directed to producing musical performances (which instantiate them). We perceive these instantiations intentionally; therefore, intentionality cannot be eliminated even from abstract-objectivist musical ontologies of this type. Only a true extreme Platonist or Pythagorean musical ontologist, happy to reject the idea of musical work’s creatibility and to see the „creative” process as an actual discovery of an eternal pattern or proportion, could do without intentional perception and intersubjective cognitive acts in his account of music\textsuperscript{115}.

Musical avant-gardes of the last century taught us to develop these musical intentionalities towards sound-, silence- and noise\textsuperscript{116}-events which at that time were not musical at all. They belonged to the domain of the unmusical to the ears of the previous generations (exactly in the way sound combinations indicated by Beethoven sounded in the first place unmusical to the classically attuned critics\textsuperscript{117}). Musicalized fiction seems to suggest a further and even more radical exploration of what can be the substratum of this sort of intentionality, of what becomes music in

\textsuperscript{115} He would do also without any „actual” („performed”) music.

\textsuperscript{116} The celebrated futurist inventor of a notation and of special instruments for ‘intonating noises’ (he called them intonarumori) was Luigi Russolo in his L’arte dei rumori (1913). Concrete and tape music expanded this palette of noises further by registered sounds of the till-then-extramusical-life, making its bits the altered substratum of musical formation (musicalization).

\textsuperscript{117} Support can be found in numerous quotes from the reviews. Let me quote a longer passage that appeared in a book by Oulibicheff in the thirties of the 19th C.: “Est-ce de la musique, oui ou non? Si l’on me répondait par l’affirmative, je dirais, comme M. Fétis le dit avec trop de sévérité, peut-être, des oeuvres d’un compositeur célèbre, que cela n’appartient point à l’art que j’ai l’habitude de considérer comme la musique” (p.209). The context of this severe judgment is the transition between third and fourth movements of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. Oulibicheff writes: “Il ne s’agit plus, comme dans les exemples qui précèdent, de quelques notes rapides qui vous égratignent en passant et laissent l’oreille dans le doute sur l’origine de la sensation désagréable qu’elle a éprouvée. Ici, vous avez un fragment de 44 mesures, où le compositeur a cru devoir suspendre l’Habeas corpus [emphasis in the original text – J.C.] de la musique, en la dépourvant de tout ce qui pourrait ressembler à de la mélodie, à de l’harmonie et à un rythme quelconque” (p.207). Quoted from: A. Oulibicheff, 

our aesthetic experience. By imitating musical devices, that is: **ways of structuring the raw material within a work of a temporal art** – these works are provocative, disturbing and unusual. They make us uncertain of where do they actually belong.

2. Berio: a piece of music made of linguistic material

Now let us turn to a borderline example of music made of linguistic primary material. This one, strangely enough, is not contained in a book, nor it could possibly be written down. Luciano Berio’s *Thema (Omaggio a Joyce)* (1958) [sound example\(^{118}\)] is a piece of music for tape. What is special about it is that it is composed uniquely from linguistic material (musically rearranged and recorded). Berio writes that he “interpreted musically a reading of the text by Joyce, elaborating the polyphonic intent that characterizes the eleventh chapter of *Ulysses*, (entitled “The Sirens” and dedicated to music) […]”. Further on in his *Composer’s Notice* on the piece he says: “in this work I haven’t used electronically generated sounds: the sole sonic source consists of the recordings of Cathy Barberian’s voice reading the beginning of the chapter:

Con esso ho cercato di interpretare musicalmente una lettura del testo di Joyce sviluppando l’intento polifonico che caratterizza l’undicesimo capitolo dell’*Ulysses* (intitolato «Sirens» e dedicato alla musica), la cui tecnica narrativa fu suggerita allo scrittore da una nota procedura della musica polifonica: *fuga per canonem*. In questo lavoro non ho utilizzato suoni prodotti elettronicamente: l’unica sorgente sonora consiste nelle registrazioni della voce di Cathy Berberian che legge l’inizio dell’undicesimo capitolo dell’*Ulysses*. Il testo viene letto non solo nella versione originale inglese, ma anche nella traduzione italiana (Montale) e in quella francese (Joyce e Larbaud)\(^{119}\).

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The key to this piece is “interpretare musicalmente” – which is much more than “set to music” (and even “mere” setting text to music usually is mistaken for something less intermedially and ontologically complicated and profound than it really is\textsuperscript{120}). The ultimate scope of Berio’s “interpretation” is to make us experience Joyce’s text as music.

Which devices does he use in order to achieve this artistic objective? For sure the \textit{basic input is verbal text} read aloud, not the kind of sound produced by violins. It had to receive special treatment, refinement, in order to ascend to the status of musical material\textsuperscript{121}, though not \textit{mode}, nor \textit{tone}, nor \textit{pitch}, nor \textit{harmonic function}. Still, it remains the sole sound-source throughout the whole piece. And it was not deformed to the extent to become in all moments completely illegible in its linguistic, connotational aspect, nor, clearly, cut off from its literary matrix.

Berio is an established contemporary composer, he uses an established musical technique (that of magnetic tape and electroacoustically elaborated recorded material – the voice of Cathy Barberian reading Joyce) and the resulting phenomenon is sonorous. These features make his piece an acceptable and relatively uncontroversial specimen of the musical art in its present-day form, even though it is composed of linguistic material and not of tones or chords. Berio sees the importance of the “experience of electronic music […] not in the discovery of new sounds, but in the possibility that such an experience offers to the composer to extend the field of sonic phenomena and to integrate them with the musical thought; \textit{to overcome, thus, the dualistic conception of musical material}”\textsuperscript{122}.


\textsuperscript{121} Bernard Sève would call this process \textit{altération}.

\textsuperscript{122} Transl. mine – J.C., cf. the original quote in broader context:
Se l’esperienza della musica elettronica è importante, come credo, il suo significato non risiede tanto nella scoperta di nuovi suoni quanto nella possibilità che tale esperienza offre al compositore \textit{di estendere il campo dei fenomeni sonori e di integrarli al pensiero musicale; di superare, quindi, la concezione dualistica del materiale musicale}. Così come il linguaggio non è scindibile in parole e concetti, ma è in realtà un sistema di

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I take ‘sonic’ here to refer the “musical sound”, equivalent of “tone” within the earlier musical paradigms; this is because speech in itself obviously is a sonic phenomenon already, without any need for the “field of sonic phenomena” to be extended in order to include it. There is, however, an alternative reading, in which this would mean “merely sonic” phenomena, as opposed to sounds as the material support of the signifiant, semiotically speaking. This would amount to saying: by the operation performed by Berio, he draws back the attention from these sounds regarded as candidates for linguistic apprehension and ascribes them to the field of the sonic for its own sake. Music, according to this second reading, would be a device that repristinates this immediate sonic value of sounds that became the matter of signs of something else (that is: they became phonemes and words). Both readings are valuable for our reasonings, the first pointing directly to a possibility of a transformative performance of a literary text, which transcarnates its original “linguistic body” into a “musical body”.

In the case of musical novels or musicalized fictions the situation is different. The thought that they could, in part, be genuine instantiations of the musical art is so at odds with common sense that it is consistently dismissed by the very people who constantly provide evidence in favor of it in their studies. Word and music scholars following the influential writings of Scher and Brown see it as a menace to scientific rigor of their emerging discipline. This is why after having convincingly shown how musical technique can be imitated in a piece of prose, and how genuinely musical elements are brought to the text in order to emerge as such within the reading experience intended by them as constitutive for the

"simboli arbitrari, attraverso il quale noi diamo una forma determinata al nostro modo di essere nel mondo, anche la musica non è fatta solo di note e di relazioni convenzionali tra le note, ma si identifica piuttosto con il nostro modo di scegliere, dare forma e mettere in relazione tra loro certi aspetti del continuum sonoro. Versi, prosodia, rime non sono più assicurazione di poesia di quanto le note scritte siano assicurazione di musica. Spesso si trova più poesia nella prosa che nella poesia stessa e più musica nel linguaggio parlato e nel rumore che nei suoni musicali convenzionali."

E. Petermann, *The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in Contemporary Fiction...*, op. cit., for instance, says that the musical novel “contains a musical presence not primarily on the level of content, but rather on that of form”, p.3 – italics J.C.
musicalization to function… they feel obliged to sustain that the works displaying these features “clearly do not become music”\textsuperscript{124}. The “quasi-material” impossibility of novels being, in part, music is re-affirmed on every occasion\textsuperscript{125}. Now the aim of the present thesis to convince its Reader that this is all but self-evident and that these declarations should not discourage us from taking the idea of music really being made within prose as a live hypothesis in William James’s terms\textsuperscript{126}.

What really repels us from accepting such a possibility is that novels (purportedly) lack sound regarded primarily as sound (1), which would be a necessary ingredient of all genuine music (2) and that they are taken not to be performative (3) nor musically-hearable (4). When these obstacles are overcome, which I have tried to achieve in the argument from silent music presented in the Chapter Music Beyond the Senses, we are left with a mere methodological axiom. It may be reasonable to keep it as such for pragmatic methodological reasons, but it would be illegitimate to extend its scope beyond what it is: a purely nominalist and arbitrary assumption.

Going back to Berio’s example I want to ask whether the same artistic objective he realized with his piece (namely: to make us experience “linguistic raw material” “musically arranged” as “music”) could ever be achieved with means different from the ones he used. In our particular case: with the means the novelist disposes of. This question is perfectly parallel to the one emerging in the previous chapter, regarding musical silence. The pianist’s gestures on stage, the opening and closing of the instrument’s lid, the presence of the audience – they suffice to make music in silence, if we agree that Cage’s silent compositions are music and not metamusical performance\textsuperscript{127}. Can this be achieved with other gestures, or with a

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} The author on most occasions is at best established as a writer, not a composer (with some exceptions, such as Anthony Burgess). They claim, at times, that they use established musical techniques in order to compose their pieces, but these programmatic statements are taken with extreme caution. On the other hand, though, these practices are studied in detail with increasing precision.

\textsuperscript{126} W. James, The Will to Believe. [in:] The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1979.

\textsuperscript{127} We are not necessarily bound to accept Cage’s explanations to the effect that it is not silence, but the audience-generated sounds which constitute the musical sound of the piece.
text? Joseph M. Ortiz has recently convincingly showed, how this is done in Shakespeare, how “At certain, intriguing moments he [Shakespeare – J.C.] experiments by subjecting poetic verse to the structures of musical time, effectively prompting his audience to hear silence as both scripted and intentional”128. In these passages of Shakespearian verse, we not only read about rests, but experience the silence they make within a compound sign-structure of partly iconic character.

I believe that a work that would make us experience itself or its parts as fugal polyphony or sonata-form development or, even better, that would generate some new musical form, perhaps previously unheard of within the “official” history of music, would thereby succeed in being music in the strongest sense available. This is the ultimate meter of Sèvres we have at our disposal here simply because alternating (to say it again with Sève129) the raw material and musicalizing it is nothing less than making music. Musicalization is not exclusive to literature; it is the essential and indispensable mechanism of all music, from the most elementary instantiations of it such as tribal drumming, where by repetition crude percussive sounds are being patterned and thus become music.

3. Intermedial Imitation Theory as Part of a Historical Dialectics

Werner Wolf130 and, more recently, Emily Petermann131 have insisted on a well-articulated analysis of music in literature phenomena within prose-fiction in

129 « La première altération est celle de l’écoute du son selon un certain mode intentionnel » B. Sève, L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit., p. 171.
terms of intermediality. This theory emerges on the grounds of semiotics and intertextuality. It is, therefore, profoundly indebted with the 20th Century systematic reflections on language and literature (and art and culture) as sign-systems and the general linguistic and philosophical accounts of signification advanced by Charles Sanders Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure. Semiotics and semiology as theoretical approaches to literature (Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, Julia Kristeva) coexist in the rich constellation of Literary Theories, notably that of Russian formalism (Viktor Shklovsky, Boris Eichenbaum, Jurij Tynianow), structuralism (de Saussure, Vladimir Propp, Jan Mukařovský, Roman Jakobson, Jurij Lotman) and post-structuralism (Barthes again, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Kristeva, François Lyotard). They all shaped not only critical discourses and literary studies of our times (remodeling thus the condition of the humanities in general) but are equally responsible for some deeply rooted individual lector’s attitudes, which many of us share. In this way our basic, immediate, original experience of reading is (at least to some significant extent) flavoured and conditioned by this immense conceptual background and formative context. I have always felt reluctant to generalizations typical of humanistic syntheses (and, in particular, within the history of ideas), for the simple reason that the everyday radical differentiation of attitudes among living people seemed to disprove all attempt at any unifying subsumptions and categorizations. And yet… Let me indulge for a while in such a dubious activity.

The overall condition of the humanities underlying Wolf’s and Petermann’s model of intermediality can be seen as a paradoxical mélange of contrasting traits I would be tempted to sketch as a spiral of dialectic movements springing from the great 19th Century opposition of Positivism and Romanticism, which foregrounded the further development of Parnassism and Symbolism. If Positivism advanced the scientific (empirical), genetic and historical method, embracing classical logic and

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132 1919 – (V. Shklovsky and A. Berlina, Art, as Device, „Poetics Today”, 2015, t.36, no 3, pp. 151–174.)
133 The best, most intelligently written and comprehensive manual of 20th C. Literary Theory I know is without any doubt A. Burzyńska and M.P. Markowski, Teorie literatury XX wieku. Podręcznik, Znak, Kraków 2007.
definition of truth, biographism, intentionalism, contextualism, ‘Life and Works’ study paradigm and social progress – Romanticism emphasized elements of irrationalism, individualism, inspired creationism, spiritualism, departing from classical forms and (in epistemology): proclaiming preference for the invisible, mysterious, intuitive “truth of the heart”, superior to the banal evidence at disposition of the scientist.134

Now this aggregation of opposite or contrasting tendencies, models and world-views was redistributed throughout the 20th Century into new dynamic constellations. In a thorough approximation, we could sketch its contrasting elements in the following points:

1. On the one hand: theoretical speculation on deep structure and mechanisms of language in general offering universal interpretative paradigms for the study of language artforms and other forms of art and communication in culture. Expansion of the linguistic (and literary) paradigm into non-verbal aspects of human activity and creativity: research of common grounds or of assimilation of non-verbal sign-systems to the linguistic paradigm and expansion of the semiotic analysis outside of the linguistic realm (structuralism, post-structuralism, semiotics, Theory).

2. On the other hand: philosophy of ordinary language based on common sense and analysis of actual ways of using words giving raise to the speech act theory (Austin, Searle, Grice, Wierzbicka); in a way a mirroring reply to interpreting prima facie non-linguistic situations through a theoretical subsumption under the linguistic models of investigation, characteristic of (1) above, by showing that many linguistic situations are themselves actions operated through utterances and within cultural conventions, rather than instances of expressing logical judgments, connotations and denoting objects.

134 Within the context of Polish Romanticism a programmatic text, a poem interpreted often as an implicit manifesto of this spiritual-aesthetic formation is Mickiewicz’s ballad Romantyczność: “Czucie i wiara silniej mówi do mnie / Niż mędrcza szkiełko i oko. […] Miej serce i patrzaj w serce!” A. Mickiewicz, Romantyczność, Vilnius 1822.
3. Harsh opposition within the Philosophy of Music against assimilating music to language\textsuperscript{135} (a commonplace from Rousseau and the 18-19\textsuperscript{th} C. \textit{Tonsprache}\textsuperscript{136}) also as a reaction to this expansion; the corresponding debate on the musical meaning and the meaning of music\textsuperscript{137}; theoretical grounding of the traditional romantic affirmations of the musically ineffable\textsuperscript{138} and the development of formalist variants of musical ineffabilism.

4. Skepticism on the auctorial intentions’ determining role for the meaning of an artwork\textsuperscript{139} coming together with (a) or extreme désintéressement in its social, economic, political etc. context and content, as irrelevant for the art’s nature (b) or, on the other extreme, reducing all specifically artistic values, including the very idea of formalism, to an expression of historico-political dynamics, whose one of the many ways of sedimentation are artistic meanings and values, which they foreground. (Ironically enough the first option, stemming from Russian formalism, was largely defended within the so called \textit{New Criticism} in literature, whereas \textit{New Musicology} incarnates the second.

\textsuperscript{135} It reflects, in new terms, the old debate dating from the Antiquity: the disagreement on the theory of ethos, in which Damon and Plato and the Stoics ascribed to \textit{nomoi} moral characters and according paidaetic impact, contrasted by Philodemus of Gadara who claimed that music was alogos and neither represented moral characters, nor had the power to shape them in the auditorium.

\textsuperscript{136} Its practical workings within Baroque music as a (lost for us) way of communicating meanings through sound figures (within the framework of the \textit{Affektenlehre}) are well illustrated in an approachable, divulgative way by N. Harmoncourt, \textit{Musik als Klangrede: Wege zu einem neuen Musikverständnis.}, Bärenreiter, Kassel 2014, 7. Aufl.

\textsuperscript{137} In the introductive remarks I already mentioned some most valuable studies of these problems: K. Guzczalski, \textit{Znaczenie muzyki. Znaczenia w muzyce...}, op. cit. For a more concise argument against theorizing music as language, see: K. Guzczalski, „O niejęzykowym charakterze muzyki”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{138} Wittgenstein, Jankélévitch, Zangwill. But the notion of the ineffable in this context – as the quality of aesthetic ideas, which “no language can fully reach and make understandable” is to be found in Kant, as well: “Nun behaupte ich, dieses Prinzip sei nichts anders, als das Vermögen der Darstellung ästhetischer Ideen; unter einer ästhetischen Idee aber verstehe ich diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch irgend ein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. \textit{Begriff} adäquat sein kann, die folglich keine Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann” I. Kant, \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, ed by. G. Lehmann, Reclam, Stuttgart 2004, p. 249 §49.

\textsuperscript{139} Cf. the famous essay on the Intentional fallacy W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley, \textit{The Intentional Fallacy}, „The Sewanee Review”, 1945, t.54, no 3, pp. 468–488.
Even from this very general and institutional point of view it is hard not to see in this last point a striking expression of that dialectical movement which always paints as more attractive the less obvious, or natural option – it is always the otherness that attracts; and so for literary criticism it was more rewarding to tend into the direction of the pure form where blatantly contents are to dealt with on virtually every level, whence theorists of the allegedly pure formal art found it challenging to re-interpret it politically, sexually, economically and in all possible narrative and dramatic directions escaping the traditional formalist Schenkerian analysis. Both poles, if regarded from some distance, seem historical incarnations in terms of our age and our intellectual fashions of the constant and epoch-independent factor characterizing art: the tension between form and matter; universal and particular; eternal and temporal; circular and linear; recurrent and semelfactive. This tension, articulated along the lines of these elementary pairs of oppositions provides a tempting way to conceive of all art (in general) and to conduce fruitful analyses of its works (in particular). Art, in this picture, is an ever lasting, and ever recreated striving to annihilate these antitheses without reducing one of the coupled elements to the other. A last couple of antithetic elements to be mentioned here is the following:

5. Distrust of all systematic truth when it comes to interpreting literature’s nature, its essential mechanisms and values as a commonplace. More in general: distrust of any form of essentialism. Deconstruction of essences in terms of showing them as structures exercising politico-institutional disciplining power. A model which becomes itself a new dogmatic ground to which any possible otherness can be, at times forcibly, reduced. 140

6. The deconstruction of this very reduction as (1) politically motivated and politically powerful itself, and as (2) essentialist itself. Saying that, for instance, Absolute music is just an expression and enforcement of a certain socioeconomical formation, and that talk of “pure musical beauty” only

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140 Cf. philosopher’s favorite prey: Susan McClary’s “sexual politics in classical music” in her interpretation of the *Brandenburg Concertos* BWV 1046-1051.
conserves this oppressive formation is just as essentialist, as any aesthetic essentialism. It’s just power, sex and politics which become the new arché. Such a paradigm is as well a totalizing structure, excercising no less violence, than the previous paradigms it denounces as oppressive.

7. A possible synthetic solution, admitting polyphony of discourses, a complimentarity of explanations. What emerges as historical, extramusically determined and determinating, can also be analyzed and lived for the new genuine essences it gives issue to. Antiessentialism, according to this position, ceases to be a genuine anthithesis of essentialism. Both paradigms provide insights and increase knowledge, but do not invalidate one another.\textsuperscript{141}

The reflexion on intertextuality developed by Julia Kristeva, Mikhail Bachtin, Roland Barthes and Gérard Genette grounds the intermedial typology in the form proposed by Wolf and recently restated by Petermann, with some adjustments (her new model of intermediality, instead of overt/covert intermediality she prefers to speak, respectively, of multimediality and intermediality proper). I recognize their substantial methodological achievement, as the distinctions and terms they propose have a number of advantages: (1) they are logically coherent (unlike some dubious distinctions made by other authors on earlier stages of the Word and Music quest for typology); (2) they are both: (a) easily and usefully applicable to analyses of various musicalized texts and (b) provide an “open-source” amendable framework for more general considerations and therefore can ground philosophical reflections. Self- and meta- referentiality, manifest in some of the intermedial phenomena discussed, gets elucidated by the more general relations observable between the idealized types of media relations their theories describe. This clarity, coherence and both pragmatic and theoretical adjustability of their framework has to be acknowledged and praised in the first place. Two further merits are: first – the heuristic and non-normative imposition of their research. Namely: even if they

\textsuperscript{141} Analogously to the possible coexistence of scientific naturalism and religious spiritualism; both paradigms offer tools of reduction to explain „the other side” but can be seen as complimentary and mutually enriching, giving access to distinct ways of experiencing the world.
invest a great deal of energy in theorizing, as especially Wolf does, they tend not to impose their framework as the only one justified or absolute. Instead, they conceive of it as of a toolbox of handy devices, which aim at clarity of thought, without any need to do violence to the very often ambiguous, non-conclusive and utterly unclear status of the works they typically deal with; this helps to eliminate confusion and equivocation in exposition, without imposing any sort of constraints on the complex reality they apply to. The second merit is that their model of intermediality integrates the broader framework of multi-inter- and intra-medial relations, covering the earlier reflexions on intertextuality. It is, though, articulated in semiotic terms and focused on what Petermann calls quite inelegantly ‘media-products’. This is, of course one more theoretic duel, as precisely intertextuality has the same potential of assimilating word and music interrelations through the semiotic definition of text\textsuperscript{142}.

4. Musicalization in fiction

Let us now briefly examine the sorts of experiences some musicalized literature could elicit. For the purpose of the present consideration I let aside Wolf-Petermann’s typology in the respect that it classifies musicalization (or literary imitation of musical elements) as a case of covert intermediality (or intermediality proper) excluding thereby cases of what they call multimediality. This makes sense from their perspective concentrated on the poietic aspect (and still, I believe, is ultimately untenable). We are now concerned with the aesthetic aspect, our question

\textsuperscript{142} It is a converse methodological option: instead of making intertextuality a subspecies of intermediality (namely: intramediality within the textual medium), some authors extend intertextuality to cover the field defined by Wolf-Petermann and others as intermediality, by applying a broad notion of text, appliable outside linguistic production, to the so called „texts of culture“. This is the strategy of Riffatterre and others, in Poland applied, for instance, by Violetta Kostka. In her studies she analyses examples of thus intended „intertextuality“ in the compositions of Paweł Szymański. The object of her research are no text-music relations, but music-music interrelations (musical quotations, allusions, variations, pastiches etc.) as a key feature of this composer’s style.
is: how do we actually (and could potentially!) experience these texts while reading them for their beauty, rather than any other values they may be bearers of.

Take Libera’s *Toccata* (See Chapter 4). If seen as a multimedial score – this novella in order to be appreciated to the full would require the reader to hear the notated motives from Schumann’s Toccata op. 7 where they are introduced, repeated and transformed (not always using musical notation, as my analyses show) and as such are decisive for the most salient quality of the overall reading experience. There are more texts including intersemiotic quotes as their constitutive elements (Kuncewiczowa\(^{143}\), Kundera, Joyce…). If most can be reasonably taken to require some sort of internal vocalisation for the Varesian “inner ear”, it is open to debate what other roles can they assume. This sort of experiences would be closest to what Berio had done on tape – the difference is that the musical sounds would occur and enter with the words in a refined interplay in our musical imagination.

But music, at least before the advent of *la musique concrete*, was not only conceptually linked to the cosmic and metaphysical harmonious structures, but was seen as a rigorous order for temporal experience. It traditionally developed in the

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\(^{143}\) Kuncewiczowa’s 1936 novel *Cudzoziemka* [*The Foreigner*, English transl. published under the title *Stranger* New York City, 1945] is an absolute masterpiece of musico-literary advanced aesthetic entwinement in pre-war Polish prose. The two main recurrent musical intertexts are Schumann’s Lied *Ich grolle nicht*, which in its last musical return on the novel’s charts produces something akin to an emotional breakdown in the reader; and the final rondo of Brahms’ *Violin Concerto*. This extatic piece, in the several notes of the main motive, is key to the protagonist’s tormented biography. The first four bars of are reported in moments of extreme tension, in musical notation integrating verbal text. This novel would without any doubt merit an entire chapter in this dissertation; let me limit here just to the observation, that she introduces an innovative device of musicalization, namely, apart from numerous and far from banal, standarized descriptions of musical practice and performance, music possesses violently Róża’s imagination. The most powerful verbal music passage of the novel is an imaginary performance, heard in the violinist’s inner ear and experienced with passion. It is presented from the performer’s perspective, Róża is the soloist dialoguing with the tutti of the „Moonlight orchestra directed by Brahms” (p. 118), which continues to play after she failed, exhausted by the final *Allegro ma non troppo*, and drew down her violin. The whole imaginary fervent performance is extinguished in desintegrating silence, which is directly present within the lines of Kuncewiczowa’s prose. This silence is a genuinely musical silence. Her unloved husband unexpectedly enters. A silent scene of sexual violence immediately follows. M. Kuncewiczowa, *Cudzoziemka*, [1936], Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1995.
word-music realm of vocality, gradually achieving a major degree of medial “purity” typical of Western Tonkunst around 1800. If the word part could have got eliminated by instrumental substitutions of vocal voices gradually gaining independence from their origin, why would it be impossible to conceive of such a combinatorics machina musicae applied to unsung texts? At least a vast array of values traditionally appreciated in artistic music could possibly emerge on the surface of the pitch-deprived worded solo voice of the aoid or maybe a Bachtinian polyphony of voices staged within the comprehensive reading act. Many formal textual devices could be experienced in this musical fashion, with no actual sound imagination or only with a hint of it.\footnote{Just like a string quartet attended to as to pure music rather than as a conversation of four voices including imagining the points of the quarrel.}

I would like us to reflect upon the sort of experiences musicalized prose can lead to, with a special emphasis on their aesthetic moments. This shift of attention towards the aesthetic experience is not by itself incompatible with what Wolf and Petermann focus on. Quite the contrary, they both emphasize and cherish the role of the interpretation and its subject – the (‘musical’) reader. Signification, the basic mechanism studied by all semiotics, has always to do with an act of interpretation, by the receiver, within a context. (Cf. Jakobson’s famous model of communication). It is in this act that all signification takes place and whereby ultimately all musical fiction is given. Seemingly a lot can be said on the text from a third-person “objective” perspective, that is, whether, for instance, the layer of signifiers contains or not the typical symbols of a foreign medium, satisfying Wolf’s definitions of overt and covert intermediality or Petermann’s definition of multimediality “in which the typical signifiers of more than one medium are physically present”\footnote{E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit., p. 12n.}. This position seems to me a categorial mistake: allographic arts (Cf. N. Goodman, even if I do not endorse the whole theory\footnote{N. Goodman, Languages of art. An approach to a theory of symbols, Hackett, Indianapolis 1988, Sixth Ed., pp. 113–116.}) cannot be
“materially present” because their presence is not “material” unless actualized in an act of interpretation of their “score”; the same seems to apply to the semiotic way of putting it, as there are no “signifiers in nature”. The example Petermann makes is even more striking: “Similarly placed, but with rather different implications, Gabriel Josipovici’s Goldberg: Variations employs a stylized musical stave, although without musical notes, to mark the beginning of each chapter in the novel. By using musical signs rather than textual means, these examples illustrate the phenomenon of multimediality, in which the typical signifiers of more than one medium are physically present”147. This approach has to be criticized as naïve and superficial. The very phrase “typical signifiers” as “materially present” is deeply flawed, because it implies that signifiers (Saussurean signifiants) are material concrete objects that can be placed in a work; this is false. Petermann is not unaware of the abstract nature of Saussurean signifiers (cf. her own remark that “The signifier is not material or concrete, does not consist of the actual acoustic properties of a spoken word”148). One cannot, therefore, determine whether a certain quantity of ink on a page shaped as a musical stave is a genuine musical signifier or not, without determining the code within which it is used and its context. The thesis that the mere occurrence of some typically musical characters in print can alone determine it as a case of multimediality is therefore arbitrary. Everything depends on the way these characters are to be interpreted, by whom and on what basis; only in such a framework can one decide, whether multimediality has been achieved or not. These remarks are valid for the allographic arts. When it comes to autographic arts both the juxtaposition of two (music-sculpture installation) or an inclusion of a reproduction in a score of an allographic art (photos incrusting a novel) are sufficient conditions for multimediality. Now, in particular, whether musical staves in text are a case of multimediality should depend on whether they are intended to be musically significant (performed, for example, imaginatively in order to integrate the reading experience) or as a vague generic symbol (as a pars pro toto)

148 Ibid., p. 28.
or even an embellishment or a cryptic element not meant to be professionally understood (musically read) by the reader. Furthermore, a work may be thus designed as to be readable on both levels, and such lecture may be a source of artistic effects and tensions. One would expect both elements not to be in contradiction. But they might be! Imagine an expressive description of solemn religious music in Palestrina’s style illustrated by staves of some obscene-texted frivolous motets. Only the musically knowledgeable reader will appreciate this while reading; the musically illiterate will perceive these staves as incorporating the Palestrinian solemnity and this precisely might be the effect envisaged by the author for such a reader. I am not aware of any case of this sort of intermedial interplay, but there is a low-profile parallel in the famous scene from the Schindler’s List where the SS-Mann plays Bach and according to one of the German soldiers it’s “Not Bach, it’s Mozart”\textsuperscript{149}. Nevertheless – it is the act of performative interpretation\textsuperscript{150} (resp. reading) that constitutes the telos of writing books and scores down, it is in this act only that (word- and tone-) art comes to be appreciated as such. Texts wouldn’t be texts at all if not as somehow potentially “readable”\textsuperscript{151}.

Now what I would like to suggest is that some of the core devices of making music with the words function as \textbf{intentional calibrators of our experiences} taking the work and its elements as their object; they indicate that our \textbf{performance of reading be musical and they provide further hints in what ways}; they function as score indications leading the silent performer in his hard work of making music, music of a peculiar kind here, as it is mostly (1) silent [takes no physical sounds as the basis of its over-organization] and (2) performed for oneself. Just as in all standard cases of music – its performative interpretation requires

\textsuperscript{149} This scene is quoted by P. Kivy, \textit{Musical Morality,...}, op. cit.; P. Kivy, \textit{Antithetical Arts}, Oxford University Press, New York 2009, p. 216.


\textsuperscript{151} This is one of the reasons why J. L. Borges’s \textit{Babel Library} strikes our imagination and undermines intuitions on what texts are. Cf. Eco’s remarks on “producing a text” by reading in U. Eco, \textit{The role of the reader : explorations in the semiotics of texts}, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1984.
some natural talent and first and foremost – thorough training, skill and knowledge that one normally acquires through long years of study. This is a universal aspect of all artistic music, be it in Europe or in Persia. No one becomes a virtuoso at heights of its most technically demanding compositions (nor even an interpret capable of performing standard repertoire) without years of musical education and practice. This is why it is easy to reply to an eventual objection, that *musica textualis* is a figment, because no one perceives it, apart from the self-proclaimed Pythagoras, advancing this insolent claim, and the few authors he quotes to back it, who actually couldn’t have meant it literally, being writers and not musicians.

5. Conclusion

No doubt: literature can deal with musical experiences not only in the mode of ‘telling’ but also that of showing; it can elicit them to some extent. This capacity will be now our point of interest. We will trace it in three very different realizations selected from the vast panorama of musicoliterary examples in Polish literature.

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152 It belongs to the standard setting of the genius’s myth (as analysed by Kivy in his *Mozart’s Skull = Czaszka Mozarta*) to claim that some geniuses were born so, with no musical training at all, which is obviously false, however some of the great composers indeed were very talented pupils and in little time were capable to grasp and learn what for the few is a matter of decades of discipline and rigorous training, for the most: is just impossible to achieve.

153 Pythagoras had the reputation of being able to hear the music of the spheres.

154 Well, if a great deal of the Word and Music Scholars analyzing these phenomena as interart excursions still firmly anchored in literature are at best musical amateurs (with some significant exceptions, such as Shockley, who is a composer and displays far less methodological fearfulness with regard to calling musical devices in these texts with their proper name), the authors of the analyzed works often had intimate knowledge of music, both theoretical and deriving from their musical practice (Proust, Joyce, Burgess, Huxley, Kunciewiczowa, Iwaszkiewicz, Libera). The case of Mann’s lack of formal musical education has to be seen together with the fact that he actually lacked any accomplished formal education (no success even at obtaining an Abitur, cf.).

155 This is shockingly ironic, but even Tadeusz Szulc admitted that “Literature is, on occasions, capable of eliciting specifically musical impressions”.

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PART II. Contemporary Musical Fiction in Poland. Three Studies
Introduction

The music of Homer’s epics is lost now, as is, with some exceptions, the music of Greek lyrics and dramas, but as is never enough to underline when dealing with musicoliterary questions, music and literature were one inseparable art in the archaic era. The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, of Polish artistic literature. It starts with Bogurodzica, an archaic, formally sophisticated solemn hymn addressing the Mother of God. The oldest manuscripts reporting this first known Polish lyric (whose composition predates them by at least one century) come from around 1400 and contain the neumatic notation of its hieratic, refined music.

The selection of examples discussed in this part needs a word of introduction and justification. All three chapters of this part are devoted to Polish authors active in the course of the last decades (Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, Antoni Libera, Krzysztof Bartnicki) whose work is interpreted as displaying three radically different modes of musica textualis. This choice, by no means exhaustive, is intended to illustrate the introduced concept at work in dissimilar cases, sharing though one property: all

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156 This fundamental historico-aesthetical truth is still often neglected, even in serious scholarship, which results in terminological errors and general absence of a deeper reflection on the role of music in what we study as Greek literature. This historical awareness is, however, fundamental for the perspective of the present study (as it was, as well, for the father of Word and Music Studies, S. P. Scher, cf. his remarks for instance in Literature and Music in: S.P. Scher, Word and Music Studies 5: Essays on Literature and Music (1967 – 2004) by Steven Paul Scher, ed by. W. Bernhart and W. Wolf, Rodopi, Amsterdam - New York 2004.). We cannot „compare” music and literature in any fruitful way, nor study intermedial imitations, if we forget that they are made possible only within a long historical process, which only recently, and maybe not for a long time (if compared with the whole span of history) separated sharply music from literature and made them become, to say it with the title of P. Kivy’s book – Antithetical Arts..., op. cit. A. Shockley’s book Music in the Words: Musical Form and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century Novel..., op. cit. has the great merit of emphasising this point and rendering it powerfully eloquent through the use of both of the Homeric invocations and that of the Aeneid. In all three epic is sung: the poet (Virgil) sings, and in Homer the Muse is implored to sing (both The Iliad and The Odyssey). For more information on Greek music and its neglected ties with literature, see M.L. West, Ancient Greek Music, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992.

have been paid little or no attention by the international musico-literary scholarship (not to mention the philosophers of music).

This choice – limiting the focus to contemporary Polish works – may be criticized as limiting the accessibility of my analyses to the non-Polish-speaking readership: my corpus being not only relatively unknown or new would in addition appear as beyond the reach of many of my readers, and thus its suitability as a material for exemplification of my theses at work would be seriously challenged.

This point is valid: when advancing a new interpretive tool or when defending counterintuitive theses in philosophy it is reasonable to explain them on widely known and easily accessible examples. Otherwise the theoretical difficulty of the exposed position risks only to accrue, because of the difficulty of the material studied. This is a fair point.

Still I decided not to change this choice. References I do passim to the canon of the Western musicoliterary acheivments permit the Reader to envisage the workings of musica textualis as applied to the texts she knows well. In order to say responsibly something new on my beloved works, such as Mann’s shorter and longer prose, I would have to give up the project of analysing the following Polish works, which without doubt merit theoretical attention.

Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus, if not analysed extensively in the present work, is to be considered as the compendium and opus magnum, the true Kunst der Textuellen Musik, to say it with the paraphrased title of Bach’s eternal Kunst der Fuge. How is textual music made in Faustus? First of all: preparation of the ground. The Musical square, which is not to be heard, together with the lecture Eye and Music, are part of Mann’s « mistification ». The reader is being convinced by traditional persuasive propositional means (by Kretschmar, by Leverhühn, by Zeitblom…) that actual music aspires to the inaudible. Then he is being seduced by the musica textualis formal techniques. Thanks to this seduction this music becomes intentionally real (and this is the only sort of reality any music can have).
One additional point of justification is that, as the Reader will notice, the third of the discussed groups of works requires no understanding of Polish whatsoever.
Chapter 3. Musical Form and Texture in Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz’s Prose

Introduction

“A prose work that actually approaches music fails as narrative; it cannot do otherwise” – claims the composer and scholar Alan Shockley\(^\text{158}\). In this chapter, I challenge this claim. Sometimes the word-composer is doomed to fail as a novelist\(^\text{159}\), to be sure. This, however, by no means is the case with the first protagonist of this part of the dissertation: Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (1894-1980). Poet, novelist, musician and musical critic, man of theatre and playwright, diplomat, politician, Righteous among the nations and communist figure of power. Iwaszkiewicz’s fiction, apart from being profoundly musical in many ways\(^\text{160}\) is first and foremost appreciated as literature. His talent shines particularly in the shorter narrative forms, distinguished by their very sober, elegant style in approaching this world’s terrible and exhilarating mystery. Works such as the

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\(^{159}\) Cf. remarks on Anthony Burgess in *Ibid.*, p. 43, or more general remarks by Wolf: a perfectly musicalized narrative would cease to be narrative, so they claim. The present interpretation or provides a counterexample to this thesis or is not convincing in what it claims on the musical second nature of this verbal piece.

\(^{160}\) As shown in a number of Polish studies, including a valuable monograph on music in Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz’s fiction: G. Piotrowski, *Fortepian ze Sławska. Muzyka w prozie fabularnej Jarosława Iwaszkiewicza*, Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010.
novels *Sława i chwała [Fame and Glory]*\(^{161}\), *Czerwone tarcze [Red Shields]* \(^{162}\), or numerous short stories, such as "Noc czerwcowa [June Night]", "Panny z Wilka" ("The Wilko Girls")\(^{163}\) and "Brzezina" ("The Birch Grove")\(^{164}\), if often acutely oriented within historical and social complex realities of Europe, are however intimately universal, touching the depths of the human condition. Iwaszkiewicz’s opus is a constant melancholy meditation of beauty, of love, of ephemeral charm and of their sister death: of the irreversible passing no thing, no place and no person is immune to. And yet it remains a vitalistic praise of energy and natural force of the ordinary, combining thus masterfully the erotic and the thanatotic impulses within this Iwaszkiewiczian world.

For several reasons Iwaszkiewicz recalls within the Polish context the immense figure of Thomas Mann, 18 years his senior: both were born in late

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161 J. Iwaszkiewicz, *Sława i chwała*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1965, vol. I–III. It contains important musical motives, such as the concert scenes from the life of the fictitious singer Elżbieta Szyller, sister to the fictitious composer Edgar Szyller (clearly modelled on the writer’s cousin Szymanowski) and their friend and pupil Ola Gołąbkowa, who sings Edgar’s songs, as well as those by Wolf or Duparc. Professional musical terminology is used in precise musical reflections, criticism and ekphraseis to be found in the novel, as for instance in the composer’s musings on his own Szeherezada: „Gdy przyszła druga pieśń, Edgar pomyślał, że pewnie nigdy nie znajdzie się taki badacz jego dzieł, który spostrzeże, że to, co teraz grają wiolonczele, jest augmentacją i odwróceniem fletowego »tematu śmierci« z pierwszej pieśni. Tak wielu muzyków zamyka na stronach swoich partitur i jedynie znajome aluzje, cytaty, żarty, o których słuchać nigdy nie wie, badacz zaś wie tylko czasami“ (Vol. II, p. 30). Many other protagonists of this monumental narration are amateur musicians (Andrzej, Ola) or devoted music lovers, like Janusz Myszyński. His father, Count Myszyński, has the morbid passion for mechanical music, and plays it on a pianola in his decadent manor: „domu mam ojca, pisze Janusz do Ariadny Tarło – dziwaka rozkochanego w muzyce martwej: mechanicznej. Godzinami wycina nuty do pianoli i potem gra na tym instrumencie, gniewając się, że mu to nie wychodzi tak jak żywą ręką. Chopin, Beethoven, Strauss, Szyller – wszystko na pianoli. Czasem w nocy ciemnej, jesiennej, kiedy dęby szeleszczą nie opadłymi liśćmi nad domem, budzi mnie martwe brzmienie wirtuozowskich pasażów. Na wiosnę, kiedy jest tak pięknie i wiatr wieje porywający, martwy instrument staje się piekielnym grzechotem“ (Vol. I, p. 43).


164 Ibid.
nineteenth Century and both transmitted into their post-first-world-war prose a sense of loss of that world, both became writers-institutions (Mann received his Nobel Prize for *Buddenbrooks* when Jaroslaw was 10), both recurred to music as the highest and most mysterious form of art, source of inspiration for their writing, and, most importantly, source of formal devices introduced by both on the pre-war stage of their literary careers. Iwaszkiewicz, just like Mann, openly admitted that his own works were often musically composed, that his texts exhibited “a certain musical form” – and just like Mann used such direct suggestions as means of musicalization. For both the primary matter of their writing was real life, non-fiction material collaged into fiction and transformed into highest achievements of literary art by formal work and mastery of style. It is hard to state anything conclusive on this *je ne sais quoi* of spiritual kinship I perceive in their works, in spite of all the obvious differences separating their figures. One such difference is that – contrary to Mann – Iwaszkiewicz was a true musician, played well the piano, had a substantial knowledge of musical theory, even sketched some actual musical compositions and had an impressive musical erudition (*vide infra*).

Despite its importance in Polish 20th C. culture – Iwaszkiewicz’s impressive work remains foreign to the English-speaking world. This translator of Gide and Kierkegaard, whose ambition was a Nobel Prize in literature, received instead a Lenin Prize and was translated into Russian and many East European languages. His high rank in communist literary hierarchies assured him numerous re-editions within the Soviet Union and nearly none on the other side of the Iron Curtain. If not through Karol Szymanowski’s *King Roger* with a libretto co-authored by the composer and his young cousin Iwaszkiewicz, if not through a number of musical settings of his poems and poetic translations from James Joyce (Szymanowski’s *Seven Songs* op. 54) – it is only thanks to the film adaptations by Andrzej

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165 The interested Reader will notice further *Werwandenheiten* between the two writers’ biographies.

166 K. Szymanowski, *Seven Songs to James Joyce’s Poems* op. 54 Nos. 1-7, PWM, Kraków 1949.
Wajda\textsuperscript{167}, Jerzy Kawalerowicz\textsuperscript{168} and Agnieszka Holland\textsuperscript{169} that Iwaszkiewicz may be somehow familiar to the English reader. English translations of only several short stories and the play on Chopin \textit{The Summer at Nohant} have been published throughout the years and they are hardly available\textsuperscript{170}.

The main theoretical interest of the present chapter lays in a detailed analysis of Iwaszkiewicz’s late musical short story – \textit{The Fourth Symphony} – interpreted as a polyphonic (two-part) sonata movement\textsuperscript{171}. In the central section of the chapter I show how this work establishes a dynamic imitative interplay between the musical texture (1) and musical form (2) on one hand and the communication model (1’) characteristic of the main protagonist and his autobiography (2’) on the other. Before I get to these crucial investigations I need to explore Iwaszkiewicz’s earlier literary attempts at imitating music in prose in a broader context of his complicated biography.

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\bibitem{168} 1961 \textit{Matka Joanna od Aniołów [Mother Joan of the Angels]}, Special Jury Prize, Cannes Film Festival, 1961.
\bibitem{169} 1975 Wieczór u Abdona.
\bibitem{171} More on realizing distinct or even historically incompatible musical features in textual music below.
\end{thebibliography}
These initial verses of Zbigniew Herbert’s poem *The Adventures of Mr. Cogito with Music* portray a formative experience of Herbert’s favourite lyric persona, but they reflect equally well Iwaszkiewicz’s musical infancy. As mature poets Iwaszkiewicz and Herbert will choose different paths – Herbert, just as his porte-parole, will be “condemned to stony speech / grating syllables (...) so when the hour comes / he can consent without a murmur / to the trial of truth and falsehood / to the trial of fire and water”\(^\text{172}\), giving moral testimony above all (*Mr. Cogito’s Envoy*), whereas Iwaszkiewicz will never turn away from music, with its dyonisian and demonic aspects (*Mephisto-Waltz*), with its “groves beyond good and evil” (*Martwa Pasieka*) and “volatile light-mindedness” (*Psyche* from the *Musical Short Stories*).

\(^{172}\) All quotes from the English translation: Z. Herbert, *The Adventures of Mr. Cogito with Music*, „Cross Currents”, 1989, no 8, pp. 33–37. The translator is not indicated. A more recent translation is to be found in:
Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz was born in 1894 in Kalnik, a village in the Russian Empire which annexed these territories of Poland in 1795. He was brought up in the cultured atmosphere of Polish destitute provincial nobility, where music was of vital importance, permeating young Jarosław’s aesthetic sensibility and determining his first performative and creative steps as pianist, composer, music teacher, critic, poet and actor. His later non-fiction musical writings include books on Bach\textsuperscript{173}, Chopin and Szymanowski, and a considerable amount of musical criticism. Together with his wife Anna he translated Gide’s Les faux-monnayeurs into Polish. Thanks to his peculiar paideia and early musical collaboration with his beloved elder cousin Szymanowski his \textbf{intermedial modernism} is something, so to speak, \textbf{innate and organic}.

2. The Fourth Symphony

\textit{The Fourth Symphony} is a late short story, published in the 1971 volume of \textit{Musical Short Stories}, five of which were written in the sixties and the seventies, preceded by the early homoerotic \textit{Friends}, written in 1929 and kept by the author unpublished for over forty years. In some ways my present analysis shows aspects of Iwaszkiewicz’s art traceable in many earlier texts, and problems characteristic of his creative world.

\textit{The Fourth Symphony} is an \textbf{explicitly musical and implicitly sexual} work, which puts both elements in an intricate interplay, full of dynamic tensions used consequently to transmute form into content and vice versa. It is a \textbf{fictional autobiography of a young provincial composer, Pietia, living his unfortunate passion for a young petersburgian aristocrat and – after a spectacular breakdown – ending up back in his little hometown to find there an ambiguous peace and reconciliation with his fate}. This love and music creative \textit{vita} of sublimation and ambiguity is set in Russia in the last two decades before the Revolution. My project was to explore what exceeds the level of mere thematization of music as (fictional and actual) works, performances, institutions, creative process

\textsuperscript{173} J. Iwaszkiewicz, \textit{Jan Sebastián Bach}, PWM, Kraków 1963.
and social phenomenon. All these aspects are naturally present in this text as a composer’s fictional autobiography. What I found, though, goes far beyond my expectations.

**A Word on The Plot and Literary Composition**

A brief outline of the plot is necessary for the further discussion to be anyhow intellegible to my Anglophone Reader\(^{174}\), even though it obviously does injustice to the charms of this narrative jewel and risks making it seem banal and sentimentally flat. 2 August 1902. Pietia, a provintial music teacher in the little town of R. some 180 km West from Moskow writes down the story of his youth, the early years in R. and an intense period of musical studies at St. Petersburg Conservatoire, which ended it up abruptly in a scandalous way, deciding his later fate. There are thus two spatio-temporal planes, that of Erzählzeit in R. and that of the Ehrzählte Zeit past in St. Petersburg, with elements in R. before and after, near to the “now”, which is directly present in the first and last phrase of the narration, giving it the form of a frame (“at the moment when I am writing these words, p. 225, and “And by the lake I go never more”, p. 285). The story Pietia has to tell is flavoured by the overall misty climate of resigned peaceful serenity, expressed in the conclusive phrase of the first paragraph, and recurrent in many details accentuating this mood through the whole. This mood remains in striking emotional contrast to the vivid enthusiasm, anxiety, longing, doubt, passion and hope characterizing the Petersburgian period, together with the intense culmination of hurt feelings and uncontrollable fury, which brought this whole epoch to a calamitous end during the spectacular quarrell at the ball *chez la duchesse* Wolkonskaya.

In Petersburg Pietia lives in a very humble wooden house in the suburbs, together with his mother and their servant Dunia. Pietia’s compositions gain him some esteem in the Conservatoire circles, but he has no real friends. Sometimes he dreams of “meeting some young person [young man], whom [he] could confess all

\(^{174}\) Remarks from the „Digressive remark on the Interest of the Plot as a Landmark of Narrativity” from Chapter 5 below apply.
[his] composer’s projects, [his] doubts, [his] enthusiasms, for instance – for Mozart’s music, [his] longings and [his] desires” (p. 227). He is also ambiguously impressed by the distant and foreign grandeur of petersburgian haute société, which he can observe during concerts in the great halls. One day, when as usual he is assisting his distant cousin Zula in her visit to her distant relative countess Woroncowa – the countess pays attention to him. When in a short conversation in French she gathers that he is a composer, she gets instantly a little concert arranged for him. It is during this performance of his songs to the words of Tiutchev, several days later, where he accompanies his young little friend Wiera on the piano – that an apparition happens. In the midst of their execution (rendered in a sober musical ekphrasis) he realizes that someone is standing there by the piano; a „tall and young officer, wearing the shiny uniform of the guards. He seemed beautiful to me” (p. 231). This is how their intense friendship starts. The young officer, knyaz Witalij Bielosielskij-Bielozierskij, comes every day to the little wooden house in the suburbs, to discuss passionately with his new friend, to play excerpts from Wagner, to read the Russian poets (Tiutchev, Fet, Nadson, p. 232). Witalij speaks of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, in ways that would cause frequent quarrels between the friends (p. 245). “He didn’t have much of a culture – notes Pietia. What do you want, a younger prince, who would have to pay ten visits daily, every two days would get drunk with the officers. He would then come to me, very embarrassed, and confess these sins, the Gypsy women, the orgies in the officer’s club, all these tricks and entertainments I had no idea of and, while reading “War and Peace”, of which I thought they belonged entirely to the past times” (pp. 232-233). Questions of “life”, “art” (“creation”) and “love” constitute the axis of their “evening disputations”, even though Pietia most significantly acknowledges that for both friends these key-words have an essentially different meaning, undermined by radically different life experiences and social status. But Pietia does not mind. All that counts is to be with Talia, to “keep him by my side for all costs” (p. 238). It is in these discussions that Pietia’s own creative process is thematized, according to the romantic line, where Chopin’s Larghetto from the F minor Concerto would be Gladkowska’s portrait (cf. Chopin’s own words from the letter to his close friend
Tytus Woyciechowski\textsuperscript{175}, and the third movement (\textit{Romance}) of Pietia’s \textit{Third Symphony} would portray Wiera (and, in accordance with the diegetic line, it would remain unfinished, p. 242). With Wiera they speak of music\textsuperscript{176}, an “inexhaustable topic” for them. Sometimes they meet all together, but Talia (this is how he called the knyaz with affect) never achieves one thing: to make them join his worldly pleasures, dinners, banquets and feasts of \textit{le grand monde}. But one day an irrefutable invitation comes and after weeks of preparations the grand ball at the Princes Wolkonski palace takes place. Pietia instantly grasps the attraction between Talia and Wiera and overhears their conversation, where they speak of love and marriage. In fury, he offends his beloved friend, cursing and accusing him of falsity: “(…) What sort of a friend are you! You want to marry my fiancée, you deceive girls, you play with them only to abandon them!” (p. 267). After this scandalous evening and a terrible pneumonia, he is relegated back to the little town of R. by the Tscharo Lake. There he leads his peaceful resigned life of a provincial music teacher, who abandoned dreams of fame and success and leaves peacefully in the metaphysical soundscape ruled by the church bells. They eternally resound over the waters of the lake in which “all the twenty-nine domes of the five churches embraced by the walls of the local kremlin reflect” (p. 269). It is at this lake that one day Pietia sees Wasia – the banya-keeper – swimming. A parallel triangle is built, with Wasia substituting Talia and Zula substituting Wiera. All the princlly grandeur of St. Petersburg is substituted by the serene provinciality of R., where the story ends, with a truly ambiguous happy end.


\textsuperscript{176} Gładkowska was a singer, as well; they did not, however, talk a lot with Chopin („I have not spoken to her since half a year”, in the quote above).
3. Thesis (I, II)

My interpretive hypothesis is this: there is a formal-aesthetic parallelism between music and homosexuality with respect to their textual rendition in Iwaszkiewicz’s fiction. Namely: a closer reading of the story uncovers a layer of musicalization which I want to call semantic-contextual polyphony (I), which is both an effect and means of expression of the homosexual reading of the text. In the second place – I claim that the work re-interprets the sonata form (II) and its traditional gendered interpretation.

I. Semantic-Contextual Polyphony

The familiar distinction between thematization and imitation, mutatis mutandis, can be fruitfully applied to the question of representing homosexuality in literature. Music (its essence, experience, meaning) has been often qualified as ineffable – as it is impossible to translate it into words, even artistically configured, in a musically satisfying, or semantically adequate way. This impossibility of translation between the immanent senses and values of music and the propositional language is the challenge for all sorts of melopoetic transgressions, as well as a theoretical challenge for who aspires to study these intermedial phenomena.

Now we need to appreciate that homosexuality in the early 20th Century, similarly faces the impossibility of expression and realization, if in different ways. First – intrinsically, in the given social context of Pietia’s autobiography – as a striving for something that cannot be fulfilled, nor even properly acknowledged by the protagonist himself. It is a variant of the topos of the impossible love: impossible both to be lived and admitted to (as no emancipated categories of identification are at hand). Second – aesthetically, conserving this status of taboo, it can be exploited to the stylistic benefit of fiction, a benefit which would evaporate in the very moment of neutralization through emancipation177.

177 German Ritz emphasizes rightly that if homosexual tensions are omnipresent in Iwaszkiewicz’s works, yet hardly ever in the „emancipation” modality; in most of the cases it is the „sublimation” modality that reigns. He uses the phrase “absent presence”. G. Ritz, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz : pogranicza nowoczesności, Universitas,
The non-emancipated homosexual-self (Pietia) is characterized by the doubleness of his world-experience (cf. Ritz) and typically assumes double-sense communicative strategies. This feature – being implicitly present in the narrated situations and dialogues – functions as a poetic model of the whole: the two-voiced polyphonic texture, which we appreciate within a musical reception paradigm. The autobiographic narrator, at times, is in counterpoint with himself, contradicting auctorially his own words as protagonist and alternating both streams:


Frankly speaking. I lied to Zula. I lied consciously, because I wanted to persuade myself, that the symphony is right there in my head. It wasn’t there at all, when I thought of it I felt a complete blank. […] And so my mind was a blank and I lied to Zula. And I repeated myself: I loved Wiera.

These auctorial remarks follow immediately the incriminated dialogue with Zula. What is characteristic here is the shadow they cast on the analogous repeated self-assertions on Pietia’s hurt love for Wiera (and not for Talia, for that matter). This is contextual sense-making through mere juxtaposition of otherwise logically unrelated statements, akin to relational sense-making in music. These words oscillate in the ear of the reader, creating a sense of doubleness and insistent pulsation: “Frankly” – “I lied” – “I lied” – “I wanted to persuade” – “I felt” – “blank” – “blank” – “I lied” – “I repeated” – “I loved”. Also situational ambiguities contribute to the overall effect of two concurring narrative voices that co-act on the reader.

Kraków 1999, p. 12. He also reflects on the “unutterable desire and the poetics of narration” in G. Ritz, Niewypowiadalne pożądanie a poetyka narracji, „Teksty Drugie”, 1997, t.3, no 3, pp. 43–60. The present analysis shows the way these stylistic (“literary”) features are used as means of musicalization here.
The structural-ideal axis of the whole composition moves from the triad of problems emerging in Pietia’s discussions with Talia: „life”, „art” and „love”, where both friends give completely different meanings to the three terms, engaging therefore in two parallel monologues rather than in an authentic dialogue, symbolizing the incompatibility of their mutual engagement. Pietia is fascinated by this, as he puts it, “interplay of ambiguities”, and explicitly downplays the importance of what is actually being said: “I loved my friend so much, that after all it was all the same to me, what did he say or think. […my only concern was to] Keep him with me at all costs, because without him I couldn’t imagine my life in Petersburg” (p. 238). Clearly, these interactions are appreciated not for the discursive “content” of both conflicting positions, but for the mere pleasure of their interplay (linking thus by a structural analogy the experience of love with the formally intended pleasures of music).

This fundamental triad of ideas (together with its essential bi-vocality) is reflected in the plot by the two specular love triangles: Talia, Wiera, and Pietia (parts 1-2), and Wasia, Zula, and Pietia in the final part. Both triangles have their dynamic heterosexual and homosexual interpretations, which are equally grounded in the text and presented simultaneously, without losing their logical incompatibility. This harmonious co-presence of two distinct voices – a typical landmark of music as opposed to discourse – is natural in the context of Pietia’s autobiography, reflecting faithfully his own double-minded perceptive and expressive attitudes.

II. Sonata Form

In a second step, I want to hear this interplay of two incompatible sense-streams as realizing the sonata form. I have not come across such a reading, striking as it is, once advanced.

Iwaszkiewicz divided his text in four numbered sections, but the autobiographic spacio-temporal frame is distinctly tripartite, with the repetition of the first space-setting in the third part: (A) first sixteen years in the provincial town of R. 180 km West from Moscow, then (B) in St. Petersburg till 1894 and (A’) again
in R. till 1902, which coincides with the Erzählzeit (the time of the narration). I take the two contrasting spatial settings, together with their expressive and symbolic load, as embodying here the tonal duality constitutive of the sonata form. Let me characterize briefly first both thematic groups and, second, their interaction throughout the whole.

(A) First Theme group in **R minor** (“Autobiography and Love”)

The **key** is R because of the space-determination (the town of R) which is explicitly stated when the first Theme is presented: in the opening of the exposition (I) and in the opening of the recapitulation (IV). It is minor because of 1) the *sweet melancholy, serene resignation mood it prevalently expresses*; 2) the fact R. is literally a small (minor) town in all possible senses of the word, if compared with its major parallel, St. Petersburg. The thematic material includes the **first-person melancholy autobiographical recollection by the composer, Pietia and his concise informative narration** set in the little town of R. **This theme is subjective, introvert and self-reflexive, moving in the constant tension towards the foreign material of the contrasting Second theme.**

(B) Second Theme in **P major** (B – “Object of Love and Inspiration”)

The vigorous, vitalistic, uncontrollable masculine-objective (third person) presentation of Witalij in the exposition and its specular version in the recapitulation (in the person of the beautiful peasant Wasia) determines the main characteristic traits of the second theme. In the exposition, it is stated in the parallel key: **P major.** This key reflects the grand settings of the aristocratic high life in Petersburg, constantly contrasted with the modesty of Pietia’s little wooden house in the suburbs (which locally re-sets the R minor key). Pietia continuously underlines how “foreign” and even “hostile” these spheres are for him. He desires Talia but finds himself in an inevitable conflict with the young prince’s socially determined way of being: vain, mundane occupations matching with his

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cynic, nihilistic views and superficial, if passionate, delectation in the charms of music.

A brilliant transition connects both themes in the exposition (I, pp. 230-232): it is the private little concert at Woroncowa’s palace, with Wiera singing Pietia’s songs and where Pietia sees the young Knyaz Bielosielj-Bielozierskij for the first time: in the curve of the piano. His beautiful and energetic figure contrasts highly with Wiera, who “wasn’t beautiful, only when she started singing her face would change, gain expressiveness…” (p. 231). The lunar character of her beauty reflects her function of a medium (of music here, and in general: of Pietia’s love for the Prince). The two female figures (Zula and Wiera) can be said to act as Dominants, as they mediate and lead to the beloved Tonic (Talia in P, Wasia in R).

The interaction of both themes builds up the tension in the first part of the Development (invitation – quarrel – “compromising letter” – fur-coat – Talia’s kiss – first occurrence of the fanfares-motive) and brings it to a spectacular culmination during the fatal ball when drunken Pietia overhears Talia’s declaration of love for Wiera. They fight and ultimately fall all the way down the impressive staircase. This literal cadenza with the immediately following fugal retransition to R minor double-close the exposition.

We are back in the little town of R. and the first theme is restated, opening the Recapitulation. Then comes the second theme, in the local R minor key, now embodied by Wasia, the banya-keeper. It is immediately preceded by a direct remark that the life in St Petersburg was “not harmonious”, whereas in R. is “harmonious” – its identification as the non-modulating transition of the recapitulation is evident within the sonata-form interpretive framework. Wasia’s physical (beauty, muscular body, vitality, charm combined with “foreignness” determined by the social distance) and vocal characteristics (“his voice resembled so much Talia’s voice, and a beautiful, somewhat Volodymirian accent, just like Talia he “bent” the “o” and pronounced just as you write it”, p. 282) strictly repeat that of Witalij, with the only significant difference being the transposition from the princely grandeur (major mode) to the minor mode of a local peasant. This results
in a new harmony between the themes achieved on the common ground of the original minor key. As Pietia falls ill, he is lovingly looked after by Wasia and the women, including Zula. In the midst of the typhoid fever he takes Wasia for Talia, which most eloquently confirms the identity of the second theme across the modes. The final scene takes place in the banya, where Wasia tells Pietia his secret: “Zula loves you so much. Marry her” and kisses him on the mouth “according to the custom” (p. 285). The dynamics of the scene is both erotic and musical, as when the sensuous pleasure of this intimate encounter between the two men grows, Pietia hears his Fourth symphony complete in his inner ear. The erotic climax coincides with the musical climax (fanfares triumphantly repeated in the symphony’s finale) and the resolution of the plot (Wasia’s “matrimonial” secret). The final cadenza – through the anaphoric ‘[i]’ in its short, decisive statements – closes the whole form in R minor, now resplendent with serenity and sweet resignation from the utterly rejected P major:

I ożeniłem się z Zulą, i jestem bardzo szczęśliwy. „Czwartą symfonię” spisałem i posłałem do Petersburga. Wykonano ją z wielkim powodzeniem, ale ja na koncert nie pojechałem. I nad jeziorem już nigdy nie chodzę.

[And so I married Zula, and so I am most happy. I wrote the Fourth Symphony down and I sent it to St. Petersburg. It was performed with great success, but I didn’t go to the concert. And to the lake so do I go no more.]

The traditional gendered exegesis of the relation between the themes (A. B. Marx, 1845) is inverted here, as is the corresponding sexual attraction setting. It offers thus a perfect match between the “feminine/passive”, subjective first theme and the contrasting “masculine objectivity” and uncontrollable beauty of the second theme.

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The prince’s visits in Pietia’s little wooden house in Petersburg were consequently announced by the leitmotif of the little sleigh bells and the recurring “pull on the rusty wire of the door-bell”. This motif – signal of the physical
presence of the loves’ object that leaves Pietia with “nothing but regret” – in the recapitulation is transformed into the magnificent music of the orthodox church bells echoing in the lake. This objectless, universal, “inhuman” music reflects the serenely resigned harmony of R minor, “a world philosophically resolved”, and yet void and creatively sterile until the second theme (Wasia) comes back and completes its perfect harmony (love) with the lacking human, “objective” dimension, necessary for life and for art.

**Conclusion**

What strikes as a profound similarity between the musical and the homosexual text intended as distinctive poietic categories (and not merely as subject-labels) is that they both imply a contradictory condition internally determined by its fundamental impossibility of realisation, resulting in opaque communication strategies. This constitutive impossibility is due to the switch in medial (semiotic) and sexual identity, which makes of the object of love or musicalization something it cannot ever be. By consequence: neither of the poetics can support “fulfilment” – because it would jeopardize their contradictory transgressive core. The beautiful kniaż Talia will never become Pietia’s lover, and a literary text will never become music. And yet – in Iwaszkiewicz’s *Fourth Symphony* – both paradoxically happen, one mediated and sense-invested by the other.
Chapter 4. Antoni Libera’s Toccata in C Major

Introduction

Antoni Libera’s latest book of fiction, Niech się panu darzy, is composed of three pieces of short prose. In this chapter, I will focus on the third novella of the triptych, Toccata C-dur [Toccata in C major], named so after Robert Schumann’s op. 7, its prominent musical para- and archi-text in Genettian terms applied across the media. After having briefly delineated the context of the work, the figure of its author and its Polish and Italian reception, I will proceed with a close analysis of its peculiar intermedial collocation between music and literature. In this case this interrelation will appear as particularly complex and striking, because of the intersemiotic musical quotations comprised in the main text of the work. As a result, we will see it as an eloquent case of musica textualis. In order to achieve this conclusion, I will localise and describe levels of the text’s interrelation with music, showing that it is best interpreted as a score for a musico-literary individual (silent) performance. It will be, therefore, a two-step procedure: the broader description of the text’s links to music, deploying tools provided by Petermann will ground the more specific interpretation in terms of musica textualis.

1. Text, Author and Context

As mentioned above, the Polish editor presents the whole book as a homogenous triptych of prose. The Italian editor, Sellerio Editore Napoli, publishes the translation as a little independent novella within their exquisite Il divano series. I shall treat it as an independent work, however taking into account the immediate context of the original Polish edition. In particular, the second novella of the triptich, Widok z góry i z dołu, is illustrated with photographs of places and

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182 A. Libera, La toccata in do maggiore, trans by. V. Verdiani, Sellerio, Palermo 2015.
architectonic details described in it, offering thereby an interesting pendant of the musical excerpts in the Toccata and a good starting point for a comparative discussion of their status within the text.

The author was born in Warsaw four years after the War ended and four years lacking to Stalin’s death, in 1949, in a family of Jewish-Polish intellectuals called Libin, saved from the Ghetto; a miracle commemorated in their afterwar surname. He is Poland’s most eminent translator of Kavafy, Hölderlin, Racine, Sophocles and critic of Samuel Beckett as well as an established stage director of his plays. His translations into Polish include all of Beckett’s dramatic works and most of his prose. Libera’s own novel, Madame, a true bestseller, has been granted numerous literary awards and has been translated into twenty languages, including English, French, Slovenian, Swedish, Catalan, Dutch, Czech, Italian, Hebrew, Russian and Lithuanian. It also involves some significant formal interplay with musical composition techniques.

**Beckett’s Prophet**

Samuel Beckett considered Libera a friend and, with a typical note of irony, his “deputy to Eastern Europe.” Libera described his lifelong personal fascination with Beckett in his autobiographical prose Godot i jego cień [Godot’s Shadow]. This work provides an important context for my interpretive enterprise here both

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183 PhD Thesis on Beckett at the Polish Academy of Sciences.


on the level of what is said there on the margins of Beckett and how the text unites heterogeneous elements. First – a word on the how.

**How: intermedial collage, literary staging, text as performance, real presence**

The book is incrusted with graphic material such as reproductions of cards and letters received from the author of *Lessness*, photographs of great beckettian stage creations (Magee as Hamm and as the Listener, MacGowran as Clov, Billie Whitelaw as May, Warillow in the *Depeupleur* etc.), covers of French, American, and Polish editions of Beckett’s works, issues of literary magazines, invitations etc. The text is enriched by schemes illustrating scenic movement in *Pas*\(^\text{188}\) or numeric structures governing *Sans*. The book is qualified as “autobiographical prose” rather than, simply, “autobiography” because it is consecrated to Beckett’s literature at least as much as to the events in Libera’s life, or, rather, the latter are presented as functions of Libera’s great encounter with this oeuvre; furthermore, it is a piece of literary fiction, if based on non-fiction autobiographical motives. Technically the narration contains and is entwined with a series of substantial interpretations of Beckett’s texts and extensive bits of translation. This digressive technique unites in one narrative flow the simple sequences of practical events with most sophisticated divagations on the translator’s dilemmas and with actual translations from Beckett. From meditations on May walking to and fro in the little Church along *His poor arm*\(^\text{189}\) we are transported to Kafkaesque adventures with the communist authorities of People’s Poland refusing the author a passport, when Beckett invites him à titre personnel to his own staging of *That Time* and *Footfalls* in Berlin’s Schiller-Theater. Beckett’s work is somehow present in Libera’s prose, in a way different from the usual distance that is supposed to separate criticism and literature. The practice of including thought streams proper to some other text in this narration is not limited to Beckett. The reader will be acquainted with the resumed content of Libera’s paper at a Beckettian conference in NYC, as

\(^{189}\) Ibid.
well as with the outline of a series of invited lectures on *Polish Romantic Drama* in New York City. The outcome it is a highly intertextual, intergenre and intermedial work producing an effect of extraordinary closeness of the literature it engages with. It obviously is an interpretation of the texts in question, but an interpretation that uses literary powers in order to exceed what we normally take to be *criticism* and become also a *performative interpretation, a literary staging*.

**Roots of Textual Intermediality in Polish Romantic Drama**

If this view is correct – Libera’s intermedial practice could be collocated within the more familiar tradition of Polish Romanticism\(^\text{190}\), disclosing a deeper sense of Libera’s digressions on the content of his NY lectures. Adam Mickiewicz’s *Dziady [Forefather’s Eve]*\(^\text{191}\) is a romantic drama, a drama which is not primarily or necessarily written to be staged\(^\text{192}\). Rather, it deploys the technical literary devices which normally serve the playwright to design the verbal and corporeal interaction of actors on stage, such as roles, text division into acts and scenes, didascalia etc. in a reverse direction, namely to represent before the “mind’s eye”\(^\text{193}\) some

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\(^{190}\) It is both ironic and most eloquent, that it was precisely against the Romantic aesthetics and corresponding predilection to intermedial vocabulary in literary criticism, that Tadeusz Szulc stood in his 1937 philippics *Muzyka w dziele literackim*. It is striking, that he himself operates with the term „musical directives within the literary artwork”, but he simply denies such a possibility and denounces Romanticism as responsible for this illusion: *W muzycznej wrażliwości, opartej o romantyczne ujęcie świata i sztuki tkwi geneza złudzeń, jakoby istniały w dziele literackim muzyczne dyrektywy* quoted in: A. Hejmej, *Muzyczność dzieła literackiego...*, op. cit.. Eng. transl. (J.C.): *The origin of the illusion that the literary artwork contains musical directives lays in the musical sensibility, based on the romantic worldview.*

\(^{191}\) I refer to the so called *Dziady wileńsko-kowieńskie* (published in 1823). Cf. Libera’s own words: „Teraz, w wieku dojrzałym, podniósł do rangi pieśni materię własnego losu i wpisał ją w dawną formę. Dziady wileńsko-kowieńskie to mit starego świata, zapis obrządku wspólnoty o charakterze plemiennym”. A. Libera, *Godot i jego cień...*, op. cit., p. 271.”

\(^{192}\) My remarks here touch upon an immense and highly complex study field within Polish philology. What I present here is necessarily an over-simplified picture, functional for my purposes here, but otherwise utterly insufficient.


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performative action. The work’s homonymous subject, dziady, are dramatically mimetized as a structured chthonic ritual performed by the traditional community during the Night of the Forefathers. Mickiewicz masterfully frames it by a suitable pseudo-ethnographic historical introduction which enforces this reading, making thus the dramatic notation serve as a performative stenograme from the fieldwork. Let me show the points of comparison between classical drama and its romantic transformation crucial for our argument in a simplified table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical drama</th>
<th>Romantic drama (Dziady, Part II)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The text commands a staging, is structured in function of what will happen on stage and uses the drama-specific score convention in order to achieve it.</td>
<td>The text uses the dramatic convention in order to “note down on paper” what happens in a collective performance of the traditional semi-pagan community. Appealing to the reader’s familiarity with such a notation used in classical drama it creates an intermedial form of poetry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It imitates “real life” action through real (physical) action on stage.</td>
<td>It imitates “performative”, “ritual” action through fictional (imagined) action concretized in the act of reading as if realizing stage indications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its primary instantiation is a performative one, on stage. (But it can be also appreciated in silent, imaginative reading).</td>
<td>Its primary instantiation is an imaginary performative one, “before the mind’s eye”. (But it can be also appreciated on stage, in an adaptation).</td>
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I used the example of Mickiewicz’s *Dziady*, as it offers something closest to what we encounter in Libera with respect to Beckett’s works, namely: a literary staging of something that is a performance itself. It is a textual work, precisely: a poem stylized as a drama, which interprets textually something that is a “ritual action”. This ritual action is not simply described or narrated. It appeals to the reader’s dramatic imagination and calls for an imagined performative interpretation through the use of standard dramatic notation conventions. Its aesthetic concretisation in the act of reading borrows thus means from another medium (theatre, as the standard realisation of drama). In this way, the work is designed to elicit special intermedial effects. As such it is both drama and something else than drama, namely, lyric poetry. Other examples of Polish romantic drama, such as Juliusz Słowacki’s *Kordian*, or Zygmunt Krasiński’s *Nie-Boska Komedia* [*Un-Divine Comedy*], to quote just the most eminent, share this intermedial expansion of poetry into drama, even if their respective objects of representation are not performative themselves.

*What: Libera on Beckett, Performativity and Music*

According to Libera, Beckett’s art is almost always staging a voice. Therefore, even shorter forms of prose are generally to be interpreted as monologues: his “narrators are almost always creators: subjects who, “live”, so to speak – in front of the reader or of the potential listener – compose what they tell, they make up entire stories or worlds adding up new details while they talk. Their speech is formally an improvisation, an act of creation *in statu nascendi*. This improvised creation with words is the main… the *only* action”\(^{194}\). He emphasizes that “speaking, creating fiction live is [for Beckett] an important event, perhaps the most important one. Because everything that the man creates is invented by him: the whole human culture is all a “tale”, as the narrator of *Compagne* says at the end of the story”\(^{195}\). This is why he encourages stagings and loud readings not only of


\(^{195}\) Ibid.
Beckett’s dramas but also of Beckettian pieces of prose (interpreted on stage as monologues). Furthermore, he argues that “these texts have a distinctive musical value: melody and rhythmics”196, emphasizing thus that the oral-performative character of these texts requires from their performers an ability to understand the way they determine also musical parameters of the voice operation. Beckett, we may add, uses different means to achieve this precision in prescribing the “distinctive musical value” of his texts. In Watt he includes auctorial musical notation (four-part rhytmical score for the Threne, and a soprano melodic score for it197, a practice to be found much earlier in Polish literature, for instance in a musically notated “polyphony of quarrel” in Karol Hubert Rostworowski’s 1913 drama Judasz z Kariothu198).

Apart from this particular care for the musical parameters of the staged voice, Libera stresses a second aspect of Beckett’s work affinity to music seen as *mathesis universalis*: “Beckett’s taste for numbers and the fact that he cultivated them in literature has several sources. One of them is the general aesthetic assumption that all art, whatever might it mimetize or express, even the utmost chaos, it must be ruled by the rules of order”. Beckett “compared his writing to composing music, which is based on a rigorous system as well”199.

196 Ibid.
197 What is important, this music is auctorial, not an intersemiotic quote, and is clearly intended as a performative directive, thus being *stricto sensu* part of the work in question. The scores in Watt and other aspects of Beckett’s engagement with music are discussed in E. Prieto, *Listening in: music, mind, and the modernist narrative*, op. cit., pp. 155–252.
Beckett, like Dante\textsuperscript{200} with his symbolism of threes and tens, says Libera, and, we shall add, like the medieval universalistic \textit{artes} based on symbolic proportions: \textit{ars rhetorica, ars praedicandi, ars musica} etc. – used the numbers symbolically – if in a radically opposed philosophical and theological context. Beckett’s key numbers are 12, 24, 60 – symbolising Time\textsuperscript{201}. Music as reflecting the numeral and proportionate order of the Universe (or at least of Time) and the musical work as mathematical ordering in time of the most irregular, ephemeral, unruly (in the classical philosophy of music – emotions, in the case of Beckett – “the utmost chaos”) becomes a sister art to Beckett’s writing.

\* 

We have to keep in mind this “collage” (both multi-, inter-, and intra-medial) technique used in \textit{Godot i jego cień} when interpreting the novella. These features, alongside with Libera’s understanding of Beckett, may guide us in interpreting Libera’s auctorial intentions and horizons while composing his own literary toccata. From the material discussed below it seems plausible to conclude, that Libera treated the musical material similarly in his own work and that he developed his own original musicoliterary devices, combining them with devices familiar from Kunczewiczowa’s \textit{Cudzoziemka} [1936] or Mann’s \textit{Doktor Faustus}. I show how his \textit{Toccata in C major} includes and modulates the presence of music, insinuating it into the very narrative tissue of fiction. Thus, the label “fiction” here deserves a further qualification, no less than his “autobiographical fiction” in the case of \textit{Godot and His Shadow}. Here it is “musical fiction”. The musical elements of the collage include: Schumann’s toccata op.7 [real], in its various and distinctive interpretations by the novella’s protagonists [fictional] and by Sviatoslav Richter [real, recorded], alongside with the \textit{sing along} voices which \textit{interpret} it (both in the performative and exegetic sense). The result is a compound work of musical

\textsuperscript{200} Quoted by Mann, from the \textit{Inferno}, as the motto of \textit{Doktor Faustus}.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., p. 414.
fiction\textsuperscript{202} notated with (1) standard characters of Polish, sometimes used emphatically in a way that departures from the rules of orthography in order to suggest musical elements; (2) special typographic devices (such as bold, italics, hyphens – all used to convey musical information); (3) musical notation in the double position of (a) illustration (as an external medium, incrustation in the sense of the above discussed collage technique) (b) the piece’s musical text proper entwined with its verbal text.

This is not to suggest that Libera attempted to emulate his literary guru and mythologised master. The novella, as we will see, has very little in common with Beckett’s style. If it overcomes narration as the primary logos of fiction, it does so without eliminating clearly traditional and simple forms of narrativity within the text. Stylistically it is conservatively elegant, with proficiently introduced elements of music school jargon, professorial style, and technical terms of music (Polish and Italian), most natural and suitable in the narrative context.

\textsuperscript{202} Inspired, to be sure, autobiographically: by the Author’s juvenile initiation into music as a pupil of Warsaw’s renown Krasiński Music School; even Prof. Plater and his interpretation constitute a cryptoportrait of his professor of musical literature, Mr. Jerzy Kolasiński. [This information was most kindly provided by Mr. Libera himself, in a private conversation in Warsaw]. And the whole piece is dedicated to the memory of Roman Jasiński (1900-1987), pianist, piano pedagogue, musical critic, diarist and man of radio, the writer’s father-in-law.
2. Music as *Dramatis Persona*, or The Intermedial Mythos

The task of arguing that something which beyond any reasonable doubt is a novella, a piece of shorter fiction, *is*, in fact, *also music*, is not an easy one, to say the least. Apparently, it gets way easier when one opens the book and finds this:

![Figure 1 Plater’s “crazy Lieder” (pp.86-87)](image)

“Aha! There we go! All right then, *this* is words and *this* is music. Fair enough!

It is a strange word-and-music compound, it reads music as well as text. This must be some avant-garde hybrid artefact”\(^\text{203}\).”

\(^\text{203}\) Or, in the case of a *blasé* intellectual well familiar with such musical quotes in a literary text – “oh, again, that old hat!”’. Other examples of musical notation quoted literary text include S. Barańczak, J. Iwaszkiewicz, M. Kuncewiczowa, R. Rolland, A. Schnitzler, M. Kundera, G. Compère, M. Roche cf. A. Hejmej, *Music in Literature: Perspectives of Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature*... op. cit., p. 60.
Let us have a closer look on how this artefact is made and what exactly is it made of.

I choose this particular ostensibly hybrid work (musical notation as shown above appears many times on these pages) in order to argue, thanks to some of its intrinsic features, that in its incorporating music it leads far beyond what a simple and (seemingly) unproblematic juxtaposition of two written media would amount to. (As if an artistic juxtaposition of two written media could ever be “simple” and “unproblematic”). Moreover, in the course of the discussion, where I will apply the Wolf-Petermann model in the analytic part, I hope to show how it needs to be expanded and possibly revised, in the lights of Libera’s piece, at least for philosophical purposes.

My first task is to provide a brief outline of the plot and how this is formally realized within the broad structure of this sixty-pages long text. This is inevitable for the sake of my analyses’ intelligibility. My second task will be to elucidate the ways in which music appears on the charts of the text, how they can be classified and related one to another.

Digressive remark on the Interest of the Plot as a Landmark of Narrativity

One last remark before I start: serious literary critics are never quite concerned that in discussing the details of the plot they might “spoil” it to the readers. But the popular culture and online amateur criticism has developed some curious rules of netiquette which prevent this from happening. The online critic is required to warn the reader if the suite of his review is a “spoiler”. Now, apart from some obvious differences in convention between the two genres of literary (and film and TV series etc.) criticism, the substantial answer to the question on this asymmetry is perhaps this: the assumptions made, as to the readers’ presumed state of knowledge, in both cases differ. The reader of a serious piece of criticism is generally supposed to know already the literary text in question, or at least: to be aware that the whole plot might be disclosed during the text’s discussion. It is assumed that he reads maturely, knowing that it might spoil some of the charms of a “first reading”, naïve and adventurous. In contrast, the reader of quick blog reviews or other resources online
might be interested in getting to know what the plot’s setting is in order to know whether the whole thing might be worthwhile for her. This is why she wants to be warned whenever a passage of a review contains the “fruit of the Tree of Knowledge”, one that “thou shalt not eat from” (Genesis 2:17).

Now my standpoint here is mixed. I have no reason to suppose that my English-speaking reader knows already Libera’s Toccata. And yet, still, I believe, I can safely disclose the points of the plot crucial to my analyses, without spoiling anything. This, I think, is possible in virtue of the very musical second nature of the work in question. Quite obviously, you cannot produce a spoiler of a sonata by describing it in detail or by analysing its themes and the way they are worked out and recapitulated; nor even by playing its decisive fragments. If it does at all influence the subsequent appreciation of the piece, it does so only by enhancing it. Knowing the piece promotes its understanding and greatens the pleasures it can offer or it is irrelevant. But it cannot spoil anything. This, arguably, is not the

204 This would be the point of contrast between architecturalism and concatenationism P. Kivy, Music in Memory and ‘Music in the Moment’, [in:] New Essays on Musical Understanding, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001; J. Levinson, Music in the moment..., op. cit. resp. But none sustains that previous aural or intellectual acquaintance could spoil the music; on Levinson’s account, if architectural knowledge of the form has little influence on the basic musical understanding, it is essential to be aurally acquainted with the piece; on most occasions, in order to legitimately claim to know some piece of classical music, we must have attended to it more than once or twice; a single hearing results insufficient for a proper grasp of its musical meaning. And on Kivy’s account – the more one knows about the structure and provenance of a piece, the more one can grasp and appreciate when hearing it.

205 Counterexamples come to mind, though. Take Haydn’s Paukenschlag Symphony, nicknamed in English, for a reason, The Surprise; and all other musical works which acted on their first audiences with effects of surprise, shock, unexpected innovation. These aesthetic effects can be neutralized by pre-acquaintance with the work. But the proponents of both theories, for different reasons, would advocate that still in typical cases of music, the gain tends to outweigh the (unquestionable) loss. On concatenationist account we lack the pleasure of getting surprised by such a device (and, even more, does the knowledge that it is there really annihilate the immediate effect during a performance? well, arguably not entirely, as the purely musical expectation there is, so to speak, deaf to reasons and knowledge; this effect, namely, of eternal surprise, would even constitute a further argument in favor of concatenationism), but we appreciate to the full all other musical devices, which cannot be so appreciated upon a first hearing. On the architecturalist account the pleasure of being surprised is substituted by even greater a pleasure of knowing that what we hear was devised to surprise the audience, and that, furthermore, it succeeded in producing this effect in its original context.
case when it comes to works playing with our curiosity of the suite and the resolution of the intrigue: once we know who murdered, the point of reading the remainder is questionable. This is of course a standard picture of a first grade (or naïve) approach to narrative fiction, where literary value, however distinct from the mere curiosity of the plot, is not completely autonomous from it. The pleasure of discovering “what happens next”, if, perhaps, conversely proportional (in its share in the sum of pleasures offered by the reading) to the literary artwork’s and the reader’s refinement, can still be considered a typical feature of most traditional narrative.

Here the reader’s curiosity has a different vector: instead of being linear, i.e. concentrated on the progression and resolution of the plot, it develops inwards: how this formal game of layers and media with the plot will end up; the plot is, indeed, an element of this higher-level interplay, and as such it is not deprived of some proper “linear” interest. But, arguably, it is of lesser importance within the overall appeal of the piece. This is why I think that knowing the plot in advance by no means could spoil the reader’s pleasures of Libera’s Toccata. It works well within the interpretation that by its very nature as an object of enjoyment it has something non-narrative to it, in the way that the recounted mythos (plot) is not the main residue of interest or (alternatively) that the proper plot is some other series of events, different from the one told206.

206 Cf.: “If it were so that it ended, it wouldn’t be sufficiently interesting, and above all closed”. Why on earth, for a piece of fiction, being “closed” would be a value, one “above all” and in particular – above being interesting? Well, of course this passage emphasizes its formal “completeness”, which doesn’t necessarily yet point towards music. But in this repetition “after years and years” we recognize a structural imitation of Schumann’s Toccata. There is no obvious link between these two formal devices, for someone who never heard Platerian exegeses. But for us, who became his pupils as well for a while, just as for the two elderly men who met again, after nearly fifty years, at the dusk of their “parallel stories” – the sense of this repetition and of the closing it offers is so strikingly clear, that by the time we reach the last words: “A kiedy dojechał wreszcie do owego momentu, na którym profesor śpiewał: „Jak to przeminęło! Jak to przeminęło!… Jakby wczoraj się zaczęło!” a do którego ja wcześniej odniosłem pamiętne słowa „on się tam jakby z czymś źegna”, spostrzegłem, że po policzku spływa mu wolno łza” the reader might advert that a tear is flowing down his own cheek as well. „I na tym właściwie się kończy ta młodościę przygoda. Przygoda, lecz nie historia. Gdyby się
Having made these observations regarding musical and literary spoilers (and having thus warned her who does not trust this account), let us now freely proceed with no further delay.

**A Word on The Plot and First Remarks on Textual Music**

The plot, in a briefest outline is this. The protagonists are three: the narrator, a young adept of a Music High School (Liceum Muzyczne) somewhere in communist Poland, his talented colleague Slavek B. and their respectable piano teacher, na tym kończyła, nie byłaby dość ciekawa, a *nade wszystko zamknięta*. Gdyby to miało być *wszystko*, nie byłoby – mimo *wszystko* – warte opowiadania” (p.117)

207 Is this a *nomen omen*? Possibly so, but there is no certainty here. Etymologically, Sławek recalls the Slavic root *sław-* meaning “to praise” and having as noun derivates “sława” – ‘glory’, ‘fame’.

It would be bitterly ironic to read it in the light of the protagonist’s surname’s initial, B, which would suggest ‘fame of the B. category’, a second class fame, which would quite correspond to Sławek’s vain triumph at the diploma recital, the promising beginnings of his soloistic career and his eventual fate of a High School piano teacher. The conclusive phrase of the introductory paragraph, contains a splendid description (ekphrasis) of the usual cacophony of different instruments practicing one hears in the vicinity of a music school, and interpreting it as expressive of “ambition and the striving for mastery. This inexhaustible practicing was supposed to bear fruit: career, splendor, fame”.

The last word is ‘sława’ (in accusative). Orig. “Marzenia o perfekcji, nadziei na uznanie. Bo w owych monologach każdego z instrumentów słyszało się *ambicję i pragnienie mistrzostwa*. **To niestrudzone ćwiczenie miało przynieść owoce: kariery, splendor, sławę**, p. 88. Furthermore, his fate and his local, short-lasting fame, are built upon his imitation of his friend’s imitation of an interpretation by another pianist, also bearing a Slavonic name composed with the same root: Światosław (Swiatoslaw Richter). This name could be read, through a (false, perhaps) etymological figure, as meaning ‘World Famous’ (‘świat’ means ‘world’). The contrast between both characters would then be striking and most illuminating. Consider their collocation within the complex constellation of intermedial imitations of and through interpretations constituted by Libera’s text. Both Slavek and Swiatoslaw Richter are objects of literary imitation within the Novella, but just as one is a real pianist and the other a literary fiction, also within the fiction Richter is the *real, world famous pianist*, while Slavek manages only to assicure himself this B. class sort of local esteem, and even this thanks to the said imitation of imitation of Richter’s *real concert interpretation* of the title *Toccata* (you can listen to this LP yourself, if you please, this concert really took place in Warsaw in 1959).

Such a complex specular structure would certainly reflect, on one hand, the very intermedial condition of the discussed work, and, on the other hand, its “surface subject”, namely the meditation of the young pianist’s fate, as consecrated to quite ceaseless emulation of the masters, in the (statistically: vain) hope of becoming one day a world-famous soloist. Such two-level interpretability of an artistic structure, where the metareflection on the work’s internal constitution depends on the very same structures that reflect on its literary “subject” – is a most praiseworthy quality, typically indicative of high artistic value.
Professor Adam Plater. After the last summer holidays before the final year, at the end of their first lesson in September, the Professor decides to modify the programme of their diploma recital: instead of an impromptu by Schubert as the final piece, he tells them to read Schumann’s *Toccata* op. 7 (p.73). The recital will close their middle musical education and the outcome of the examination will determine their future: who gets an excellent grade has chances to continue the musical career at the Academy, who does not – will need to change life plans. Now the core of the first part of the *Toccata* are two lessons where two musical *ekphrasis* is introduced: first – *in abstracto*, when Schumann’s composition as such is briefly described by the narrator himself, with a stress on its technical difficulties208, second – *in concreto*, when Plater plays it to his pupils and reveals to them that the piece is a “pianistic novella on the art of piano”. He says: “It’s a singular piece. A novelette for piano on the art of piano. Music about a pianist. A sonic portrait of a musician. A portrait expressing his life and fate. Do you hear it? He starts his day. He wakes up, wears his morning gown and there he is by his instrument, there he plays, warms up his fingers: scales, arpeggios, finger excersises. *Legato, staccato, smorzando.* [...] Finally, when his hands are quite warmed up, he concedes himself bashfully a short moment of release and he mutters himself the melody of his life, the monogram of his fate – the fate of a pianist, a musician. There,…. here, this leitmotiv here… this sequence of ten notes

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208 But even in this first apparently technical description, where the narrator presents it as a difficult study, the future programmatic grain is introduced in the form of a genologic reflection. For the narrator it’s more of a piano study, than a *pièce à choix libre*, according to its place at the end of the standard diploma program where it substitutes the impromptu. This makes him reproach the Professor during the following lesson: “you added us, Sir, one more study; and a monstrously difficult one!”. The narrator provides an imaginative *simile* when he says: it is “like a model warm up: a piece imitating the exemplary training of the pianist”. It makes the reader think of Camille Saint-Saëns’s *Le carnaval des animaux*, which in the middle of this veritable zoo places a clear parody of the everyday pianistic warm-up with school-style scales and arpeggios and comic effects of anger at committing errors. *Orig.:* “W całości jest to [*jakby modelowa rozgrzewka: utwór imitujący wzorcowy trening pianisty*, zawierający w sobie podstawowe zadania techniczne i rytmiczne [*…*] Dodał nam pan profesor jeszcze jedną etiudę – powiedziałem z wyrzutem na wstępie kolejnej lekcji – i to potwornie trudną” (pp.73-74)
accentuated iambically: \textit{ta ta ta-ta ta-ta ta-ta ta-ta}” \cite{80}, all translations mine – J.C.).

Transported completely by his pedagogical furore, Plater sings along bizarre words to the four-bar main motif floating over the motoric semiquavers:

Słyszycie to? – I wraz z kolejnym nawrotem owego lejtmotyw-u profesor zaczął śpiewać:

\begin{quote}
Gdyś sobie graam, nie jestem wtedy saam!
\end{quote}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{“Playy-ing the tone – I’ll never be alone!”}
\end{figure}

When the great day comes, Slavek gets an excellent grade and the narrator who plays right after him, after having performed brilliantly through the whole programme (two studies by Chopin, Bach’s prelude and fugue and a Bethoveenian sonata) – fails in the final \textit{Toccata}. What actually happens there and makes him interrupt the performance is a very ambiguous matter, having to do with Plater’s crazy \textit{Lieder}\textsuperscript{209}.

\textsuperscript{209} I coined this phrase as equivalent to the Narrator’s preoccupied “wariackie śpiewy” \cite{82, 99}, rendering ‘śpiewy’ (singing) through ‘Lieder’ in order to emphasize the intersemiotic character of the operation, converse to Mendelssohn’s \textit{Lieder ohne Wörter}. The same adjective is used “wariacka opowieść”, “crazy tale” describing Plater’s programmatic “revelation”, “sermon”\cite{89}. 

104
During the performance, he gets increasingly distracted by some voice which seemingly sings along to the echoing “prologue” of the “leitmotif”:

“Doon’t be deceived…

doon’t be decived…”

and then, *accelerando*, as in a refrain:

“doon’t be… doon’t be… […]” (p.112)

This distraction becomes obsessive, “Who on earth is moving their lips there!” (p.113) to the point when the narrator “like Orpheus in Hades” turns his head towards the jury (p.114) to notice that nobody is making any faces nor moving lips, as he suspected. Only the Professor nodded with disappointment at what he took for a bravoure gesture of his over-self-confident pupil.

...and then, precisely on the leitmotive-prologue bars and the six times repeated echo of the last notes, on that downward fourth which sounded to my ears with the words “doon’t be… doon’t be…”

don’t be… don’t be … don’t be … don’t!

my train crashed.²¹⁰

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²¹⁰ A. Libera, *Toccata C-dur*, [in:] Niech się panu darzy, Biblioteka WIĘZI, Warszawa 2013, p. 114. All translations, including the lyrics of the „crazy Lieder” are mine – J.C.
The narrator decides to give up piano and, “like the Schumann le reveur”, starts studying law (p.115). Slavek makes it to the Academy. The epilogue comes “nearly fifty years” later (p.117), after decades spent abroad, on the western side of the Iron Curtain, resumed only very briefly. The narrator says yes to an invitation for a

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211 The leap, most significantly, is introduced by the remark: “… I didn’t realize that from then on I were not to hear this piece for many, many years” (p.117). An Italian reviewer of Libera’s Toccata in do maggiore, has strongly criticized this leap: “A quel punto come la composizione si arresta e involontariamente (?) scoppia la bolla di candore e prosa coinvolgente che finora Libera è stato in grado di tirare fuori. La storia subisce il classico passo in avanti di anni […] E il romanzo si chiude su di loro, sui racconti delle rispettive vite, con una frettolosità che dispiace e che chiude la storia con l’ennesima esecuzione da parte di Slavek della Toccata in do maggiore. In sintesi, La Toccata in do maggiore non è onestamente un romanzo indimenticabile e Libera dimostra uno iato piuttosto curioso tra la sua apprezzata capacità di interpretare Beckett e quella, di cui è quasi del tutto privo, di osservare il presente e dare alla sua narrativa lo spessore che certi spaccati storico-culturali meriterebbero” Greco, Salvatore. 2015. „‘La Toccata in do maggiore’ di Antoni Libera.” PoloniCult. Un blog italiano di cultura polacca. http://polonicult.com/la-toccata-in-do-maggiore-di-antoni-libera/. This criticism is entirely misplaced, as it ignores completely the formal motivation of this formal development and its textual bases within the text itself. The second motive was quoted above – simply if the protagonist of the narration is the Toccata itself, then there is no point in narrating years when it didn’t resound. But the first and most important one is to be found in Plater’s exegesis of the Toccata. (The Pedagogue explains “as if in a trance”:) “Ta repetycja to chwyt na zmianę skali czasu: z wyrywkowej na pełną, z „dniowej” na
school reunion, comes back to Poland and finds his old colleague there. Plater has
died thirty years ago: now Slavek teaches piano. In the final scene, in his office, he
plays the *Toccata* once more. During this last performance, the narrator reflects
ambiguously on both biographies. At first, his own success, money, family, travels,
career abroad – strike him in contrast with Slavek’s humble teaching position in the
sad communist reality, unfulfilled ambitions of great soloist career and a lonely life
devoted to pupils in a mediocre institution. But then, in response to the repetition
of the first part of the Toccata (in lights of its Platerian exegesis), he realises in this
life consecrated to every day piano practice “something more than just the trait of
unfulfilment and vain routine – something touchingly sublime: a sense of self-
sufficiency, a sense of « raw happiness »” (p.126). He is struck by the vanity of all
these decades of his own mundane occupations when compared to Slavek’s music.
The last chord of Libera’s piece is unresolved vanitas and nostalghia touching both
perspectives.


Libera masterfully combines extreme narrative density with simplicity of
plain, familiar music-school style, great renditions of particular rituals and
linguistic habits typical of this musical milieu\(^\text{212}\). In one short piece (the reader has

\(^{212}\) The role of this „peripheral”, „institutional” musicality should by no means be downplayed. These contextual
settings frame and set the musicalisation of the text proper, just as the socio-institutional aspects of musical life
frame and condition our experience of music in the real life. Here recent philosophy of music comes as an
important aid, as it points convincingly to how these institutional „external” aspects regulating musical life
actually shape music itself. The paradigmatic change in musical aesthetics of perception after 1800 was
analysed as a result of the rise of public concerts and concert halls, cf. L. Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of
Musical Works*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992. Also Kivy advocated the idea of the „Great divide” in
music, which was criticised by Young. Cf. J.O. Young, *The ‘Great Divide’ in Music*, „British Journal of
op. cit. Memorable *ekphrasis* of concerts and especially of operatic performances, such as in Mann’s
*Walsungenblut* or of the Nazi-organized spectacles in the Zoppot Waldoper in the thirties in Huelle’s *Śpiewaj*
the impression that every word and phrase is somehow necessary where it is, as if dependent from some non-referential order rules) Libera combines canonical strategies of musical mystification as means of musicalization with some innovative techniques. In the *Buddenbrooks* music kills Hanno, purporting the “fall of the Family”: an ambiguous tragedy. And in *Doktor Faustus*, apart from music playing a similar decisive role, Kretzschmar’s lectures prepare and corroborate Zeitblom’s intermedial maneuvers and muscobiographical equations, just like Plater’s theatrical and inspired lessons anticipate and – in a way – cause the recital’s breakdown. His crazy Lieder result literally fatal for his pupils. The spectacular element of intersemiotic quotations comes together with straightforward yet innovative parallel strategies of typographic rendition of the musical elements to the extent that even a reader with no score reading skill will get some rhythmic idea of how Schumann’s toccata sounds like. Plater’s “Liederisation” of pure music as response to programmatic “instrumental lyric” creates a vindictive demon (voice) which is responsible for the catastrophe during the recital. Richter’s interpretation, first “borrowed” by the Narrator and then “stolen” by Slavek gains its plasticity as an autonomous work of musical interpretation. These procedures cannot remain unnoticed by the attentive reader, as they are overtly thematized in the dialogues. Richter’s interpretation, itself being a rendition of Schumann’s op. 7, can be analyzed as a multiple imitation: played by himself -> (1) recorded and played back from the LP -> (2) “parodied” by the Narrator -> (3) “borrowed” and subsequently “stolen” by Slavek. This process is visible to the agent and dividable in distinct imitatable elements. As such, in its complex imitative nature, it plays a decisive role in the tragic *peripatheia*.

*ogrody* or even the relatively „innocent” lengthy descriptions of Venetian operatic life from Sand’s Consuelo – they all gain strictly musical importance thanks to this theoretical understanding provided by philosophy. They can be regarded as something aesthetically more functional, than a mere „scene from the opera house”, if combined with other musicalization techniques (arguably: it is the case of Mann and of Huelle, to much a lesser extent traceable in Sand). See: T. Mann, *Frühe Erzählungen 1893-1912* [Wälsungenblut; Der Tod in Venedig; Tristan; Tonio Kröger et al.], S. Fischer 2002; P. Huelle, *Śpiewaj ogrody*, Znak, Kraków 2014.
Fictionalizing music emerges here once more as a crucial element of musicalizing fiction (– in a lens it shows what happened on larger scale: consider the role of Wagnerian Leitmotiv technique in the new opportunities it created for the writers imitating music). This is obviously a manipulative petitio principii: first you show music as it were literature, you convince your reader and seduce him into this fiction and second – you imitate this literary element ascribed to music, duping your prey into a splendid intermedial illusion. But if a mystification, this mechanism works on the level of intentional calibration – and thus entices perception more musico in the spirit ascribed discursively to the music itself. The use of this “innocent” technical trick does not oblige musicalized fiction to take anti-formalist stances. Quite the opposite: the formalist paradigm is precious and often voiced, as it offers high rewards to literature capable of imitating it.

**Libera’s Toccata analyzed through Petermann’s New Model of Intermediality (Expanded and Discussed)**

Let us use the new model of intermediality proposed, examined and defended by Petermann to see which elements of textual imitation of music can we observe through its lens. The advantage her approach has over the models it is based on (Wolf, Rajewsky) is that instead of nuancing the various types of intermediality, it offers a flexible analytic tool that can be used to figure out which features that it maps in general are effectively present in a particular case. I take it for granted that this model, however developed within her work on musical novels, can be applied with no systematic modification to novellas and other forms of shorter fiction. The purpose of applying the model here is twofold: on one hand, it has a heuristic value, for it leads to a systematic identification of parameters that interest us; on the other hand it can be tested in action and confronted with the elements salient in Libera’s novella but not fitting in the categories it proposes.
It is most helpful to distinguish sharply textual IMITATION from THEMATIZATION of musical features. For Aristotle both showing, imitating in gesture or tone of voice, acting, telling and describing were all species of μίμησις, proper to different τεχναί (arts). It is however useful to keep the two apart – like Plato, who distinguished mimesis from diegesis, the latter corresponding roughly to the sphere of thematization. This enables to focus on fiction made more musico, imitating music in the way it is made, it is performed and it is attended to - rather than just treating musical subjects (falling as well in these categories) in narration. Having this in mind we must however emphasize that both procedures often go together and cases of imitation with no element of thematization are rare and theoretically problematic (the other way round it is not quite the case). This aesthetic focus of Petermann’s study, in contrast with earlier, more sign- and communication-oriented typologies of intermediality, harmonizes with our own approach.

In her exploration of the musical novel, Petermann deals with two types of textual imitations of music: novels imitating features of a whole musical genre, in her case: jazz and blues, the second: consecrated to novels “based on a particular piece of music”, which in her study case are J. S. Bach’s Goldberg Variations BWV 988. The key concept of her analyses is imitation, taking as object “musical structure, performance, and reception”. Depending on the context it is treated as a derivative/generative structural model, where it consists of mimetising some structural features of a musical work, for instance, the form of an air and thirty variations on its harmonic pattern followed by a final repetition da capo of the air. When it comes to performance, literary imitation is at most times co-present with thematization: describing performances, making them a part of the plot or even setting the whole narration “to them”, as it is the case in Nancy Huston’s Goldberg

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Variations\textsuperscript{214}. In this novel the whole narration can be interpreted as a thought stream “upon the piece”, “upon” literally in the sense that it is performed simultaneously with the music, just as in BWV 988 the new musical material of subsequent variations is simultaneously presented with the constant reiteration of the harmonic progression.

The following detailed analysis takes the form hierarchic table, adapted from Petermann’s model; I hope it is still the clearest way of organizing the material.

\textbf{Tabula}

\textit{Intersemiotic Relations within A. Libera’s Toccata in C Major}

\begin{itemize}
\item[A.] \textbf{Intramediality} (verbal text / verbal text)
\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] [Thematization*] Schumann’s Biography read by Slavek
\item[2.] [Imitation**] Use of musicalization techniques present in other literary texts - Mann\textsuperscript{215}
\begin{itemize}
\item[a] Plater -> Kretzschmar
\item[b] Music as an agent: Hanno’s Death
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\item[B.] \textbf{Intermediality} (literature / music)
\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Thematization
\begin{itemize}
\item[a] Homonymous Title with a musical work
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

This homonymy introduces paratextual ambiguity: does the title designate Schumann’s eponymous op. 7 only as its subject, \textit{resp.} heroine, or is it to be intended architextually (namely: that the work published under this title is a toccata itself, just as Schumann’s op. 7.). This ambiguity is a part of the musicalization game. The title is perfectly justified in terms of the first answer, and the second is geologically problematic, for we are immediately faced with the question of its

\textsuperscript{214} The novel comes in two linguistic versions authored by the bilingual Huston; I read the earlier French text: N. Huston, \textit{Les Variations Goldberg}, Actes Sud, Arles 1997, Babel.

\textsuperscript{215} This, being, in Wolf’s terms, a covert feature, emerges in my interpretation here and is not overtly indicated in the novella, nor, for that matter, in any other texts by Libera.

*, ** Asterisks designate a division imposed here by the nature of the analysed text, but absent from the Wolf-Petermann model. For them Thematization and Imitation are cases of intermediality only.
relevance for the form actually displayed by the piece, as understood in musical terms. I turn to this in the conclusion.

\[ b) \quad \text{Description of the work and its interpretation}^{216} (I) - \textbf{Objects} \]

(1) Toccata op. 7 [real - passim]
   (a) Execution
      (i) Plater’s (+sing along)
      (ii) Narrator’s (exercise, lesson, diploma)
      (iii) Slavek’s (lesson, diploma)
   (b) Verbal interpretation (and meta-interpretation*)
      (i) Plater’s (positive\[217\])
      (ii) Narrator’s (negative)
      (iii) Slavek’s (formalist)
   (c) Recordings: Richter’s interpretation thematized and „acting” on the level of mythos.
      (i) Autonomous „interpretative work” – confirmation of Plater’s sermon’s revelation (p.89 + other pieces on the cd mentioned) – imitated by:
         (a) The Narrator (lesson, pp.103-104) [Plater: “parody”]
         (b) Slavek (diploma)
      (ii) Other interpreters mentioned and qualified with epithets (Cziffra, Horovitz, p.104)

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216 Both: (a) performative – execution; (b) discursive – explanation of its sense in programmatic terms. Plater’s “crazy Lieder” are a performative setting of (b), transmuting its originary discursiveness (expressed linguistically as an argument) into a hybrid hic et nunc (“Lied”). This Frankenstein lives his own life and performs his role of an agent within the narrated plot. A reverse process is described in Slavek’s fate, as recapitulated in the last scene, under the impression of Slavek’s last execution of the Toccata: “A ja ujrzałem go nagle, jak przez te wszystkie lata siedzi przy klawiaturze i niestrudzenie ćwiczy. Ćwiczy, ćwiczy i ćwiczy, wciąż na coś licząc i marząc. O recitalach, koncertach, o światowych tournées. A potem już nie marząc, tylko patrząc przed siebie. I jedynie słuchając, co wystukują palce” (p.126). Gradually his dreams (on the life of a famous pianist) accompanying his insistent practicing fade out and he is left with the music (“what his fingers tap”) alone.

217 Plater’s verbal interpretation is in itself intermedial. Precisely: it is a narrativization, a fictionalization of music. And this not only on the diegetic correspondence level (music as symbolizing the young pianist’s fate) but also on the structural, technical level (repetition in music explained through its role in construing narration).
(2) Chopin – 3 Studies:
   (a) C major and E major op. 10
   Slavek’s execution during the second lesson, narratorial verbal interpretation including programme clichés traditionally ascribed to these pieces, e.g. “the paroxysm of cough” in the famous chromatic cascade scored by Chopin 'con bravura’ (p.102),
   (b) G-flat minor (in a simile to the Toccata, p.104)
(3) Bach’s Prelude and Fugue
(4) Beethoven’s Sonata
(5) Schubert’s Impromptu
(6) Schumann: Variations on the „Abegg” Theme, Studies on a Theme from Paganini, Papillons, Karnaval, Phantasienstücke, Kinderszenen, Kreisleriana218, Piano Concerto in A minor, Konzertstück, Noveletta in F major219

c) Description of the work and its interpretation
   (II) - Means

   (1) Use of technical musical terms (articulation, agogics, dynamics etc.) – very dense.

   Its categorization under the label of thematization is problematic, as these score qualifiers are technically parts of musical notation and the borderline between “use” and “mention” is hard (or impossible) to draw.

   Special case: “leitmotiv” used in a manipulated way (appropriate only on the grounds of Plater’s programmatic interpretation; a self-fulfilling curse reflected in: “don’t think you’ll pass…” rationalized later on as an “illusion, a projection of one’s own lack of faith”220 (p.124), which, though, through its action, came out to be providential).

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218 Quoted by the Narrator in the discussion on the interpretation – as examples of the “programmes, legendary little plots, that Schumann used to invent for his compositions” (p. 78).
219 These pieces, according to the booklet of the LP, constituted the program (inclusive of the encores) of Swietoslaw Richter’s recital in the Warsaw Philharmonic Hall in the late Fifties. A CD released in 1996 by Deutsche Grammophon No 0289 447 4402 6 containing a 1959 recording is available.
220 Orig.: „iluzja, projekcja własnej niewiary”.

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“Iambic” in order to describe the accentuation of the 10 notes of the “leitmotiv”. Inversion of the usual direction of terminological transfer; terms from the vocabulary of poetics applied literally to describe an element of music (rhythmic accent).

2. **Imitation**

   a) **Of music as a technique**

   (1) *Repetitio simplex* (shared – on the level of situations, places, but also “Homeric epithets” for musical elements form the *Toccata*) and

   (2) *variatio* (shared *mutatis mutandis*):

   Example of verbal repetition-variation (the material is a verbal interpretation of the *Toccata*):

   – „Jednakże jest on w C-dur” – wyrecytował Sławek – „i brzmi zasadniczo pogodnie, czy wręcz krzykliwie radośnie, jest on w istocie smutny, przerażająco smutny” (p. 123, a seeming verbatim repetition of narrator’s words, underlined by the locutory verb “recited”, and enforced by the enthusiastic “you remember” that followed, but actually a changed and more pessimistic version of the original, cf. p. 79).

   (3) Musical imitation: 3 “voices” stating the "subject" repeatedly - fugal technique

   b) **Of the toccata**

   (1) As musical material (quotes)

   (2) Onomatopoeic and typographic transcription of musical features such as metric accent and rhythmic relations (e.g. “*ta ta ta*”):

   This technique of sillabic rendition of musical rhythm has its predecessor for example in Jerzy Andrzejewski’s 1947/1948 novel *Ashes and Diamonds*. This work, politically engaged on the communist side, critical of the Polish Resistance (Armia Krajowa) and very far from any emotional or aesthetic exaltation is nonetheless full of musical references of different sorts. There is a scene, masterfully
reinterpreted in Andrzej Wajda’s 1958 film *Ashes and Diamonds*, where at dawn, at the end of a party in a hotel bar, the majordomo Kotowicz has the insane idea of making the band play Chopin’s *Polonaise* A major op. 53. The piece is quoted (in a dialogue between Kotowicz and the band’s pianist) thus:

„Tam-ta-tam. Ta-ra-tata-tata-tatam…”

No doubt, the reader is supposed to hear the opening motive of the famous piece in these sillables. Indeed, it would be really hard not to.\(^{(3)}\)

(3) As interpreted verbally (two fates – two readings)
(4) As "voice" ascribed to its melodic material (through the process of “Liederisation”: it becomes a decisive agent in mythos - like in Hanno's death in the *Buddenbrooks*)
(5) Repetition ”50 years later” (based on the interpretation of its sense in music “leap” – p.81)

One more execution of the *Toccata*.

Points 3-5 realize the Mannian postulate of “perfect unity of material” between the angelic and the infernal, achieved in Leverkühn’s compositions.

C. **Multimediality**

1. **Use of musical notation**
   a) *Toccata* op. 7 [real]
   b) *Crazy Lieder* [?]

2. **Use of solmization**
   a) *Toccata* op. 7, octave motive in chromatic progression

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II. Meta-intermediality*

1. The absolute-program music question raised explicitly

2. Formalism (Slavek) vs. subtle and philosophically nuanced anti-formalism (maybe Langerian symbolism? Plater)

3. Equations between musical and narrative devices (explicit)

Note on the categorial addition

Thematization not of music as such, but of intermedial phenomena and practices in general should be considered separately. It needs to be singled out in the analytic tree, as it has a special musicalizing function, namely, by discussing these problems explicitly, it prepares the reader for their better perception within the work. The evaluative ‘better’ here is measured primarily with respect to aesthetic axiology (if it manages to have this attention-callibrating effect on the reader) and not necessarily to scholarly accuracy or factual truth. This means that these effects could be achieved also through inaccurate or misleading considerations of the intermedial phenomena. They may be performed both by the narrator and by the characters.

Miscellaneous points (Analysys)

Homeric epithets / musical labels:

a. potwornie trudna etiuda – potworna kaskada akordów – potworna toccata (p.123)

b. [KA]222 – potworna / straszna / finalna kaskada akordów

c. piekielna toccata (pp.76, 92, 97)

222 [KA], [CM] and [L]: These are concrete musical units from Schumann’s Toccata, represented by the listed epithets and recognizable immediately as such in the ear of the reader through the “education” it receives within the text.

i. kiedy mniej więcej w środku brzmiała przez chwilę stacatto – najpierw w moll, potem w dur – urzekająca fraza: jedyna pełna melodia w tym ćwiczebnym utworze (p.77).

ii. Na fali tego nastroju… o, tego espressivo… wykwita niespodzianie cud muzyki: melodia, urzekająco prosta, oparta na trzech tonach w chromatycznej progresji (p.83).

iii. cudowne syrenie głosy (p.111), [these wonders are ambiguous, their wonderful charm may result – as it actually does in the novella – syrenic deviative call of the abyss]

e. [L] – czterotaktowy lejtmotyw (p.77) / wracający motyw (p.77) / [ten / ów / wiadomy / Φ] lejtmotyw (p.80, 81, 87 – Plater’s exegesis; 104, 105; 107 – deal scene; 110 – Slavek’s diploma recital, narrator overhearing through the door of the school Concert Hall; 112, 113, 114, 114 – narrator’s own recital; 124 – discursive reminiscence, in the final dialogue; 126 – Slavek’s final execution in the cabinet) / [ów / wiadomy / ów] refren (pp.82,85,99)

i. „Muzyki czar to jest niebiański dar” (p.82) [heavenly content of the little motif at the heart (‘divine apogeum’, p.82) of the ‘infernal’ and ‘monstruous’, ‘terrible’ toccata]

ii. […] lejtmotyw. Doprawdy słychać w nim było głos szczęśliwej pokory i „surowego szczęścia” (p.110).

iii. nucąc sobie swoją piosenkę-modlitwę (p.82)

iv. niezrażony, nuci sobie swój hymn, swoje życiowe credo – (p.85)
i. Ale przed pierwszą woltą – w miejscu, gdzie kilka razy powtarza się jak echo sam prolog lejtmotywu (to skoczne „ta ta ta-ta”) 

**Plater in the Kretzchmar function**

In pages 69-70 we find the first characterization of Plater: (1) the gift of elocution, characterized elsewhere (p. 79) as “his magical language”; (2) apart from being a pianist, he taught the “musical literature” classes. This is a standard class in all lower grade music schools in Poland; but in the intermedial context of the novella Plater’s double identity (professor of piano and of musical literature) is most telling. (3) Further intermedial clue corroborating our working hypothesis linking Libera’s technique with drama: “he had something of an actor. Lessons with him – it was theater”:

posiadał też rzadką wiedzę z zakresu historii muzyki i biografistyki, a przy tym **dar wymowy**. Potrafił bardzo ciekawie i barwnie opowiadać, głównie o sławnym artystach – o wielkich kompozytorach, o ich wyczynach twórczych i życiowych dziwactwach – lecz i o innych sprawach, niekiedy abstrakcyjnych, związanych z formą utworów, harmonią i kontrapunktem. **Stąd też jego zajęcia z literatury muzycznej** cieszyły się niezmiennie ogromnym powodzeniem. Słuchano go z podziwem, nieledwie uwielbieniem. Miał w sobie coś z **aktora. Lekcje z nim to był teatr**[223].

Lessons with Plater are described as spectacles, with some **je ne sais quoi**

To **d’ineffable** to it:

**Przedziwny to był spektakl. Niby pokaz rzemiosła, a jednak nie tylko to, bo było w tym coś jeszcze, choć trudno powiedzieć co. Coś z innego porządku, który wymyka się słowom.** Dawało się to odczuć zwłaszcza w finale utworu, a w pełni dotarło do nas, kiedy profesor skończywszy, ni stąd, ni zowąd zapytał:

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– No, zrozmieśliście?

This is an utmost paradox: the musical *je ne sais quoi d’ineffable* is elicited by the Professor’s *programmatic* (i.e. “literary”) interpretation of the toccata. Precisely in this moment the unexpected question comes: “So, did you get it”? The startled Slavek replies, after a while of silence: “What, Sir?”:

Zapadła chwila ciszy, po czym strapiony Sławek odezwał się niepewnie:

– Co, panie profesorze?
– No, jak to co? – profesor uśmiechnął się pobłażliwie. – O czym jest ten kawałek. O co właściwie w nim chodzi.

“What is this piece about. What is it actually about”. This is the introduction to a discussion, where Slavek opposes such programmatic suggestions, quoting the professor himself.

**Conclusion**

Libera’s novella is a piece of prose which contains genuine musical elements, namely: melodic material taken from Schumann that resounds in the reader’s inner ear alongside with Professor Plater’s insane little Lieder, repeted over and over again. These Lieder led the protagonist towards the irresistible catastrophe that decided his fate. The necessity of such an *andamento* is both tragic and musical: marked by the irrefutable iron consequence of counterpoint and destiny – essentially irreversible. Libera’s achievement should not be diminished by its multimedial dimension being overt. Musical notation is used first as an illustration, second as an integral part of the narration complementing words; third as a part ostensibly substituted in consecutive occurrences by its verbal equivalents.

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224 Even if it can be argued that through the rigorous mathematical form displayed by the counterpointistic consequence, the temporal irreversibility is overcome by the very process that establishes it. The sound relations being governed by eternal (a-temporal) proportions make everything reversible in the sense of possible transformations. This is most evident in regular palindromic structures within regular canons and canonic imitations such as in Bach’s *Musikalisches Opfer*, where the second voice of the canon is in retrograde, introducing thus an eternal circularity and identity of a sequence and its reverse movement.
according to the arbitrary convention established by the text itself (through Prof. Plater’s lessons\textsuperscript{225}, the protagonist’s peculiar interpretations and through the recurrence of the “homic epithets” analysed above as [KA], [CM], [L], corresponding to precise melodic [CM], [L] and harmonic [KA] elements of the toccata). In the climax moment of the tragic peripeteia, when the protagonist hears the sirenic voice tempting him into the abyss, the music – when it is most intense – is first evoked in words and only afterwards repeated within the modified score. But what is even more important: the scene as a whole is an execution of the musical score provided by the novella, as the “crazy Lieder” are really notated as Lieder, that is, with a verbal text subscribed under a precise melodic voice – an instrumental voice, the voice of the piano, which through this complex operations gains full agency: he words inscribed in the score are uttered in concerto (sic!), and, to be sure, not by a human voice.

Having made these observations I would advocate a position that accepts the main motivations of “aural-sonicism” (presented in the introductory chapters as an element of the current standard view on music) and rejecting only its dogmatic consequences. There is irreducibly musical understanding and there is beauty which is purely musical. Both are known and given to us humans within the “aural-sonicism” contingent framework which, however, should not be absolutized. For the true formalist cannot be too much attached to the matter, formed by the forms he places at the core of his analysis of beauty.

But if this is music – what kind of music, what form it displays and in what relation does it stand with respect to Schumann’s op. 7?

\textsuperscript{225} They are “master interpretations” in the context diegetically established by the narration; Plater, by his professorial position, personal authority, erudition and esteem in the eyes of his pupils is invested with the necessary powers to “make things with words” to use the title Austin’s celebrated work, or, more precisely, to “make sounds speak words”, to grant his crazy intermedial interpretations the stamp of effectivity. In this professorial role and intermedial the role of this role (!) Plater resembles Mann’s Kretschmar (who himself, in Mann, is even homonymous with Kretschmar, the celebrated authority in musical hermeneutics).
Libera’s piece doesn’t replicate the structural outline of the eponymous toccata\(^{226}\); rather – it plays with its musical material constituting an independent variation on its themes. Just like in the variation technique in traditional music it quotes the themes from their source *verbatim* in the first place and then elaborates them applying the composer’s own style and texture making up for a new composition. This new composition here combines two semiotic systems on the level of producing its score. As a result we get a score for a particular silent performance of music and narrative entwined. Musical executions are crucial events of the whole plot (*mythos*) and cannot be reduced to something non-musical without distorting the piece’s organic coherence and beauty.

Beckett on Joyce: “Here form *is* content, content *is* form. You complain that this stuff is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not *about* something; it *is that something itself*\(^{227}\).

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\(^{226}\) Even if the general structure of repetitions could accommodate such a reading. Or maybe this is a three-part free fugal form following the toccata? Such motivic connections in pairs toccata-fugue or prelude-fugue are rare, but not inexistent in the history of music. Actually, one of the examples is to be found in Clara Schumann’s toccata and fugue op. 16 No 3. Suggestion that would enforce the global reading of the piece as an independent musical composition and not just a formal derivate (even if Linda Hutcheon in her *Theory of Adaptation* quoted apud Petermann, *Ibid.* might be right that “coming second is not to be secondary or inferior [nor] o be first is not to be originary and authoritative”). I feel that the authorial intention was to create a formal resemblance between Schumann piece, “the pianistic Novella on the art of piano” to his own Toccata, that is, the novella. Still its facture, the constant presence of three autonomous voices (and the fourth, Richter’s, which speaks only over a limited timespan

Chapter 5. From *Finneganów Tren* to *Da capo al Finne* – More Than a Translation

I am (…) interested in testing (…) the axiom that *Finnegans Wake* is literature because it contains letters

Krzysztof Bartnicki\textsuperscript{228}

Introduction

We are presented with a whole range of disturbing problems by the provocative work of Krzysztof Bartnicki (born 1971 in Opole, Poland). He is among the few people in the world who offered a full translation of Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* into another language\textsuperscript{229}, making Polish the seventh since the original’s publication in 1939\textsuperscript{230}. Yet what will be my focus in this chapter is his successive intermedial engagement with Joyce’s text, rather than the translation itself. In the first brief section I will describe Bartnicki’s work along most simple and down to earth lines, exposing its conceptual elements to the reader and providing references to the audible and textual material available. At this stage I will limit any comments to the necessary minimum. In the second part I will proceed with a discussion of the work, following the paths indicated by Bartnicki himself and counterpointing them critically. In the third part I will conclude giving the work a place within the realm of *musica textualis*.

1. Object Description and Genesis

A recent exhibition at the Zachęta – National Gallery of Art in Warsaw (*Życie. Instrukcja*, 04.02.2017-23.04.2017, curator: Jadwiga Sawicka) confronted the

\textsuperscript{228} K. Bartnicki, *Da capo al Finne*, 2016. I read “contains” here as “is made of” or “contains almost exclusively”, as otherwise it would make little sense, both with respect to received ideas (“axioms”) on the essential features of literature and music; and with respect to Bartnicki’s actual work, as analyzed in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{229} The question of the work’s original language and of the translation languages respectively is a thorny one in this case. See the section What Gets Lost in Translation below.

visitors with a group of audio/visuo/textual artefacts embodying/communicating Bartnicki’s artistic work upon Joyce following the publication of his translation. It is a constellation of recordings, texts and events presented under the title Bartnicki’s Variations on Joyce’s Variations on Various Themes\textsuperscript{231} (Work in Progress\textsuperscript{232}, 2012 – 2017). The core idea from which all the successive realizations and modification stem – is to reduce the text of Finnegans wake into a musical cryptogram, derived from the original through a rigorous application of a clearly defined sign-selection procedure. I will describe the procedure and its variants in the detailed discussion below.

Bartnicki, after ten years of translator’s work and fervent study on Finnegans Wake felt forced to admit that, even if he succeeded in publishing it in Polish as Finneganów tren, he fails to appreciate this impressive work qua literature\textsuperscript{233}. He felt urged to approach it in some other manner, in a way that would do it experiential and intellectual justice, to perform it in a thought-provoking way. This impulse can perhaps be interpreted as a striving created by Joyce’s work itself, inscribed by him into the text by the utmost semantic frustration its readers are notoriously left with. If this were true, Bartnicki’s work could appear at least as a legitimate interpretive possibility, one among many others, if not as the key to brake the enigma.

“If it fails as Literature – why don’t we make an effort to hear it as Music”, thought Bartnicki. A simple concept and a set of straightforward rules


\textsuperscript{232} This implies both the actual open character of the work and of course suggests its union or continuity with the original title of FW used by Joyce before its publication as a whole under the new title.

\textsuperscript{233} This blasphemy can shock devoted Joyceans, especially if it comes from the mouth of one of seven or so people on the Globe who managed to publish an entire translation of FW. Cf. his Foreword to the English Edition, where he says “Admit, in simplified Quintilian terms, that literature is meant to teach, move, or please – to convey information, didactic patterns, or emotions – and see that James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (FW) fails as a literary text”. K. Bartnicki, „Da capo al Fin♫e”, op. cit.
governing mechanical operations on (one of the versions\textsuperscript{234} of) the Joycean text permitted him to generate new and unusual versions of this obscure masterpiece. These, despite their cryptographic textual support, may turn to be much more approachable not only to Bartnicki himself, but, potentially, to the public as well, than the original work. His reading of \textit{Finnegans Wake} is not a reading through its notoriously unclear meanings, but \textit{despite} them, in a procedure called by Bartnicki \textbf{reduction}. It consists of rewriting Joyce’s text faithfully with the omission of musically insignificant signs. Now this requires a decision on which typographic elements contained in \textit{FW} are musically interpretable and how. Two different reduction rules are to be found in Bartnicki’s to-date work: (1) the simpler one in “Da capo al Finne” (2012, 2016), a book presented at the exhibition, where the set of letters taken as corresponding to musical sounds consists of soundnames of the diatonic scale plus H (C, D, E, F, G, A, B, H\textsuperscript{235}) and the more complex one (2) in “F _ NNEGANS _ A _ E: Stuite in the Key of Ш”, where the list of musically meaningful signs and sign combinations is much longer, as it includes not only single letters but also combinations thereof and accepts musical sign-to-sound mappings other than the Western European letter notation (for details and discussion, see below).

\textsuperscript{234} He used the Viking/Faber and Faber 1958 Edition of \textit{FW}, cf. J. Joyce and (arr. by) Krzysztof Bartnicki, \textit{F _ NNEGANS _ A _ E: Stuite in the Key of III} (1939), 2014, , 376 (Final word). And K. Bartnicki, „Da capo al Fin\textit{Ge}”, op. cit. (Preface).

\textsuperscript{235} In the Central European musical convention H means B and B means B-flat. I turn back critically to this below.
This idea and the reductions presented by Bartnicki as independent publications gave issue to a series of (audible) musical pieces set by Bartnicki and arranged by Wojciech Kucharczyk (born 1969). In these pieces Bartnicki and Kucharczyk transform the sound sequences contained in the reductions from Joyce
into *imitations*\(^{236}\) of existing pieces, pieces often created after the times of Joyce. The result is a new work (presented at the exhibition as a *work in progress* under the above mentioned title), beyond doubt, but *what sort of work* it exactly is and in what relation to Joyce it stands will be under scrutiny as soon as we are done with its primary presentation and analysis. Further on we will discuss the hypothesis that it is a *work of musical performance* or *composition* or *arrangement*. For my reconstruction of the work I rely on two primary performative sources, namely, my visit to the Zachęta Gallery exhibition\(^{237}\) and a concert-lecture given there on 16.02.2017 at 18h00 by both artists. In this I am aided by printed primary sources\(^{238}\). A second\(^{239}\) group of sources includes various critical texts and interviews given by Bartnicki and his commentators. Because of the conceptual character of at least some of the works constituting this constellation, a sharp distinction between the work and its secondary (auctorial) literature is in this case impossible to draw.

\(^{236}\) Imitation, the crucial Platonic term and *terminus technicus* of polyphony, is also central to Wolf-Petermann’s theory, leading sometimes to confusions. For Wolf-Peterman a novel cannot contain genuine imitation (in the sense of the *terminus technicus* of music), at best it can imitate textually the imitation technique. This is may be very confusing to the unprepared reader.

\(^{237}\) The Exibition inspired by the work of Georges Perec was subdivided into four parts (in the order of visit): *ludic* (which was home to Bartnicki’s work), *sociological, novelist* and *autobiographical*, followed by the *Reading Room*. This context enables drawing links between Bartnicki’s self imposed generation rules and the works of the OuLiPo (Ouvroir de Littérature potentielle) and especially Perec himself. His lipogram technique famously used in the novel *La disparition*, 1969. is reflected in Bartnicki’s letter elimination procedures (if for different reasons). Just as the members of OuLiPo, the author of „*Da capo al Finale*“, op. cit. reflects through his works on the problems of authorship, plagiarism, originality and the nature of artistic creation, fascinated by mechanical procedures and acting under self imposed *constraints*.


\(^{239}\) These positions are out of print and hardly available; I use and quote their Prefaces, Notes and the Final Word to *Finnegans wake*, but I have no access to the full text of this work. The Author explicitly refused himself to send me a copy for the purpose of this study, yet he sent me some excerpts from the main text and replied in detail to my lengthy letters.
2. The Work and Its Moments

But even if somebody were able to hear FW in its true rhyme and rhythm, under the spell of song, could literature cast as music be better than music cast as itself?

Krzysztof Bartnicki²⁴⁰

Text as Score

In order to read Joyce as music, Bartnicki decided to treat the text as a musical score. This decision gave birth to a series of correlated artefacts, all standing in some derivative relation to James Joyce’s text, but different in nature. The approach to the literary text as a partitura was crucial to our reading of Libera’s intermedial novella and compatible with our reading of Iwaszkiewicz’s *Fourth Symphony* in the previous chapters. In both cases the musical reading was shown as responding to a vital performative suggestion of the text, an appeal to the readers’ musicality²⁴¹. The reader, within that model, becomes a silent interpret of a verbal structure which calls for an aesthetic engagement guided by musical basic concepts of form, interaction of interdependent voices, semantic transfer between word and melo-harmonic elements in both directions, appeal to the inner ear or musical imagination. I argued that these texts as we get them call for this sort of concretization. In Ingarden’s terms – some parts of the schemata built up with quasi-judgments²⁴², on a holistic analysis may be – and preferably are – understood as substitutes of typically musical imperative symbols. And what these substitutes command to the silent performer are concretizations of selected musical elements potentially composing a formal whole. Such concretizations are governed by the text as a verbal score, and not necessarily incarnate as – be it physical or imagined – sounds.

²⁴⁰ Foreword to: K. Bartnicki, „Da capo al Finale”, op. cit. (Bold – mine, J.C.)

²⁴¹ It can be objected, that a genuine musical score must be read in musical terms, such an interpretation is not optional, as no work at all emerges when not applied, in contrast with the textual music partituras discussed, where standard readings are not musical²⁴⁰, but linguistic.

Now the Joyce-Bartnicki case is radically different, as the mechanism at work is of a qualitatively dissimilar nature: it does not involve semantic engagement with the sign-chain understood as a specimen of language. The text becomes a musical score not in virtue of the sort of linguistic meanings it offers at a first level of understanding, but through a shift in the general decoding paradigm – the set of semantic rules used in the basic interpretation of the symbols sequenced in the text.

More precisely, it is a two-step semantic procedure, where both steps are separated by a shift between two semiotic systems. The first-grade linguistic understanding moment is at hand, but its role is limited to frustrating negativity, to the famous “semantic despair” it induces in the reader. Yet this frustrating effect has its key function: it leads the distressed would-be reader to other interpretive hypotheses on the symbolic system to which the sign-stream belongs and within which it contains meaningful information. Among these we find the one Bartnicki chooses to explore, namely, that FW encrypts a long chain of musical

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231 Quote from: Twórcza: Krzysztof Bartnicki, n.d.


235 Cf. the refrain of Pippo Pollina’s song featuring Franco Battiato: “James tell me what do you want to say with your book, Finnegans’s Wake [sic!]” P. Pollina, F. Battiato, and Nada, Finnegans’s Wake, 1999. [sic!] The title - as well as the lyrics - of this cantautore expression of ‘semantic despair’ distorts the title of its Joycean purported eponymous work: cf. the cover of the 1999 album Rossocuore as well as the single album – both contain the incriminated Saxon genitive. This error (or “error”) can be explained perhaps through the reference to the original Irish ballad. But it seems rather a simple proof of how far one can get in realizing the “non reading – other creative engagement” hermeneutic principle with regard to FW. The authors of the song know “James’s book” only “by ear” – uncontaminated by the orthography of its very title(!).
This constitutes the second step which is brutally illustrated by the published form of Joyce’s text after reduction:

Illustration 2  Da capo al finne, fragm.

Concert performances of these works (or their recordings) at the present stage of Bartnicki’s activity make Joyce’s text as literature absent from the perceptual stratum of the pieces: the text is entirely transformed into musical sounds. Nothing, in principle, excludes though putting both readings in interrelation. In other words – after having performed the above described musicalization procedure that necessarily annihilates the literary stratum of the text, it is possible to turn back to the original text and explore the potential tensions between the two sign chains. This opens doors not only to speculation (Bartnicki himself found some striking correspondences between the music he “found” in an excerpt and its textual linguistic meaning) enabling further anchoring or textual corroboration of the musical interpretive hypothesis, but also to further musicotextual experimentation within the final musical compositions that issue. One very simple one would be to set the Joycean text to the music excavated from its flesh, maybe in a way that would emphasize some parallelism or contrast between the expressive or

Secondary literature to FW is immense and contains many other interpretative keys and hypotheses, all aiming at making sense of what does not make sense on the “surface understanding” level.
associational meaning impact of the music and the images evoked linguistically by the text.

Let us sum up the stages of this process in points:

(1) FW frustrates the basic/surface linguistic comprehension on the part of the reader.

(2) The reader, acting upon the interpretive principle of charity, opts for a semiotic switch. His reasoning is this:
   a. FW has surface sense (Premise, from the principle of Charity)
   b. FW has no natural-language surface sense (from: experience and research)

FW has surface sense in some other semiotic system than natural language.

Now in order to uncover such a meaning, one has to test the text as if it belonged to different known semiotic systems. Let us try to interpret it as having musical surface sense and see, or rather hear, what happens. The hypothesis of FW containing a sequence of musical information is just one among many other options; it is, however, partly corroborated by some indications within the text itself and in Joyce’s remarks on it elsewhere.

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247 At least none to match the work’s assumed profundity as a literary artwork (that FW is a profound artwork, literary or not, is an additional premise made in this reasoning). Cf. here the discussion on musical profundity and general criteria of profundity as formulated by Kivy: J. Levinson, Musical Profundity Misplaced, „The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism“, 1992, t.50, no 1, pp. 58–60; P. Kivy, Another Go at Musical Profundity: Stephen Davies and the Game of Chess, „The British Journal of Aesthetics“, 2003, t.43, no 4, pp. 401–411.

248 In the case of Bartnicki, it must be stressed, from ten years’ intensive translator’s work concluded with a successful publication of FW’s seventh translation worldwide.

249 Bartnicki makes arguments to the effect that the plurality of mutually incompatible readings of the basic sense of this stream of linguistic signs proves that we have no reasons to think, that one day such sense will be philologically established and widely accepted.
Motivation in Joyce: Desemantisation and Resemantisation

The text itself offers close to none coherent quasi-judgments to decipher, at least as far as stable, uncontentious quasi-judgments expressed in a natural language are concerned. It is typical of artistic literature that its meanings are subject to discussion, contention and interpretation, making it common for a literary masterpiece, that the corpus of its interpretations and commentaries greatly exceeds in volume the primary text itself. But at least of works whose integral texts are at our disposal, and especially of such works written within the last two centuries, it would be very awkward if the very basic signification of a great deal of phrases were unresolvedly unstable. This, however, is exactly the case with *Finnegans Wake*. It is a chain of linguistic signs which rarely do constitute well-formed sentences of any known modern or ancient language. Nonetheless, by the very use of linguistic signs (letters and punctuation marks, printed in lines on paper within a standard paginated book form, and quite frequently: the use of recognizable standard English lexemes, in their proper or variated form), it primarily appeals to the reader as a readable text. It plays with this invitation throughout the lengthy whole: the sign-stream, if not written in correct English, constantly evokes English (Irish) meanings, as well as those in ancient Greek, in Latin, French and other languages, resounds with plurilingualistic and multimedia assonances, orchestrates associations, images and intertextual connections. This the cryptic sign-stream continuously places itself anew within the literary, human, civilized and historically

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250 This instability due to lack of resolution within any known established system of reference is a feature that *Finnegans Wake* shares with a number of musical works written after the “emancipation of the dissonance”. The line of parallel is drawn between the tonal system as a set of established references and directives analysable in terms of tensions from dissonance to resolution, where some classes of configurations lead to other, like the seventh of a dominant leads to the third of the tonic, to make a simplest example.

251 There is a whole library of studies on these aspects of Joyce’s work. Bartnicki quotes some of them to convince his audience that no possible consensus on virtually any vital aspect of FW’s interpretation can ever be achieved and that, therefore, all interpretations are equally indiscernible in their legitimacy.
rooted context and strikes as inhumanly uncomprehensive, or comprehensive as mere glossolalia\(^{252}\), intolerable balbuciendo\(^{253}\) of the saint or of the mad\(^{254}\).

Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax!\(^{255}\)

This memorable onomatopoeia, quite paradoxically, is one of the safest points on the page (FW 4), in the traditional reading terms, as it is a clear and straightforward quote from Aristophanes and any reader familiar with the Frogs will instantly feel comforted at this point\(^{256}\). The intertextual reference, however, is thus given priority here over the mimetic direct reference to the outer world, that purportedly was the core mechanism of literature, illustrating ante litteram or perhaps heralding implicitly the post-modern textological claim, that literary texts, primarily refer to other texts. If we get at the image of grotesquely coaxing frogs here it is through the recognition of the quote from Aristophanes, not the other way round. Thus, the traditional model of primary linguistic apprehension as basilar for any other level of apprehension in literature is seriously put in question here. Arguably “Brékkek (…)” does not express any judgment, which we could primarily understand and consequently ascend to higher orders of literary understanding. Instead it creates directly an intertextual bridge to Aristophanes; only this intertextual reference invests the quoted line with eventual mimetic meaning (i.e. ‘frogs coaxing loudly’). This is brilliantly ironic, as it is done through the use of an onomatopoeia (in its original ancient Greek context), a rhetorical device arguably closest of all to the ideal of language as direct phonic imitation of nature.

\(^{252}\) Pejorative phrase used by the fictitious writer Philip Quarles in the celebrated passage of A. Huxley, Point Counter Point, Harper and Row, New York 1928., describing what musicalization of fiction ought not be.

\(^{253}\) Mumbling of the mystic in ecstasy, term used by St. John of the Cross.

\(^{254}\) Both figures are united in the Russian Orthodox type of saint-madman jurodivyj.

\(^{255}\) J. Joyce, Finnegans Wake, Wordsworth 2012.

\(^{256}\) Aristoph. Frogs 209: βρεκκεκκέξ κοάξ κοάξ, ρεκκεκκέξ κοάξ κοάξ,.
To sum up: traditional accounts\textsuperscript{257} on linguistic meaning as reference to nonlinguistic objects, states of affairs (actual or imagined as actual at least within the fictional context established by the work) clearly fail to explain the mechanism of how \textit{Finnegans Wake} can be linguistically understandable on the basic level of interpretation for the reader. Facing this fact or we search for some other model of linguistic meaning to explain the use of language in this work of literature or we search for some other model of meaning, not necessarily embracing the work’s elementary linguistic (and therefore: maybe even literary\textsuperscript{258}) nature. As nature abhors vacuum, this very crisis of the traditional semantic and narrative model functions as a springboard towards the \textbf{alternative possibilities of sense making} which require reader’s extensive interpretive activity. One of the possibilities, is the one explored by Bartnicki.

Now it is highly implausible that Joyce intentionally inserted the musical cryptogramme “decoded” afterwords by Bartnicki in his reductions. It is not though so implausible, that FW requires interpretations precisely \textit{of this} kind, namely, that it was intentionally designed as an invitation to produce them. On this account the understanding of FW would reside precisely in producing interpretations of this kind, for further aesthetic and intellectual engagement.

\textbf{The Implied Phonetic Apparatus (Sonic Interpretation of Linguistic Signs)}

An additional question arising at this point is that of the implied phonetic apparatus. If the text is not (simply) English, then how do we know how to pronounce it? Normally the two phenomena (natural language in use and its corresponding word-to-sounds encryption rules) are co-determined: if I open a book and instantly recognize French words and it makes sense to me in French – then if I decide to read it aloud, I will act upon this hypothesis: I will read ‘coquillages’ as

\textsuperscript{257} Criticized, to be sure, also within linguistics today, cf. Wierzbicka, but reigning in Joyce’s times in the works of logical positivists.

\textsuperscript{258} I say: maybe, as this dissertations’ methodology prohibits me to assume a necessary element of a particular \textit{matter} in defining an art.
[kɔkijaʒ] and not as in English nor as in Italian. Thus, the phonetic vest of what I read depends on the natural language which I recognized at first hand in the text, on my natural capacity and on the learned skills (depending on whether I studied Latin in Warsaw or in Oxford or in Rome). Sometimes, though, the fictional frame may guide me to a different choice, as when a character pronouncing the French text in question is characterized as a, say, American lady whose perfect knowledge of French grammar and vocabulary can be rivalled only by her intact accent from Ohio. The spectrum of importance of this phonetic element for the appreciation of the text’s value is broad, from very low, as in non-artistic texts which serve a practical purpose, to very high, as in some genres of lyrical poetry. But even where this stratum determines scarcely any aesthetic properties, it is always there, as an element of the very nature of the linguistic sign. Furthermore, this phenomenon is extremely complex even in the case of known natural languages, as the variety of dialects, personal idiosyncrasies and even phonetically-relevant phisio-anatomical differences between the speakers is overwhelming. The metodological evolution of phonetics within scientific linguistics from more normative towards more descriptive stances means to us that little help from science can come in establishing the class of “proper” or “correct” loud readings of a contemporary literary text. It wasn’t so in the past, where *ars rhetorica* provided professional training and standards of declamation, which differed from place to place and from time to time, but still constituted a systematically and institutionally transmitted theoretical and practical knowledge on this part of literary performance, comparable to the skill of the *cantor* in realizing the score, according to the requirements of the

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259 I said: fictional frame, but in other cases it may well be a contextual performative frame. For instance a well formed ancient music singer will have good reasons to sing a Latin motet by François Couperin or Charpentier using consequently French peculiar pronunciation which differs greatly from all the previously mentioned local versions from other places all over Europe.

260 It can be argued that in some merely pragmatic usages of prose it is completely eliminated, as irrelevant for the whole communication process which involves no vocalization, even imaginary, at all.
musica ficta rules\textsuperscript{261}, as well as ornamentation and improvisation skills seen as an integral part of the mere score reading capacity.

The problem can be illuminated by a further parallel to music. There, too, it arises, with respect to, for instance, instrumental color. Usually the score (in its classical form from 17-18\textsuperscript{th} C. onwards) provides instrumentation information, limiting the range of sounds acceptable as correct realizations of the work notated at least to the sounds producible by the instrument of the indicated kind playing the indicated pitches, with the indicated rhythm, articulation, agogics, dynamics and other parameters. We may disagree on the bowing choices of, say, Perlman, playing Glazunov’s Violin concerto, but as far as it is played on violin and not on trombone we know at least that we disagree on the soloist’s legitimate interpretive choices rather that on the identity of the work played. Literary notation seems less precise with respect to sounds, as on normal occasions it seems not to exclude any sort of pronunciation, if contained within the natural language’s phonetic paradigm, and this, as we said, is conceived of with increasing liberality within linguistics. The linguist feels no more in the position to say that, for instance, lisping, characteristic of a prominent range of English speakers, is an incorrect realization of the [s] phonemes; instead, she may classify its sonicity as statistically less frequent with respect to the standard. But art is less democratic, especially when it plays with lisp as means of imaginary instrumentation, scoring some character (like Mann’s Dr. Institoris, for instance) as lisping.

Joyce’s text seems naturally to call for an Irish English phonetic realization. Words written by Joyce’s hand, even if inexistent in any dictionary, suggest being read as inexistent Irish English words, and not, for instance, German or Slovak. This has reasons to be found both through internal and external critique of the source. The internal critique reveals the predominance of English words, syntax, collocations and prepositional expressions. The external critique considers by whom the text was written (Joyce) and where it was first published (Dublin), indicating an undoubtedly Irish English context of primary reception.

\textsuperscript{261} Vide: M. Bent and A. Silbiger, Musica ficta \textit{[musica falsa]}, 2017.
Unlike in the standard cases, though, **this phonetic variable as a separate point of consideration is made necessary here by the above described processes of dereferentialization**. When linguistic unity is broken, it is legitimate to ask, **does the text determine univocally the phonetic apparatus of its sonic (or imaginatively sonic) realization, and if so, how does it do so and what happens to this determination in the process of translation**. On the other hand, though, it may be taken as one of the few constants in this complicated equation. For if we cannot agree on the precise meaning of a plethora of neologisms we encounter there on each page and of the phrases containing them, it can be argued that at least we know the rules of producing their phonetic correlates, which at times make much more “surface” sense than their eye-read counterparts. Two are the hints at hand here:

1. Joyce’s own recorded readings of passages from FW seemingly give an ostensive reply to this doubt: we can learn the rules of correct phonetic interpretation of the inscriptions constituting the body of the text from how Joyce himself reads them aloud. There is still, however, room for questions left. Is this the normative phonetic interpretation, or maybe one of more legitimate interpretations? Perhaps Joyce’s figure is normative as a **reader-figure**, where the decisive factor is the reader’s mother-tongue-driven instinctive reply to the noted sounds, and not at all as a **coder-decoder author-figure**, which provides the only correct way of vocal interpretation\(^{262}\).

2. Passages where words are written phonetically, that is, acquire the recognizable shape of meaningful English locutions only if read (or imagined as read) aloud within the Irish English phonetic paradigm. This is a stronger indication, as on the general principle of charity we are obliged to assume such a reading of a text, that makes more sense of it and prefer it over other possible readings.

\(^{262}\) Both options, of course, accept the wide margins of tolerance characteristic of natural languages in their spoken and written version.
As we will see in the discussion (3 below) this issue is relevant not only for linguistic surface meaning interpretations, but for the musical transliteration readings as well: critics writing on FW in the Sixties and quite recently used phonetically transcribed sounds of utterances as encoding musical information in solfège and letteral notation.

The text seems to defy the hypothesis that it implies one phonetic apparatus. Arguably it contains a substantive amount of French, Latin and other languages implied phonemes, and not only etymological roots, especially when they appear in italics and in a correct form of the non-English language evoked, for instance:

*L'Auberge du Père Adam*

*(FW, p. 124, italics in original)*

Such an inscription seems to call for a French reading, just like the French dialogues reported in direct speech in 19th Century Russian, Polish or German novels. On the same page we find another challenge to this account, namely standard phonetic notation for Slavonic languages mixed with English orthography and a sillable accent marking within the word: *profèššionally* (my italics – J.C.) immediately followed by an italicized French-English hybrid *piquéd* (italics in original).

Thus – even with regard to what was supposed to be the most comforting and least contentious stratus of *Finnegans Wake*, the sonic flow it prescribes, we are left with more problems than answers.

**What Gets Lost in Translation**

Translation is one of the possible conceptual keys to the Gordian knot of musicalized fiction. Bartnicki’s work – as an independent work “about” the translator’s status and auctorial authority performed by the translator himself – adds one more problematic layer to the standard ways of linking translation with inter-art phenomena. As a paradigmatic operation known from the very beginnings of literature, theology and philosophy, consubstantial in its practical development and theoretical autoreflection with biblical and philosophical hermeneutics – it offers a vast cultural background for the study of intermedial transfer phenomena.
Also from the practical point of view – a comparative analysis of musicalized (or otherwise music-related) artistic texts turns out most revealing. In general, it may be assumed, that if we distinguish broadly between perceivable sonic properties of music, apparent to the ear within the temporal span of audition, and its other aesthetic properties, such as architectonic form, mathematic proportion and context-based relational features – the latter can be sometimes preserved in translation, whereas the former necessarily get lost (if not entirely, for instance rhythmical accentuation patterns, alliterations, rhymes – singular elements of the text’s sonic organization – can be exactly or inexacty imitated in translation).

It is not by accident that Peter Dayan’s main Word and Music seminar at the University of Edinburgh is entitled Poetry, Music and Translation, suggesting the key role of translation in understanding the interrelation between Poetry and Music. The working formula of this seminar has remained unchanged over years. It offers a simple structure of inquiry, which involves reading poems invoking music in languages unknown to the majority of participants first in original, then in English, and observing their formal and contextual features. One of the standard tests which all the discussed texts must undergo is the investigation of what happens to the reference to music of the original poem in its translation. Responses vary from poem to poem and from translation to translation, but always shed sharp light on the way poetry and music are (or are not) entwined in these texts. Through a careful comparison of the original and its poetic translation, the seminar’s participants gain a privileged insight into the workings of these little ephemeral musico-litterary paradoxical miracles which at times take place in poetry engaged with music. Bartnicki’s work analyzed in the present chapter stems from his struggle with the text in the translation process into Polish; recently it has been even interpreted as an open “translation series” in its entirety.

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263 He is the first and, to-day, only Professor of Word and Music Studies in the World.
264 I. Okulska, Intersemiotic Translation to tie-in Products, „Forum of Poetics”, 2016, no Fall, p. 66.
Dereferentialisation as symptom and means of musicalization

Dereferentialization is often used as a means of musicalization,265 inviting the reader to search the logos (order, sense) of the semantically unstable stream of linguistic signs somewhere beyond literature – most typically in its sister temporal asemantic art of music. Furthermore, Joyce himself encouraged musical explorations of the *Wake*, calling it “his ‘suite’ in the key of E-flat” and saying that the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” chapter is “his ‘melodic’ chapter.”266 Up to this point standard explorations of music in *Finnegans Wake* stemming from these constatations – share the grounds of Bartnicki’s take on Joyce. The fundamental difference resides in the relation between the stream of primary linguistic signs as noted in any complete exemplar of the book and the musical elements it is supposed to engender. While the standard readings accept the linguistic strata, if precarious, as constitutive of the supervening musical strata (the pair text-reading is conserved, in that the first level of understanding is linguistic, and only its outcome is to be perceived under musical concepts), Bartnicki – in order to get to Joyce’s music here – decides to discard the linguistic code whatsoever and interpret the symbols common to this code and the musical code within the latter.

His task, then, is to extract letters that – in the Western musical convention – are soundnames (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) and to research the musical readability of such a material. His work can be divided in to several steps, phases or stages, which fall into three general categories of Conceptual, Textual and Performative. The main phases we can distinguish are:

265 This is a thought explored by Prieto and earlier by Wolf.
(1) Conceptual

The concept itself (a work of conceptual art, providing the rule-determination of the subsequent stages of realization). Let me sketch these rules straight away:

a. Take all letters from the set (Aa, Bb,Cc,Dd,Ee,Ff,Gg,Hh),
b. Write them down in the order in which they appear in Joyce’s text, without omitting nor adding anything.
c. Take them to be soundnames, applying the Anglophone convention, with two exceptions: b stands for B-Flat and h stands for B.
d. Appreciate accordingly.

Note

Bartnicki claims that this choice is not completely arbitrary, because it refers to the default notation system of Joyce. The exception made for B and H, that is, to interpret them according to the Central European system (used, among other countries, in Germany), according to Bartnicki, has to do with the celebrated Bach Signature-motif, which presupposes the semitone difference between B and H. But this is inconsistent with a second argument, advanced by Bartnicki to ground this radical musicalization strategy, namely the correspondence between this:

\[ \text{\begin{smallmatrix} & 32 & 33 & 34 & 35 \\ & - & \flat & \natural & \sharp \end{smallmatrix}} \]

on the margin of the page and B. C. A. D. capitalized and dotted letters to be found right next to it in the novel’s text. It is difficult to understand why would Joyce give this “translation muster” here and require the use of the “German” convention elsewhere.

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(2) Textual

The book *Da capo al Finne* containing a brief introductory essay and a chain of letters generated by the application of the rules contained in (1) to *Finnegans Wake*. The book, most significantly, was one of the exhibits in the Gallery: one could take it into hand, read the essay, flip through the remainder and reflect. The book was in one exemplar and it was wired down to the exhibition table which I take to be a significant element of framing – thereby it indicated that it was not supposed to be read through, book-form generated appearances notwithstanding.

This musical text notated with letters derives – in all its forms – from *Finnegans Wake* through a series of operations. In case of producing an imitation these include a computer-assisted extensive research of this chain of letters for recurrent patterns and similarities to sound configurations known from actual music, both predating Joyce and posterior. The result is a selection of “reductions” – letter sequences which then can be elaborated to form a set of pieces of (audible) music. These pieces – musically notated and performable - add to the rigorously preserved material the lacking musical elements of rhythm and octave-determined pitch.

(3) Performative

A collaboration with the sound-arranger and performer Wojciech Kucharczyk in order to give the abstract ideas a concrete sensitive form of sonorous embodiment: pieces written by Bartnicki are arranged by Kucharczyk as pieces of electroacoustic music, presented on meetings with the public.\(^{268}\)

These pieces are not a-logos, in several ways. They derive from the Text (logos in the sense of (a) words and the use of language calling for (b) ratio, but failing in this). They are consummated within a discursive frame – they are commented on philosophically by the author-performer, they are rightly attended to as executions of the Text, and the way this is possible is essential to take them properly as artworks. The similarity to known pieces of music (Chopin, Williams, Williams,

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\(^{268}\) To be heard here: [https://soundcloud.com/gimcbart](https://soundcloud.com/gimcbart).
Paganini etc.) is supposed to be clear to the audiences’ ear, it is supposed to function as spontaneous recognition. This happens in the very moment of clash between the intellectual clarity of the work’s constitutive features and its immediate aesthetic working on the ear: when you hear it you perfectly know how it is made, what it is supposed to illustrate or demonstrate, you know that the musical primary material is a constellation written in Joyce’s pages. And there comes the moment of its instant recognition as belonging not only to the soundsphere but to the well familiar realm of music: you hear this is Chopin, you recognize his music.

In a word: Bartnicki makes us immediately recognize as music something about which we know that is essentially governed by Joyce’s text, by the very sequence of linguistic signs written by his hand and published under the name of his last novel and masterpiece. Bartnicki is not making any scholarly claims about the author’s intentions and plausible readings. He reacts creatively to the enigma of *Finnegans Wake* making its apories sensibly given to us, in an unresolved categorial contradiction between how our mind classifies what we are presented with and what our ears recognize it as.

### 3. Some Critical Remarks

Let us start the critical discussion of Bartnicki’s plurinistantional work by observing that at the very core of his idea – namely: reading Joyce’s letters as musical sounds – is nothing new to the Joycean ilk, at pains at finding the melodies promised by the the writer himself, on various occasions. Margaret Rogers offered a similar reading of the musical material for the celeberrima *fuga per canonem* promised by the Author of *Ulisses* in the *Sirens* episode. All the numerous critical attempts to find its material within the verbal stratum (be it on the level of sounds or meanings or both combined) being disputable and incompatible one with another – she turned to the potentially musical letters (English system: a, b, c, d, e, f, g) in search for the fugue’s *soggetto cavato à rebours*²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁹ *À rebours* because – as is usual for a number of musicalization strategies discussed in the present dissertation – this device reverses the vector of reference or encoding from the one found in standard musical practice in its relation to language or other media. In this case what served the composers to encode verbal messages (such as
These attempts are prone to severe criticism. One of Bartnicki’s points of reference is Prof. Jack W. Weaver, whose musical incompetence is demonstrated with clarity on an embarrassingly large number of elementary error examples reported by Alan Shockley. Apart from these mistakes made literally in the musical abc (such as the inability to identify properly the intervals Weaver quotes in his analyses as significant for his whole argumentation; the misunderstanding of the notion of triad and of the musical key – with his nonsensous “each has three flats but not the same three” [sic! he even repeats it several times in his book]; or the inability to interpret correctly different notation systems he tries to use and so forth) more general criticism is to be addressed to this sort of “musical kabbalah”. Sometimes it could lead (if only executed competently, as Weaver’s abc errors lead him to false results) to interesting conclusions, such as, for instance, the identification of the sameness of the musical “signature” of the four Evangelists and its musical identity in matter with Earwicker himself (as HCE).

Matthew – “Say! Eh? Hah” (FW 559.21-22) – [c – e – h] etc. for all the four.

In brackets, I provide the phonetic transcription of the utterance analysed as containing musical information. As you can see – phonetic reading of their respective exclamations does lead to a unifying musical signature. Both “phonetic apparatus” and “musical notations” including the solfège are necessarily at work, and one mediated by the other, to get to this conclusion. But if music becomes a necessary participant in this operation, it does so not necessarily as music (it could well be “just” a mode of encryption, parasitizing on the musical nomenclature, but having nothing to do with the actual sounds that would be called into existence in a musical reading. This, however, would seem implausible in the lights of the

signature, dedication, quote, mention etc.) in non-texted or, even more interestingly, otherwise texted music (cf. Dux Ferrariae), is used within the verbal medium to encode musical material. This musical mode is thus reproduced and reversed, making up for a double musicalization (first as an application-transformation of a musical technique – because this is a musical technique, one that serves the composer to organize his sonic material in a determinate fashion – and second, in the more apparent way, by permitting an aesthetic transformation of the water of linguistic signs into the wine of music.

abundance of musical clues left by Joyce himself. Yet, if we remember that “eye music” is something not only well customary in the history of music, but plays even a greater role in the history of literary musicalizations (Augenmusik in Doktor Faustus) – this question remains open.

Still – this critical point seems to show well that Bartnicki’s sort of operations are far less subtle in their workings, as they annihilate the literary texture transforming in entirely into music, and this is done in a mechanical way (his rules are semi-arbitrary, see below). Bartnicki can defend himself, though, that he doesn’t rely on Weaver’s reasonings flawed by his incompetence, and that his work is in no way distorted by these misinterpretations; this would be true. And furthermore, he could well argue that precisely because he does not claim any sort of unicity or priority of such a radical musical reading over other “keys” to Finnegans Wake – his operation by no means closes paths to further elaborations and mises en relation of layers emerging in divergent interpretation strategies. And this, effectively, would also be true.

It is understandable to accuse Bartnicki of performing an “easy” or even “anti-humanistic” reading, missing the meanders of the challenging text, which disappear when it is no longer treated as a linguistic utterance. But it is undeniable that Finnegans Wake precisely in the way it is linguistically challenging as to the methods of interpretations – gives way to a certain legitimization of such gestures, as far as they do not claim to have the last word on the text’s interpretation (which, again, is obviously not the case with our author). Furthermore, such a gesture performed by one of those seven humans who succeeded in publishing a complete translation of FW, cannot be easily dismissed as an “easy” gesture. Its preparation or preliminary work lasted ten years. With Levinson’s distinction of two types of interpretation\footnote{DM/CM interpreting. Cf. J. Levinson, Two Notions of Interpretation, [in:] Contemplating Art, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 275–287.} we could classify Bartnicki’s enterprise on the side of exploring interpretations with no aspiration to determine the text’s meaning (at least intended as something stable and expressible in words; arguably the artistic actions such as
Bartnicki’s constellation are different ways of understanding Joyce, comparable to the ways in which normally we display understanding of music: by dancing, moving our bodies, singing along or being able to recall and sing or play the music we understand. In sketching such an interpretive possibility (of Bartnicki’s interpretive work on Joyce) I point towards a deeper level of musicality his creative enterprise would involve.

Conclusion

If there is any sense in my last remark – the proper conclusion of my interpretation may itself take form as doing, rather than telling: the Reader will find it in the Appendix to the present Chapter, containing an experimental piece of music I wrote to conclude my reflections on Bartnicki. The piece, *La ci darem la mano in FW*, constitutes an integral element of the present argument and should be played back from the provided audio link.

We saw Bartnicki’s case as a provocation of incertain nature – somewhere in between OLiPu, with their contraintes, and blatant misinterpretation or intellectual illusionism. Whatever our final judgment of value will be, we may recognize the systematic difference in type of the musicalizing operations at work here. As discussed in the earlier parts of this chapter – the way *Da capo al finne* and the following arrangements interpret a text of prose as music is radically dissimilar of other cases of *musica textualis*. It annihilates the literary tissue, making the presence of music no more a consubstantiation, but a true transubstantiation. The secular bread of literary signification loses its linguistic nature in the moment of “consecration” and assumes entirely the “divine” nature of musical flesh. What was readable – now is hearable and the copresence typical of standard cases of *musica textualis* of both elements in their aesthetic working gets entirely suppressed in favour of music. Having said this, we need to remind ourselves of the crucial role of the conceptual element which, in contrast with the aural evidence of musical presentation, reminds us both of the Joycean (that is: literary) nature of the work’s *materia prima* and of the fact that it is legitimated uniquely by how this literary nature is realized in *Finnegans Wake*. It is in *Finnegans Wake* a s l i t e r a t u r e
where reasons for this musical transubstantiation lay. Thus – we can dispute Bartnicki’s work and especially – the arguments which he provides in his “program notes” to the effect that Joyce’s text really grounds such operations. But leaving the outcome of such a discussion aside, we must conclude hypothetically, that if the suggestions of his work on Joyce are true, and they are at least true in the sense\textsuperscript{272} that they “happen on stage” (are performed and have their aesthetic and speculative impact on the audience), then his work participates in the idea of \textit{musica textualis}: it creates an aesthetic and intellectual illusion of music striving there inside Joyce’s text.

Appendix to Chapter 5

Joyce’s *La ci darem la mano*

What I Found in *Finnegans Wake* Initial Two

Paragraphs Trying To Reduce Bartnicki Ad Absurdum

This Appendix contains a report from an experiment designed to prove that using Bartnicki’s method you can “find” virtually any musical piece in *Finnegans Wake* and set up to provide grounds for further considerations. In a concise way I describe the whole process, I present its results (a piece of experimental music reproduced below) and I offer some concluding commentary on this outcome.

**Initial hypothesis**

The position I wanted to test by this experiment can be resumed as follows: (H) Applying Bartnicki’s constraints on the reduction and imitation procedure you can produce a convincing imitation of any tune you please, if it is of a reasonable length and if it can be transposed into a combination of abcdefgh; in addition – there is no need to search for it, you can start wherever you choose. The rules of transcription allowed by Bartnicki are sufficient to get an impeccable reproduction of the desired melody, with several options of “neutralizing” rearrangement of the remaining material in accompanying voices. What remains to discover is: (1) how long will it take to find the desired sequence and (2) will the outcome indeed be aesthetically convincing (univoquely recognizable as the imitated source).

The first question is of a statistical nature and can be answered by a calculation. The second question requires realization: it needs a piece of experimental music to be written and assessed. My experiment answers the first question with respect to the tune I quasi-randomly chose, leaving the probability

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273 Just as in any other longer piece of writing in Latin characters; but here we focus on FW, as in part Bartnicki’s argument relies on some properties of this text as it is, linguistically (and not musically) intended.
calculus to my fellow statisticians\textsuperscript{274}. It answers the second question in the form of a written composition, of dubious musical value, but undoubtedly voicing Mozart’s \textit{La ci darem la mano}.

\textbf{Procedure Applied}

I decided to stick to the most severe set of rules among those used on different stages of his \textit{work in progress} by Bartnicki himself, namely: (1) reduction to abcdefgh, (2) all sounds must be presented in the exact order to be found in Joyce’s original\textsuperscript{275}. This imposes a linear order (no more than one sound can start resounding at a time, even if you can build accords by prolonging notes in other voices). In result by reading the score you are able to reconstruct the exact sequence of letters from the original.

This is how I set the initial challenge: let us see how many letters from the beginning of Joyce’s book will it take to collect a random tune that will come to my mind. Strictly speaking: \textit{quasi}-randomly, in the sense that I chose something of my liking, spontaneously in a radical aesthetic and historical contrast with the pompous and bombastic Williams found by Bartnicki in Joyce in startling abundance; and preferably diatonic\textsuperscript{276}. The first phrase of Don Giovanni’s Duettino with Zerlina – seemed to me a perfect candidate for the purpose. It fulfills the above-mentioned preconditions, it came to me spontaneously, and despite its diatonic simplicity it

\textsuperscript{274} I went through this path with my friend Łukasz Ponikiewski, whom I would like to thank here.

\textsuperscript{275} These are Bartnicki’s original constraints. In several later pieces, he allowed for vertically arranged sound combinations, but only of „palindromic“ structure – such that give the same sequence of letters, regardless of whether read from the bass to the treble or \textit{vice versa}; on rare occasions Bartnicki used also even more liberal rules, leading to more attractive sonic arrangements, but making it impossible to decipher the original arrangement of letters in Joyce without further specific clues.

\textsuperscript{276} This was for the sake of simplicity, because the actual set of admissible sound combinations is expanded by the B-flat included in the set under the name of h. Furthermore: non-diatonic melodies of a limited ambitus or simply not containing certain grades of the scale can be successfully notated within this set. For sure you will never find any dodecaphonic series in FW. But the crucial point here is this: melodies possibly “encoded” in FW depend on the assumed reduction and transcription model and not on the disposition of the text itself (of course within reasonable limits, as the text provides necessary material which – if lacking – cannot be “outsourced”).

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uses the major scale’s full material with the exception of the fourth grade and – most importantly – it is highly characteristic, memorable, unconfoundable with any other tune.

For Bartnicki – the first step to his imitations is the search for a tune in the immense block of the reduction (published as *Da capo al Finne*). I decided not to search for letter sequences, but simply impose an arbitrary tune and an arbitrary starting point: the very beginning of FW. Before I took the book in hands I wrote down Mozart’s melody in C major and – below the stave – the letters. They are 29, I realized (I counted in, most naturally, the appoggiatura). Then I opened *Finnegans Wake* on the first page of the main text and searched for the first c. I found it in the second line in the word ‘commodius’ and went on circling with a pencil the nearest occurrences of the 29 letter sequence. I was amused to find the last c in the last word of the first full paragraph: ‘aquaface’. “Brilliant” – I thought – “welcome to the over-interpretators paradise!”, with my head buzzing with ideas of most improbable and absurd elucidations of the opening paragraphs of FW coming at hand and perfectly provable on the grounds of my “discovery”.

This was the first spontaneous go at the experiment, and it showed me that *La ci darem* “is there” and that it is contained in the very first lines of the book. The second go was lengthy and systematic. It is of course the latter, systematic version

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277 Chopin, too, was haunted by this ear-catching little melody and honoured it with a composition for at least two reasons atypical of him: form and orchestration. Variations in B-Flat major on the Theme *La ci darem la mano* op. 2 are a theme and variations form and count among the very few orchestral works he wrote, together with both concertos and the *Rondo à la Krakowiak* op. 14, all form the Warsaw period. Another Variations for piano and orchestra belong to this period, namely the *Fantasy A Major on Polish Airs* op. 13 (Published as *Fantaisie Brillante sur des Airs Nationaux Polonais pour le Piano avec accompagnement d’Orchestre* in Paris and under similar titles in London and in Leipzig). This delightful composition starts with a theme recognizable probably to any Pole, *Laura i Filon*. What is singular abut this merry folk tune is that it was spontaneously associated with a pre-existing poetic text from the late 18th C. by Franciszek Karpiński. This extremely musical poet, author of dozens of songs, including the *Song on the Lord’s Nativity*, which is still sung as a Christmas Carrol, to a *polonaise* tune, hymns and psalm paraphrases, wrote it as an idyllic romanza. The piece recalls in its first part an operatic love aria, and in the second – an operatic duetto. It is perhaps this intermedial collocation of the original poetic piece that made its musical version gain great popularity within a very short time. Chopin wrote his *Fantasy* as a student of the Warsaw Conservatoire around 1828.
of the experiment, which I expose in detail in the following points, leading the reader step by step from Joyce’s text as it is to the musically notated final product—Don Giovanni’s first phrase to Zerlina contained entirely in the first two paragraphs of *Finnegans Wake*.

I. Joyce, *Finnegans Wake*

1. The Text as it Is

riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs.

Sir Tristram, violer d'amores, fr'over the short sea, had passen-core rearri ved from North Armorica on this side the scraggy isthmus of Europe Minor to wielderfight his penisolate war: nor had topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse to Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their mumper all the time: nor avoice from afire bellowsed mishe mishe to tauftauf thuartpeatrick not yet, though venissoon after, had a kids cad buttended a bland old isaac: not yet, though all's fair in vanessy, were sosie sesthers wroth with twone nathandjoe. Rot a peck of pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory end to the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaf ace.

278

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278 FW p. 3, I conserve here the division into lines of the standard FW edition. Stats: 850 signs with spaces; 708 signs without spaces.
2. Punctuation and Spaces Removed

RiverrunpastEveandAdamsfromswerveofshoretobendofbaybringsubaccommodiusvicusofrecirculationbacktoHowthCastleandEnvironssSirTristramviolerdamoresentroverthehortseahadpassencorearivedfromNorthArmoricaonthisidethesraggysthmustofEuropeMinortwierderfighthispenisolatewarnorhadtopsawyerstricksbythestreamOconeexaggeratedthemselsetoLaurensCountysgorgioswhiletheywentdoubletheirmumperralthetimenoravoicefromafirebellowwedminisheshetotaifhuartatriceanotyettouchthoughvensoonafterhadakidsadbuttedabalandoldisaacnotyettapeckofpasmalthadJhemorShenbrewedbyarclightandruendtotheregginbrowwastobeseenringsomeontheaquaface 279

3. Letters Other Than AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHh Removed

eaEeadAdaefeehbedbabgbacdcfeccabacHhCaeadEaedafheheahadaceeaedfheheahadaceebheaceeeaggeaedheeeaCggheedheebheeaecfebeedheheafalaecehgeafehadadcadbededabaddaceghfaaeeeeehhheahadeaefahhadhebeeddabghadedheegg babeeegeheaface 280

Note

The second paragraph (or the first full, as the first one begins famously in the middle of a phrase, one that begins at the end of FW; note here in addition that the last line of the this second-first paragraph begins with the word ‘end’) ends with the word ‘aquaface’. This is another biblical reference to the Genesis, consequently in reverse order (I quote Gen 1:1-3 from the Vulgate to make apparent the matrix of reference, including aqua, facies and facio, -ere):

279 Stats: 685 signs.
280 Stats: 264 signs.

The word is composed of two lexemes belonging to two languages, Latin and English: ‘aqua’ and ‘face’ (and both cross-interpretable in both languages, for the Latin ‘aqua’ is highly assimilated in English and understandable as relating to water, cf. aquapark, aquazoo etc. and as the English ‘face’ comes directly from the Latin ‘facies’ and is also the imperative form of the verb alternative to ‘fac’, as if it contained the order to act). What is even more striking, the word ‘face’ is one of these words which do not “get lost in translation” according to the severe denaturating model applied by Bartnicki here. Being composed entirely and exclusively of “musical” letters it stays where it was, unmodified, in the musical reduction, gold probed in fire, marking, as it does in the Joycean text, the end, the verge, the borderline of our extract (being both the last word of the opening paragraph of FW and the word where we find the last of the 29 notes of Don Giovanni’s seductive tune, for the extraction of which form Mozart’s score, see below):

ccdecadhhhdgcccdecadcchaggaha

These characteristics make of this point a true interface where both codes connect and are exposed as a surface with which the interpret (be it literary or musical or both) interacts.

The actual reduction

The actual reduction starts with the first of the 29 letters and ends with the last (typed in bold):

cdefeccabaeHbCaeaedEaedaefeheahadaeeecaeedlhAcahdehecagghfEe
cdefghheahadaebheeeceeeaggeaeddheeeaeCggheeedbheeaheeacef
Now when we know exactly how this reduction was made and we see the way it contains the 29 letter sequence, it’s high time to go through the simple procedure of getting this sequence out of Mozart’s score. To this task now I turn.

Stats: 238 signs.
II. Mozart, *La ci darem la mano*

1. First 8 measures of Don Giovanni’s part in the *Duettino* (Act I, Nr 7\(^{282}\)).

1.1. Melodic line alone

2. Id. transposed from original A major to C major:

3. 29 pitches in letter names (h for b, b for b-flat) sequenced\(^ {283} \).

\[
\text{ccdecadhhhdgccdecadcchaggahc}
\]

\textit{282} W.A. Mozart, *Don Giovanni*, ed by. G. Schünemann and K. Soldan, trans by. G. Schünemann, Peters, Leipzig 1941. Schünemann was a Nazi (from 1933 in NSDAP) and apart from this “magnificent” work of teutonising Da Ponte’s libretto he also must be remembered for having “entjudetet” [“un-Jewed”] the German translation of *Le nozze di Figaro*. I use this compromised edition to make several points en passant. It shows how translation and interpretation can exercise outspoken violence – both against persons and artworks. And the German Schloss which adapts the Italian “casinetto” in a fashion most faithful to the “hier in Deutschland” (cf. Leporello’s “Catalogue” aria, emphasis mine – J.C.) helps me add final gloss to the present ad absurdum argument, see below.

\textit{283} In the English notation the sequence is: \texttt{ccdecaddghcdgccdecadcchaggahc}. Observation: it takes 266 musical signs from the beginning of FW to get these 29 letters in the right order.
4. Id. Transposed into F major:

\[ \text{ffgafdggeeeefgcffgafdgffedccdef} \]

5. 29 pitches in letter names\textsuperscript{284} sequenced.

6. Id. Transposed into B-Flat major:

\[ \text{bbcdbgcaaaabcfbbccdbgcbbagffgab} \]

7. 29 pitches in letter names (h for b, b for b-flat) sequenced.

8. Id. Transposed into E-Flat major:

\[ \text{ssfgscfdddbsfsfgcfsdsdcbcds} \]

9. 29 pitches in letter names (h for b, b for b-flat, s for e-flat) sequenced.

\textsuperscript{284} B-flat being the fourth grade of the F major scale (and IV is the only grade lacking from this melody) makes it irrelevant, which notation (English or Central-European) we choose. This choice is, however, relevant for the further elaboration of the material (the richer the reduction matrix is, the more “diluted” the reduction will be and the more notes foreign to the melody and in need of arrangement it will contain.
III. Transition from Text to Hearable Music

All the above presented letter sets encoding Mozart’s melody could be found in Joyce’s text, reduced accordingly (the E-Flat major version would require a reduction to abcddefghs).\(^{285}\)

Now, to get a reduction of this quasi-randomly chosen theme from the text, with no violation of Bartnicki’s rules, it is sufficient to write these 29 notes in the proper rhythm by Mozart and the rest on accompanying staves, in a way suitable to your needs:

a. To get the pure melody – write them in unhearable or barely hearable frequencies.\(^{286}\)

b. To get accompanied melody – allow for sounds that are acceptable harmonically and apply (a) rule only to those too contrasting.

c. To get the melody with unmozartian accompaniment, group the remainder to form distinct melodic lines above and below, in a different register and colouring (use distinctive instrumentation).

To be entirely faithful to Bartnicki’s method, I opted for the C major transposition notated in abcddefgha (steps 1-3 above). The result of my arrangement is this.\(^{287}\)

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\(^{285}\) The F major transposition is, as already mentioned, convention-insensitive, containing no si sounds, whereas the C major transposition could be noted in both English and Central-European convention.

\(^{286}\) Bartnicki’s own strategy is writing the undesired notes in very fast rhythmical values. I adopt this strategy extensively in my La ci darem la mano in FW but a simple operation (three octave transposition upwards of the Flauto piccolo part realized by a synthesizer capable of emitting these high frequencies and respective downwards transposition of the bassoon part) would do the trick. The use of unhearable or barely hearable sounds or “primordial sounds of nature” on the verge between the articulate and the viscerally perceivable is nothing new nor shocking even in the greatest works of the classical canon, starting from the Postromantic Era. Consider here Wagner’s Vorspiel to Rheingold with the music’s gradual emergence de profundis or, on the opposite side of the spectrum of musical and hearable frequencies – the prelude to Lohengrin with its extremely high piccolo tones played pianissimo or Mahler’s First Symphony opening movement.

\(^{287}\) You can hear the piece (on a computer-generated, mechanically interpreted recording) here: [https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwTBNjwE48-hbmxWdUhxbWhDZm8](https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwTBNjwE48-hbmxWdUhxbWhDZm8)
I la ci darem la mano in FW

First Two Paragraphs of Finnegan's Wake
(signs other than soundtimes abbreviated omitted)
or
Don Giovanni's First Phrase to Zerlina in their Duettino

James Joyce (1929)
arr. by J. Crechi (2017)

Tempo: 60

Flauto piccolo

Violino d'amore

Fagotto

Tempo: 120

Fl. picc

V-la

Fag

Tempo: 18

Fl. picc

V-la

Fag

Tempo: 21

Fl. picc

V-la

Fag

Tempo: 22

Fl. picc

V-la

Fag

159
The above presented work contains strictly the 264 sounds you get by rewriting the first two paragraphs of *Finnegans Wake* with the omission of all characters but the soundnames abcddefgh. All these sounds are played in the linear order in which they appear in Joyce’s text. Don Giovanni’s theme is conferred to the Viole d’amore (part realized by at least two instruments called also *Liebviol*). The first six bars constitute an introduction realized by the bassoon – 25 sounds preceding the first occurrence of the letter c in *Finnegans Wake*. After Don Giovanni’s theme finishes one last letter, e, from ‘aquafece’ remains and is duly played by the piccolo as the major third of the still resounding final tonic.

The Mozartian theme is aurally evident, vibrant, even vulgar in the straightforward and unveiled way it dominates the whole material, thanks to its rhythmization and instrumentation. The test is passed – the arbitrarily chosen theme emerges within a very limited span of exactly two first paragraphs of the text by Joyce – it resounds in an undisputable manner, through an uncompromised *scandito*. The rhythm is a strict augmentation of Mozart’s, with the only exception in bar 21 which has no negative influence on the aural recognizability of the phrase (it’s hardly perceivable for the ear and in perfect congruence with the stress-pattern of the Mozartian original). The augmentation is compensated by the agogic setting of the piece in M.M. alla breve = 120.

Despite the arbitrary character of the theme-selection process the arrangement displays striking levels of symbolic entwinement with the source text. Don Giovanni and Zerlina are a transposition of the archetypal pair from the book of Genesis. Howth Castle corresponds without doubt to Don Giovanni’s “Schloss” from the hideous German mistranslation, violating the original Italian for the sake of morose nationalistic self-infatuation. What Don Giovanni does to the newly wed, naïve and disarmed Zerlina - could not be better described than as *violer d’amores*, violer d’amour. This theme could not find a better instrumentation than the *viole d’amore*, to become a musicoliterary instrument par excellence in the hands of the humble hagiographer Serenus Zeitblom.
Just as the Biblical order is reversed within the literary layer of the text (Adam and Eve – “past Eve and Adam’s”), so it is in its musical rendering: *La ci darem la mano* is a duetto of seduction, but it is the woman who is being seduced by the man\(^{288}\). The legitimacy of musical coding in letters here is further corroborated by the presence of the most famous of all musical signatures – the BACH motive – in the very first bar after the introduction\(^{289}\). I was at pains at making it recognizable for the ear, but Joyce’s arrangement of the material makes it necessarily an *Augenmusik* feature. Where Mozart surfaces for the delight of the senses and seduces the ear while staging seduction – there Bach comes inaudibly refined and reserved for the intellect\(^{290}\).

I leave the rest of the true “Oconee” of possible interpretations in this vein to the phantasy of my Reader. Mine “exaggerated themselse” sufficiently to ground a solid conclusion.

**Conclusion**

Bartnicki’s work is an intellectual provocation, a witty one, for when it gets unmasked as such – its thought provoking potential only accrues, instead of being once for ever combatted. For what is presented as a rigorous process of “reduction” and “search for imitations” allegedly to be discovered in Joyce’s text – in order to offer a new and stimulating performance of its Prothean potential – is actually far less conceptual and more aesthetic. Our experiment gives grounds to ask the question: why are Bartnicki’s *imitata* only subtle echoes of the *imitanda*, on the boarderline of recognizability within the foreign musical matter, when is is musically possible to make them so strikingly direct, as I demonstrated it in *La ci darem la mano in FW*? And my answer is that: most importantly because Bartnicki

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\(^{288}\) I will spare the Reader the observation, that the material from the line 6 of FW where the text reads “**his penisolate war**” (emphasis mine – J.C.) falls exactly after the letters-sounds corresponding to Don Giovanni’s “la mi direte si” (would the flauto piccolo playing these notes frivolously and in an irritating-hi-pitched mocking tone provide thus a doubly ironic commentary on some serious complex of the infamous *libertino*?).

\(^{289}\) Cf. bar 7 of my score above, in the part of bassoon. This is indeed an interpretive *sforzato*.

\(^{290}\) This is a *cliché* on Bach’s art I particularly abhor.
wants this mysterious, alien, unfamiliar veil to cover what otherwise would be charmlessly evident; the aesthetic point stays precisely in making the recognition process not to easy, not to obvious, to leave space for the audience’s imagination, memory and sensibility, to give room for a free interplay of their musical recollections. A recognition in this aesthetic modality not only gives more immediate satisfaction, but first and foremost: seemingly “proves” all Bartnicki’s claims, makes them appear more profound and invests the melodies “found” in Joyce with an air of mystery and puzzling aesthetic quality.
PART III.  Philosophical Perspectives

musica ad omnia extendere se videtur

Jacobus Leodiensis
Chapter 6.  
Musica textualis as an Aporetic Field

Introduction

As it was stated already in the first part – musica textualis is first and foremost an aporetic field, an exploration of the problematic potential of transmedial realizations of music in prose, rather than another positive theory or typology of interrelations of music and literature. From the philosophical perspective both music and literature are in a way given, preceding any reflection on them, and in another way – they are construable contextual concepts, all but independent from their intellectual history. This duality of givenness and the need for an intellectual reconstruction ab ovo is a rudimentary trace of the philosophical attitude, starting from the Ionians asking for the principle element of all things. Later on, this philosophical sentiment was expressed in Aristotle as the feeling of awe in front of what is. In this optics, all starts with a feeling of wonder as a reaction to what is given, the world, the self, and in our case: the idea that music could be achieved in a novel with fulgurating Exaktheit, no more merely depicted, but embodied, made present and effective. This idea fills me with awe when I aesthetically live its incarnations, such as in the little space of white paper separating in Mann’s Buddenbrooks the rendering of Hanno’s piano improvisation from the medico-encyclopaedic report on typhoid fever and from the other blank space after which Hanno and his music are already and irreversibly gone, giving retrospectively the modulations and transitions of his music the highest grade of efficiency known to epics, namely that of necessary causation within the plane of the plot, or the tragic mythos.


292 Cf. Goehr’s declaration of wonder produced by her reflections on the intellectual history of the work-konzept: “This chapter […] does not reach a final conclusion. It is designed to leave readers sharing its author’s sense of wonder at how human practices come to be, succeed in being, and continue to be regulated by one set of ideals rather than another” L. Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works..., op. cit.
In the second chapter of the first part, *Music Beyond the Senses*, I argued that there is a consensus between most continental and analytic philosophers of music of our day that, to put it again with Bernard Sève’s words, if art was not already there, the philosopher of art would have nothing to think. An analytic philosopher is most interested in picking up the understanding of concepts common to the ordinary reasonable and suitably educated people. This very methodological cornerstone makes it questionable, whereas analytic philosophy can claim any legitimate insight at all into at least such regions of art, which proclaim their outspoken dispise for mediocrity and evenness, or those which put these categories in question\textsuperscript{293}. If the role of art is to produce *ostrannienie* - then the whole enterprise of sober reasoning on intuitions shared by common people, with the (necessary) qualification, even more difficult to accept, that nevertheless they should be “suitably prepared” is (to say the least) doubtful. When such concept is roughly delimited, the analytic philosopher wishes to analyze it, that is: reconstrue its contents in a coherent, reasonable, argued way, one that illuminates the understanding of the “folk concept” in question and avoids inconsistency, ambiguity and other logical and semiotical flaws. The repertoire of arguments in such a discussion is mostly divided between (1) appeal to intuitions or sensible *communis opinio*, as the general premise of the whole enterprise is to analyze something already given there, if residing in unclear or otherwise confusing forms of shared conviction; (2) appeal to general rules of good reasoning (logic, legitimate use of examples, fair dealing with other people’s positions and so forth); (3) appeal to introspection, especially valid within analytic philosophy of art, where at some point reflexive knowledge gained in first-person aesthetic experiences becomes a necessary point of reference; finally (4) appeal to other thinkers’ works, especially those canonized in the anglophone analytic circles, in the form of polemics or adaptation. From the technical (and simply factual) point of view this repertoire of more general idealized methodological cardinal standpoints has to be completed by more down-to-earth

\textsuperscript{293} In fact an art that would not do so at least to some extent – and this not only on Shklovsky’s account of art – is hard to conceive of.
observations on the academic practice within which analytic philosophy of music is articulated. What I mean here is a certain relatively closed circuit of prestigious anglophone academic journals (such as the British Journal of Aesthetics or the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism) and publishers (Oxford U.P., Cambridge U.P., Routledge, Blackwell, to quote only a few). For discussions of more technical musicological issues secondary sources include mostly, once again, anglophone journals, such as Nineteenth Century Music or the Journal of Musicology, for instance. Quoting primary sources and secondary literature only in English translations is an embarrassing standard and the instrumental use of historically embedded concepts of non-anglophone thinkers or even entire learned traditions is not an uncommon practice. What is outside this restrained limelight – simply tends to inexistence. This approach, if frustrating and often extremely impoverishing and unfair, has its good sides: at least it is tendentiously clear and transparent, having all the arguments on the table, apart from the (more or less) tacit political premise that “there is only good philosophy or bad philosophy; good philosophy is what we practice, and the rest or can be adapted or is bad philosophy”.

Now, as is apparent from the way this thesis is construed, despite the above-mentioned reservations, it is the analytic philosopher whom I frequently address in

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294 Zangwill states openly and without any hesitation his disinterest in historical and exegetic intricacies concerning the concepts central to his latest book and its hero, Eduard Hanslick.

295 This tendency sometimes is truly grotesque, as in the case of Peter Kivy who in his last book on music mentions that its first chapter Mozart’s skull has been previously published in the Harvard Review of Philosophy, he gives even a precise date of a Harvard conference where it was presented in 2009, but says nothing about the fact that it was originally published in a prestigious Polish journal Res Facta Nova in 2008. Prestigious, maybe, but on the other side of existence! Well, c’est la vie! Cf. P. Kivy, Czaszka Mozarta, „Res Facta Nova”, 2008, t.19, pp. 189–201; P. Kivy, Sounding Off. Eleven Essays in the Philosophy of Music..., op. cit., p. xii and 3-22.

296 There is no place here for any further assessment of the form of spiritual activity (or exercise spirituel, to borrow Pierre Hadot’s phrase) offered by the analytic philosophy of art, but I tend to be both (a) extremely critical of the limiting and anti-humanistic aspects of the said philosophical paradigm and (b) intensely engaged with its results, as it is evident from the references made in the present dissertation. Perhaps such a position is practically untenable in a longer perspective.
these pages. This is why I will dialogue with some of the analytic definitions of music in the enterprise of commenting on a possible definition of musica textualis.

1. On defining music

“What is music?”

I put the question above in quotation marks – even though this is also my question – but it is actually impossible to indicate one author from whom the quote comes. This is the question posed by the Discipulus in Scholia Enchiridias in 10th C., as it is the question asked by the two great German musicologists ten ages later297. We still happen quite not to know how to answer it, which does not really mean that we do not know it. Of course we do! And some of us very well, by intimate and lifelong acquaintance. This is why quite a good answer to the m-question is just to stand up and sing it or sit down and play... or...? Well I understand my task in the present dissertation as mostly performing this kind of deixis with respect to works which up to this point were less obvious bearers of musichood: some of the novels and short stories. My discourse is thus intended as preparation (and when necessary: elimination of obstacles, such as the myth of sonicism or ear-idolatry against which I argued in the First Part) and of pointing out to the features one needs to perceive and perform for oneself in order to “hear” this other music. But once this accomplished our question comes back: we know it, because we experienced its charms (or its pains and humiliations!). But we still do not know how to conceptualize it adequately.

This therefore is not an easy question. It is not only difficult to be answered, but even difficult to be sensibly asked. And its exegesis is a fascinating, unobvious and adventurous enterprise. These are clear symptoms that the question in question is a genuine philosophical problem.

To some ears it sounds simply as a more specific version of the general problem posed by the philosopher of art (and by the devil, which, at least in Doktor

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297 In the title of their exquisite little book
Faustus’ Chapter 25 might be the same\(^{298}\), namely: “What is art?”… But as we have already seen – music is not always a subspecies of art. We are already aware that music as medium (or an anthropological universale; a social phenomenon; a practice) is something broader than art. Not all music is art, just as not all art is music. And at the beginning of our journey we revisited times and contexts where music was not art, but metaphysical order and universal harmony and the science thereof. The new question emerging thanks to musica textualis is this: is there musical art outside the medium of music, musical art realized within the medium of literature?

Music cannot be defined. Yet we theorise it (theory of music, musicology, philosophy of music, psychology and sociology of music, anthropological perspective on music). All these disciplines must dispose of some local, technical, implicit or rarely explicit, concepts of music. Or not? At last, alongside with the musical life, education, institutions – they determinate denotations of the term. Note that: these terms become crucial in the avant-garde contexts, (vide, e.g. Mattietti Boulez spartiacque, 2016, where Boulez’s institutional and political functions come along with standard activities of composer and conductor). Maybe this is much more than a contingency – maybe avant-garde music uses these channels of auto-determination not least than the standard acts of artistic indication\(^{299}\) where this explains the composer’s activity, but in a broader sense, it refers perfectly also to the performer’s power: what he performs is music). If this is true, alongside with some traditional means of establishing music, contemporary music would be determined and created, effectively designed and lawfully established outside of the traditional spheres of musical performative practice and notation.

\(^{298}\) The exact question posed by the Adornian devil in Mann is “What is art today”?
Still, some try to define music. This might seem *prima facie* typical of the analytic tradition, but it is not exclusive to it. A survey of the definitions shows that the emerging *definienda* are certainly all but one sort of thing. The term ‘music’ seems irreducibly and fundamentally polysemic. In other terms: a descriptive definition of music seems unavailable, because of the fluid and polymorph nature of music itself. People have always thought of radically different sorts of entities (processes) under this concept and this seems to be more a definitive feature of it than any other (isn’t this exaggerated? Certainly, it is not true of sculpture, for instance; but it might be true of poetry…). One should at least distinguish between logical types of definitions that we encounter: some are descriptive, and some: prescriptive. Some are purely rhetoric: by the form of “music is *x*” they want the reader to realise some important feature of music (or, conversely, of *x*, where it is defined as *m*). These rhetoric ‘apparent definitions’ can make use of paradoxes or be provocatively false or partial, if taken literally.

**Examples of analytic definitions of music:**

**Def. m. in Kania**

Music is (1) any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be heard, and (3) *either* (a) *to have some basic musical feature, such as pitch or rhythm, or* (b) *to be listened to for such features.*

**Def. m. in Levinson**

Music is “[i] sounds [and silences][302] [ii] temporally organized [iii] by a person [iv] for the purpose of enriching or intensifying experience through active engagement (e.g., listening, dancing, performing) [v] with the sounds regarded primarily, or in significant measure, as sounds” (1990a: 273)

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[301] J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit. =1990a
An example of other contemporary definitions of music:

Def. m. in André Boucourechliev\(^3\)

La musique serait… un système de différences qui structure le temps sous la catégorie du sonore.

A modified definition of Kania, which accommodates musica textualis:

Def. m. ’Kania-MTx

Music is (1) any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be perceived, and (3) either (a) to have some basic musical feature, such as tone or rhythm, or (b) to be attended to for such features.

Prolegomena to the future definition of musica textualis as part of music

I want Musica textualis to be the philosophical category for a special kind of music, most commonly coexisting symbiotically with literature, that does not use tone (just like other musics which refuse to use it, e.g. concrete music or silent music discussed above); precisely that which substitutes tones with words or smaller linguistic units; the musical play might involve their sonic values – among others – or might be collocated at the level of senses / representations / semantic values.

Kant’s free play of the cognitive powers as central to the judgment of beauty would redirect and guide this line of thought. The risk is that the concept be too broad: all art would be music; this is the symbolist position\(^4\). A lighter version would be monism as to the deep nature of all aesthetic experience without reductionism to music. An intermediary solution: music renders this free play

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\(^4\) The „myth of great musicality” paralell to the „myth of great literarity” in symbolist period: M. Głowiński, Wokół książki Stefana Jarocińskiego o Debussym…, op. cit.
directly / immediately audible, by organising external sounds and in this universally artistic manner it renders the nature of the play aesthetically evident.

Such a position, if further developed, could possibly offer a critical insight into the misstating of formal properties of literature from the neo-formalist positions\(^{305}\) where we find the absurd claim that the only formal values in prose would be those inherent to the sequence of words considered as mere sounds when read aloud\(^{306}\). Formalism should not be confused with materialism.

Music itself creates its own material\(^{307}\). It does not occur *ex nihilo* in every single composition, but on the level of the whole musical system, in which the piece emerges. The tonal harmony system proclaims the palette of twelve tones (and their implicit interrelations), which remains a sieve of the entire spectrum of hearable\(^{308}\) pitches; the instrumentation provides the timbre axis of choice. Their intersection generates *everything*: the whole musical *universum*. Beyond it – there are non-musical sounds, and non musical silences – musical *nothing*. The late 18\(^{th}\) Century first loosens the rules of possible sound combinations (always limited to the above-mentioned palette). The early 20\(^{th}\) Century offers new sets of rules for combining this material (e.g. dodecaphony). Then it broadens the palette itself: microtones, new timbres, and finally: non-tones: noises, registered street sounds and speaking voices. Now, consider the problem: and what if in the same period, roughly speaking, Thomas Mann, instead of musically organising white noises and clatters, decided to organise in this fashion the structure of his novel, as well as the position of every single word in one or more of its paragraphs? On what basis should we say what he does is not music at all? The fact that we are used to hear music in concert


\(^{307}\) B. Sève, *L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe*..., op. cit. explains it through the concept of alteration.

\(^{308}\) This is dialectic as, even if physiologically we still are able to register the “odd” frequencies – we do not perceive them in a measure in which our ear is calibrated by the musical system in which we are musically raised. So – ironically – the musical system has the power to calibrate, to a certain extent, our physiological perception (need for some up-to date research reference in the Psychology of Music, perceptive magnet etc.).
halls rather than read it in a book seems insufficient as a criterion for serious, scientific classifications.

2. What Reality?

According to the classic Aristotelian view, Truth is a function of Reality. What makes a judgment true is its adequacy to Reality. A judgment is true if and only if things out there are just as it states (Cf. Arist., Metaph. Γ 7, 29; however, this position is also expressed in Plato’s Dialogues, for instance in Plat. Crat. 385b, or in Soph. 263b, where it is voiced by the Stranger).

But Art, says Plato, is far from truth. For what it tells is fiction, and what it depicts is – at best – a faint and distorted imitation of what really is.

This Platonic point has been ever since a source of contention and of great confusion. Why? Because we equally agree with its major premise (the Classic Conception of Truth, or the Correspondence Theory) and disagree with its conclusion.

We accept the fair point, that art’s use of meaning and of representation is far from truth. Obviously, contrary to what is written in Kafka’s Trial, the tribunal with offices in the attics, has never prosecuted Joseph K. Neither did pigs ever say that “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”, as is written in: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 transl. by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921.

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309 This whole section is kept admittedly as simple as possible. This is why my fellow logicians and historians will pardon me the way I discuss fundamental problems of their fields; the present argument is humble in its means, but I found it nevertheless necessary for the elucidation of my point.

310 Socrates formulates it as a question: „[…] speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false?” and Hermogenes confirms. Eng. Transl. in: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 transl. by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921.

311 Or, even worse, an imitation of an imitation, as for Plato the objects imitated by art – sensibilia – are themselves already faint copies of the truly Real Things – the Ideas.

312 I assume it is still valid for the common sense view, even if of course it has been contested in philosophical logic (non-classical logics). Without doubt it is a principle accepted by whoever takes „negativist” stances on „literal” vs. „metaphorical” usages of musical predicates in musicoliterary scholarship (cf. Introduction, supra).
in Orwell’s *Animal Farm*. But nevertheless, we are profoundly convinced that: 1. these texts do not affirm falsity; 2. they are profoundly true.

How is this possible?

Simply, we deny that these affirm the content of the “judgments” they are made of.

How is this possible?

Simply, we deny that these affirm the content of the “judgments” they are made of.

Note: in what follows, by ‘ps’ I refer to narrative quasi-judgments (cf. infra). The actual picture is rendered far more complex by the actual entwinement of such judgments with genuine judgments (historical, political, social, economical, psychological, moral, theological and philosophical) which typically appear in many works of fiction. Here I let this complication aside.

The logical form of judgment is altered in narrative, giving rise to what Ingarden calls the quasi-judgement. The link between Judgment and Reality as constituting Truth is conserved (Tarski famously expresses this Aristotelian link as the material criterion for a satisfactory definition of truth), but the vector of adequacy is reversed. Literary Reality (LR), in contrast to Reality tout court (R) is not the pre-existing, given, outer world, to which judgments conform or not, but something that comes into being within the complex process of a literary reading. This process consists partly in the imaginative interpretation of the chains of quasi-judgments constituting the literary text.

In the standard use of language, a sentence p is true if and only if it corresponds to Reality. In the narrative use of language, this convention is used to create new Rs, by establishing the states of affairs they are made of, through writing ps. The reversed correlation between Judgments and Reality is conserved, but Truth is seemingly rendered trivial: if L-Reality is made with ps, for whatever p there is

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313 The factual judgments, for instance, claims on historical or natural facts, have their truth conditions; some other judgments, such as metaphysical claims, are object of theoretical contention; and in the postmodern era even the factual claims have been desconstructed and made problematic. This does not, however, alter my argument.

314 On an individual level, and on an intersubjective level.
a corresponding state of affairs, which belongs to LR. Therefore, all ps are true (within LR).

But this picture is over-simplified. It would be an error to think, that LRs are mechanically composed of the states of affairs indicated by the ps of the narrative text. They are not. All ps appeal to the Reader’s imagination, and, yes, this appeal is due to the underlying acceptance of the Correspondence Conception of Truth. It is however in the Reader’s act of Aesthetic Experience, or, to say it with Ingarden, aesthetic concretisation\textsuperscript{315}, that the L-Reality is actually created. Some very important elements of LR are not expressed directly in any of the ps of the literary text, nor even logically inferable from them; still they rise in the mind of the Reader, and become crucial elements of LR. Furthermore, among the text’s ps there might be some p and some \( \neg p \). This does not, however, make LR necessarily explode (as in polyphonic discourses, both of the Bakhtinian type in Dostoevsky, and of the musical type, as showed above in Iwaszkiewicz, where in order to avoid contradiction, the reader allows for independent voices to be constituted; thus, the logical principle of non-contradiction, expressed in three different ways by Aristotle, is used artistically in order to achieve polyphony\textsuperscript{316}, even if narrative contradictions may also have this function (for instance, in some works of Beckett); and still, arguably, the debris of the LR after explosion is the moon-landscape “depicted”, or – better even – performed through the use of this semantic dynamite\textsuperscript{317}.

This is why ps constitute the work’s “schematic” structure, and not the LR directly. This schematic structure – in the act of concretisation – provides the

\textsuperscript{315} For his doctrine of the literary artwork as a schematic formation, containing necessarily places of indeterminacy, which call for an aesthetic concretisation – see: R. Ingarden, The cognition of the literary work of art..., op. cit. The objects of such aesthetic concretizations may subsequently become objects of cognition.

\textsuperscript{316} In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me repeat: Bakhtinian polyphony need not be a musicalizing device, but it may be used in this way, just as any other literary device or feature, such as alliteration or division into chapters.

\textsuperscript{317} These pyrotechnic metaphors refer, needless to clarify, I hope, to the logical law of explosion (\textit{ex contratictione quodlibet}).

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Reader access to the LR. Literary Reality is given in its determinacy in the Reader’s experience.

In this sense narrative ps contained in a novel, do not refer to reality. What they actually do, however, relies on the validity of the link between Judgment and Reality. As a result, we must distinguish:

1. Assertions of logical judgments.
2. Narrative use of (quasi-) judgments.

Both rely on the Correspondence Theory, but in different ways: (1) can be Truth-evaluated thanks to it, whereas (2) cannot\(^{318}\). (2), in virtue of the Correspondence, acquire the creative power, becoming *verbum ponens*. They act on the reader through what they state. They might posit imaginary worlds by describing how things are there\(^{319}\). This creative action must be consummated in the Reader’s intentional acts – stimulated and governed by the disposition of ps in the text – for the Literary Reality to emerge. This is its proper way of existence, to which the L-True predicate is correlated\(^{320}\).

It is only in the lights of this extremely condensed discussion (of a problem which alone would merit an entire dissertation\(^{321}\)), that we can give a clear answer

\(^{318}\) Of course it can still be locally applied, as the True-in-LR, which is the common ground for arguments in cases of contention with regard to a particular work’s content (for instance, consider the question: „in Gargantua’s opinion - what is the best equivalent of toilet paper?”; if I said „silk”, I would give a false answer. But if I said „a soft little rabbit” this would be True-in-LR, even if still literally false. An inexistent person cannot, arguably, hold convictions, even to this effect).

\(^{319}\) Some postmodern fictions, such as R. Pinget’s *Passacaglia*, are ostensively logically incongruent and, arguably, as in Beckett as well, what they posit is not “a fictional world”, but the very act of telling and construing fiction.

\(^{320}\) This conclusion does not delegitimize attempts at evaluating such a L-Reality’s verisimilitude or truthfulness with respect to the laws of nature, psychology etc. known (both by ordinary experience and by scientific investigation) from Reality. It only avoids confusion between the two ways of existence and their correlated Truth Predicates, which is responsible for the undesirable second implication of the Platonic account of art.

\(^{321}\) Furthermore, this picture was sketched here with respect to judgments, but it applies as well, *mutatis mutandis*, to names, individual descriptions, quantifiers, modal operators and many other elements studied in different branches of logic and philosophy of language.
to the question posed at the end of the first chapter: What reality do we refer to when we speak of music’s real presence in some verbal artworks?

Is it the reality of the tree growing here in N., where I am now achieving my work, the same reality of the paduan columns and frescoes, which silently accompanied me in the past three years? Or is it rather the L-Reality of King Lear’s Throne and Madame Bovary’s Hat? After all, even the most fervent Flaubertian scholar does not need to affirm R-Reality of that exceptional hat in order to analyse its refined functions and workings, nor to praise the novel, which „affirms“ its existence as a true masterpiece.

Cannot we now just give up the idea of musical silences elicited by word formations as musical, as really musical, and put them in a row with trees, tables and windows, people, places and events populating the beautiful L-Real worlds? And cannot we meekly agree with the certainties proclaimed by some of the reasonable and respectable Word and Music Scholars, that musical elements in novels are musical at best sub specie analogiae, with no power to change the aesthetic and therefore ontological status of the works which contain them? To be sure, among these L-Real people populating novels there are musicians, L-playing L-violas d’amore and L-composing L-infernal cantatas, which can be even analysed formally and even emulated in R-real musical works. None of them needs to be taken as existent in the R-world. So even though in Verona the lovers still pilgrim to Giulietta’s tomb, and in Vilnius there is a plate commemorating the place, where Konrad was kept in prison – we do not need to search for Leverkühn’s bones or the manuscript of Wagner’s Der Rattenfänger von Hameln.

322 For a beautifully competent study of these compositions, see: T. Ziolkowski, Leverkühn’s Compositions and Their Musical Realizations, „Modern Language Review“, 2012, t.107, no 3, pp. 837–856.
323 The plate reads „D.O.M. / Gustavus obit / M.D.CCC.XXIII Calendis Novembris. / Hic natus est Conradus (...)“ commemorating the transformation of the hero of the III Part of Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve.
324 P. Huelle, Śpiewaj ogrody..., op. cit., pp. 303–307. The protagonist of Huelle’s novel, a musician from Danzig, who discovered Wagner’s unfinished manuscript and witnessed the rise of German National Socialism, is (not) to be confused with E. T. A. Hoffmann. The manuscript vanished after it was taken away by the Soviets (just as Mr. Hoffmann himself).
But the question still persists: are the musical elements which emerged in the interpretations performed in Part II *supra*, such as the sonata-form in Iwaszkiewicz, or the Platerian crazy Lieder (which we can still hum now, cannot we? tell me, my Reader! be honest!), or Mann’s h-e-a-e-es (oh, wait a second… Mann’s, or Leverkühn’s? To whose work do they belong?) are these elements really entities of the same kind as the piano in the curve of which Pietia saw for the first time the beautiful knyaż?

My answer it is a convinced: no, they are not.

They are genuine musical elements and therefore works containing them are not only literary works, but musical works as well; and experiences we have of these works, when we silently perform them with musical taste, imagination and skill, are genuine musical experiences.

3. Away with Ockham’s Razor

In the previous section I sketched an argument, which can now be restated in points:

1. In ordinary uses of language Truth is the congruence of what is said with how things actually are.

2. In fictional uses of language – and in artistic prose such use of language is predominant – the form of connection between how things are and what is said (previously called Truth) is maintained. However, the vector of congruence is reversed, making what is said responsible (ontically) for how things in the fictional world are.

3. This is the ontic principle of fiction: creation through making special *quasi*-judgments. These are no genuine judgments, as they do not serve to describe the world (what is). They cannot therefore be True. These judgments rely on the relation between facts and utterances – called Truth – in order to establish new Realities.

4. It is an error to think, that these Realities are composed with *quasi*-judgments (phrases written in novels and short stories). They are not.
5. Instead, it is correct to think that these *quasi*-judgments construe a schematic formation (the literary work of art), which by its very nature appeals to be realized (executed, interpreted) within the act (performance) of reading (silent or aloud or both, depending on the work and its context).

6. What we experience in such interpretive acts, the intentional object of these experiences, is the fulfilment of the literary artwork’s *telos*. Literary artworks are composed *for* such realizations.

7. Typically, the literary text is a very complex tissue, where *quasi*-judgments are entwined with genuine judgments (true or false) and other propositions, such as philosophical, moral or metaphysical statements. Furthermore – as Theory well shows – all these propositions are to be interpreted within an infinitely complex net of intertextual and intermedial connections, within contexts and conventions, making any straightforward account of fiction as logically composed of the sum of the judgments expressed in its sentences patently inadequate.

Up to this point, we were analysing the special literary use of sentences which seem to assert things, but actually build fictions. This account draws freely on Ingarden’s account and sympathises with elements of the Reader Response theory. It should work well with performative accounts of literary reading, such as Kivy’s. In the present thesis, I adopt this performative view: the literary score requires a literary performance on the part of the reader. I repeat “literary” (as earlier on in the analogous formula on music I repeated “musical”) because of the skills and competences required on the part of a reader are specific to literature. Knowing to read is just a liminal prerequisite of these skills. High level reading of a literary artwork requires no less refinement, knowledge and experience, than reading the score of the *Waldstein* or that of Machaut’s *Messe de Nostre Dame*.

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325 This book irritates at times with its excessive lack of historical and contextual awareness, and has some naive and debatable points. Its overall thesis, though, that the literary reading is an individual performance of the narrating voice, according to the score constituted by the work’s text, has to be cherished. P. Kivy, *The Performance of Reading. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature...*, op. cit.
There is just the contingent difference, that most people in modern societies are literate (know how to interpret vocally verbal signs of their mother tongue and grasp the basic meanings of a number of words), just as most people are musically illiterate (cannot decipher musical notation). This makes of music something “elitist”, whereas everybody believes they can read literature.

This account is perfectly symmetrical to the account on music. The relation between score – work – performance – object of aesthetic experience we were using implicitly up to this point for music can now be symmetrically applied to literature, with the necessary adjustments.

This whole (re)construction was necessary for the next point to be formulated:

8. On special occasions, a reading of the literary score might force on us the conclusion: “Parbleu! Here it reads: make music! It clearly does!” Such an instruction, if obeyed (to avoid misinterpretation), appeals to the musician in the reader and commands him to make music:

‘μουσικήν ποίει’ [!]

In the course of the analyses presented in the second part I tried to show in detail how such a command may be realized.

The crucial conclusion is this:

1. Music is a performative art, (at times) using scores, but always requiring someone to make music and someone to hear it as music.

2. In cases of musica textualis this someone is you.

3. Musica textualis is music, a special type of music (to be sure, in certain important aspects, far less bizarre and fare more conservative than many a composition performed at contemporary music festivals).

4. It would be incomprehensible to expect from it to be “materially present” somewhere in the book which contains it. Of course, it is not there in the inscription! It must be performed!
And as long as the reader will be misguided by negativist, apriorical, dogmatic interdiction on having music in prose – this of course will not happen.

Imagine a person who has no idea of Western music and of musical notation. Handle them a score of the *Hammerklavier* sonata. What do you expect to happen there? Will there be any music?

Mitigating acritical or incompetent usage of musical paradigms in interpreting literary texts cannot justify blindness to musical directives some works of prose arguably contain. Which musical interpretations of prose are good, and which are harmful, both to the interpreted artwork and to its audience?

This question is perfectly symmetrical to the problem of evaluation criteria for musical interpretations (performances). This symmetry provides only one more argument in favor of *musica textualis* as a genuine, if undeservedly underestimated, kind of music.

Let me address one possible objection, to the effect that scientific rationality demands the methodological principle of ontic and terminological economy to be respected. This is a fair point. Why do I need to speak of the musical sonata form in Iwaszkiewicz, if I can analyze this very same structure using descriptive terms and operating on narrative units of the text understood simply as a short story, which, after all, it is?

To this my reply will be short: I need these terms in order to perceive the elements to which they refer – perceive them musically (hear them “*i n m y m i n d ’ s e a r*”). If aesthetics is still about the Baumgartenian *cognitio sensitiva*, it is reasonable to question the universal validity of Ockham’s razor as its methodological principle. This principle, in general, is a methodological directive for scientific theories. Scientific theories formulate hypotheses about the world and aim at combining the greatest degree of simplicity with the greatest explanatory force. Does *cognitio sensitiva* belong to this family? I doubt.

It is a known psychological fact, that the more nuances of snow’s color and quality we recognize, the more words we have to distinguish them (as is the case of the Inuit). If then Aesthetics still speaks for *cognitio sensitiva*, it should arguably
seek to broaden constantly its vocabulary, find new words for new experiences and sensations. For its principle source of knowledge is not intellection, not synthesis, but first of all: pathos. The more you can experience – the better. The only case one should refrain from multiplying terms and ontological postulates, of course, is when two terms refer to the very same experiential quality or relational feature. But as I hope to have shown – developing musical vocabulary with respect to such works as Libera’s *Toccata in C major* responds to the necessities inscribed in the work as it is, gives proper names to experiences it elicits, educates the reader, hoping that the next musicoliterary performance she will give of it, or of another piece of *musica textualis*, will be musically better, more conscious and more refined. It amplifies the work’s aesthetic potential and thus magnifies its artistic value.

There is another logical peculiarity resulting from the inversion of the truth triangle with respect to literary *quasi*-judgments.

With respect to empirical judgments such as “all ravens are black” the only case of gaining secure knowledge is to disprove this hypothesis, by finding one raven which is not black. Then, at least, we will know for sure, that it is false that all are black. Because we have seen the one which is not. It is impossible to confirm the statement “all ravens are black” empirically. At best, you can corroborate it by multiplying your raven-observations.

With respect to *quasi*-judgments and the LRs they constitute – the exact opposite principle is valid. You can “dis-corroborate” an interpretation by finding more and more people who do not see its point, but the only epistemic certainty available, can be gained in confirmation. You know my interpretation of the sonata in Iwaszkiewicz is L-True if and only if you manage to perceive aesthetically what the interpretation postulates.

Music must be interpreted (musically understood and performed, according to the performer’s inventiveness, taste, skill and intelligence). There is amatorial music-making and spontaneous singing. But in order to interpret masterpieces of western artistic tradition one needs years of training, and of special skills, such as, for instance, the ability to read and properly interpret the way a piece is notated.
This is why we desperately need to acknowledge the musical status of *musica textualis*, this is why we need this concept. Without taking this step, we will be unable to learn how to interpret musically these musicoliterary scores. Any argument to the effect that this music is not music, because it is fiction, derives from a **categorial mistake**, for it fails to distinguish **quasi-judgments that compose equivalents of imperative symbols**, from **quasi-judgments that establish trees, tables and talking cats in fictional worlds**. This was the core of Szulc’s error and it is repeated over and over again, if in milder forms. Szulc was convinced that literature disposed only of this second sort of creative tools; that pianos, bells, concerts and compositions were elements of the represented world of the same nature as those fictional trees, cats and fancy hats. Many of them are. Musical objects and situations can be merely thematized as anything else, and can well serve artistic objectives other than making music with words. In fact, genuine candidates for *musica textualis* are a precious rarity. But we need a way to recognize them and to respond to them with competent and tasteful musical interpretations, that is: to do them fundamental justice.

We need a clear concept to grasp the specificity of this peculiar musical function of (some) devices used in works of prose, in order to learn how to perform them, how to appreciate them musically, how to integrate them in our philosophical reflections on music and how to enjoy their beauty. Hopefully a step towards the establishment of such a concept has been made in the present thesis.
Conclusion

1. *Musica textualis* in its definition depends on the definition of music, because it participates in the idea of music. Music, taken in its broadest and most inclusive sense, is its *genus proximum*. Leaving for a while aside the fascinating and yet unresolved problem of the essence of music, it is however possible to state something more specific on the *differentia specifica*. *Musica textualis* is music shaped in linguistic primary matter. The art of shaping linguistic primary matter to produce beauty is literature. On occasions literature does so *more musico*, imitating musical workings in the way it shapes its content to appeal the reader’s musicality and in the sort of aesthetic interplay it produces in the audience. If we accept this broad aesthetic definition of literature (and by explicit exclusion of verse and drama we further limit its scope to prose) – we arrive at the core of our concept.

2. The works of *musica textualis* are literature, but literature that not only aesthetically and axiologically, but also ontically strives to transcend itself and become its other – music – not (primarily) through external hybridity of media but by the very literary means. In this it arguably remains *literature* (T); nonetheless – to the measure it succeeds in its striving, it becomes *music* (AT).

This formulation is not paradoxical in itself, as it is not analytical to neither of the concepts that their extensions are disjunct. Historically the whole contraposition of arts within the Système des Beaux Arts\textsuperscript{326} is quite a late invention; at their origin, music and literature are one. A contradiction raises only if such a disjunction is explicitly introduced in their respective definitions, or if an element is introduced, from which such a disjunction follows.

An example of such an element, as we have seen, is the presence of actual sound regarded primarily as sound and perceived by the physical ear introduced by some thinkers into their definitions of music. If music is necessarily this, then it follows that a piece of literature can never become it (because its sounds are not regarded primarily as sounds, but at least equally as sounds and linguistic signs, or because it is appreciated in silence). Historical, contextual and aesthetic arguments were advanced in the previous chapters to the effect that such an element should not be introduced into the definition of music.

On another plane, though, it has been shown that it is in the vital interest of both arts, music and literature, to cultivate some myths and stereotypes with regards to the other. Music is often represented as a power transcending the powers of language in many respects, becomes the symbol of emotion, of the mystic, of the infinite; of wisdom, of death and of love. It is invested with diabolical powers, moral agency and political responsibilities. It is presented as something irrational, seductive, pre-human, anamnestic, sexual or – vice versa – angelic and disincarnate, atemporal and purely intellectual. It is a mirror of self-cognition and existential meditation. In all these extraordinary capacities, it is presented as something radically different from discursive language, an autonomous and mysterious realm, often reserved only to the initiated. A formalist stereotype of music elevated above all servility to expressing meanings and having representational content is very keenly cultivated within its literary presentations. In this “unlikeness” resides its attractivity, the very crucial challenge for intermedial imitative strivings. If there was no musical essence, no systematic advantage of music over language, there would be no point in emulating it in verbal art.

Conversely, music seeks for literature (especially: poetry) as its quintessence, as its higher, more spiritual part, which has to be understood by the initiated listener. Through the Wagnerian idea of Gesamtkunstwerk and the practice of musical drama, music seeks to regain the union with its sister art dramatic literature (and other arts), producing thus hybrid compositional devices, such as the Leitmotiv, which combine the literary with the musically formal in one texture.
This technical development at the very core of music creates space for substantial imitation in literature. Literature wants music in its purity and alterity, but it uses all possible means to make the intrinsic obstacles evaporate. Music is the art of repetition, substitution and playful equivalence of non-identicals, the art of arbitrary investing its matter with local senses and rearranging these equilibriums over and over again. And literature keenly uses this feature of music, substituting sonic elements with narrative bits, recurrent phrases, places, situations and other elements both of the fictional worlds represented and of the linguistic expressions it is made of in its verbal constitution.

3. Let us repeat it: *musica textualis remains literature*; however – to the extent it succeeds in its core transgressive striving – it *becomes music*.

The only measure of success and of truth in achieving this goal is aesthetic *effectiveness*. The only ontological criterion is thus experiential, as it is uniquely within the aesthetic experience that the musical properties are given. Berkeleyan *esse est percipi* is the ultimate ontological principle in this domain. This follows from the intentional nature of all music.

This feature of music is paralleled by the intentional nature of literature. The specific literary quality that makes the difference between the literary and the non-literary within the linguistic is intentional in nature. Take two physically undistinguishable objects, printed texts, two pages long, one of which is Kafka’s *Vor dem Gericht*, a literary artwork, and the other is a standard court report, not an artwork. No objective test can prove with certainty which one is which. In order to recognize their literary nature, one must interpret them.

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A counterargument from stylometry could perhaps be formulated. Let us just observe that even if correct attributions were possible (and I doubt in their accuracy), this could never be done without a corpus of texts previously classified as artistic by human subjects, which is: in acts of sentient interpretation and aesthetic experience. Still, arguably, such a machine would be easily duped by a work form Borges’s *Babel Library* (yes, but, after all, is there anyone, who would not?).
4. If we accept that music, just like language, is a natural kind, an anthropological universale\textsuperscript{328}, we might need to accept, that the art of music is not necessarily uniquely realizable in this medium.

5. Pure\textsuperscript{329} music is an essentially formal art\textsuperscript{330}. It is the art that generates its own material, by the power of alteration\textsuperscript{331}. This material is being dynamically worked by the alternation of higher levels to form a temporally extended object (performance) to which corresponds in some traditions an atemporal paradigm (\textit{opus perfectum}, indicated by a notated musical text). Traditionally it takes sound as the substratum of the primary alteration. This is an undeniable fact. But effective sound-stimulation of our physical ear is not necessarily essential to music. This reservation permits us not to discriminate the inaudible musics, and to experience them under a unitary concept with standard cases of music. Thanks to this operation we can observe their organic interconnections not sub \textit{specie analogiae}\textsuperscript{332} but \textit{realiter} (in the intentional sense).


\textsuperscript{329} The idea that it is possible to extract the purely musical element in music, which of course enters into many „impure alliances” with theater, poetry, cinema etc. is – as virtually any other idea - a concept, which emerged in the course of intellectual history. More precisely, it emerged within the history of western music, in particular conditions determined by the politics, social powers and economy in Western Europe around 1800; it can be sociopolitically deconstrued and criticized on many levels. The processes responsible for its emergence, though, are collocated on a level which cannot annihilate it as an idea, as a paradigm, as an experiential and intellectual option. Arguably both ways of dealing with concepts (essentialism vs. contextualism) are worthwhile and should be complementarily performed, in research as well as in concrete engagement with the arts. I am afraid that in saying this I might achieve the impossible: both the essentialist and the contextualist will agree – for the first and last time in their lives – they will agree that I am wrong.

\textsuperscript{330} This position is genuinely formalist, and therefore not materialist. Some formalists (but not Hanslick and not Kant) are in fact materialists, rather than formalists.

\textsuperscript{331} In B. Sève’s technical sense of the term.

\textsuperscript{332} Cf. Remarks of Prieto in – partially – a similar spirit (at least to the extent in which he argues convincingly, that the WMS quest for non metaphoric scholarly nomenclature is radically misguided, E. Prieto, \textit{Metaphor and Methodology in Word and Music Studies}..., op. cit.
Altering the raw material and musicalizing it is nothing less than making music. This is an operation on our intentionality, on our aesthetic disposition\textsuperscript{333}. \textbf{Musicalization is not exclusive to literature; it is the essential and indispensable mechanism of all music.}

\textsuperscript{333} « La première altération est celle de l’écoute du son selon un certain mode intentionnel » B. Sève, \textit{L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe...}, op. cit., p. 171.
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Musica textualis

Une approche philosophique des incarnations textuelles de la musique

Introduction

Cette recherche philosophique repose sur l’hypothèse que la musique peut être réalisée dans des textes en prose. Par « texte en prose » j’entends une séquence de signes linguistiques disposés, sans usage de rime ni de vers, d’une manière qui se prête à une interprétation et à une appréciation musicales, et même les exige. Cette approche « faible », qui fait reposer la musicalité textuelle sur l’interprétation et les modes de perception plutôt que sur les propriétés de premier degré du texte (ses qualités objectives), est pourtant enracinée dans la « faiblesse » propre de la musique en tant que telle. La musique vit en effet dans l’interprétation ; le texte musical (au sens musicologique traditionnel du terme, la partition) ne fait naître la musique que dans l’interprétation musicale qui en est donnée. En dehors de l’interprétation le texte reste lettre morte ; il n’est musical que par rapport à ses interprétations possibles. Ceci peut sembler constituer un cercle vicieux, mais cette circularité est propre aux arts performatifs - et même à tout art, si l’on prend par exemple en compte la question du « regard pictural » dans les arts plastiques. On cherche par là à souligner l’ontologie intentionnelle de tout fait musical et de toute propriété musicale. La musique est une certaine manière d’articuler les différents

334 De même, la littéralité du texte littéraire ne réside nulle part physiquement, elle n’est pas tangible dans un texte en dehors d’une interprétation littéraire.

335 Exactement comme un cadavre est bien autre chose qu’une personne humaine.
niveaux de la perception et de l’entendement ; l’écoute musicale elle-même est musicale non seulement par la nature de son objet, mais aussi parce qu’elle le co-
établit dans l’acte de l’expérience musicale. Et ceci n’est pas une option en dehors de laquelle on aurait aussi de la musique en soi, une musique objective. S’il y a un en soi musical, il l’est dans cette modalité intentionnelle, qui nécessite l’action transfiguratrice de l’Esprit, spiritus vivificans de l’interprétation musicale. Je répète l’adjectif « musical » pour souligner qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une interprétation quelconque, mais que les règles et compétences pratiques qui y sont mises en œuvre sont le résidu de la musicalité beaucoup plus forte du texte musical (partition). Le principe ontologique de Berkeley, esse est percipi, a valeur universelle dans le monde de l’art (au moins au sein des approches esthétiques de l’art – les propriétés esthétiques ex definitione ne sont données que dans les expériences d’un sujet humain sentant). Et si les arts différencés ont quelque chose qui pourrait être conçu comme une essence – ce quelque chose se trouve non pas dans les matériaux que l’on utilise (dans leur dimension physique), mais dans les modalités selon lesquelles leurs arrangements sont perçus et appréciés. En ce sens, les matériaux ont aussi leur place dans la caractérisation spécifique des arts qui en usent, mais seulement au fur et à mesure qu’ils déterminent les formes du jeu de sensations propres aux différents arts. À partir de l’aspect hearing (transposition de l’aspect seeing de Wittgenstein et des seeing as et seeing in de Wollheim\(^{336}\)), notions inspirées par la Gestalt-
Psychologie comme l’est aussi le quasi-hearing de Gurney ou Levinson, on monte aux niveaux plus élevés des intentionalités musicales. Bernard Sève (2013) souligne le caractère primordial de l’altération musicale, déclinée sur tous les niveaux du royaume musical qu’elle engendre, à partir de l’altération des sons (même par la simple répétition) qui les répartit entre sons non musicaux (bruits, paroles, sons de la nature etc.) et éléments de la palette musicale. Ces sons musicaux sont rangés dans des échelles, inscrites dans le corps des instruments de musique et, par conséquent dans l’oreille du musicien, dans la voix du chanteur, et, encore une fois,

dans l’oreille du public. Les deux niveaux les plus élevés de l’altération musicale se trouvent dans l’organisation concrète des sons dans une œuvre, puis dans l’interprétation de l’œuvre et son devenir historique. Il me semble juste d’observer que l’altération musicale n’est rien d’autre – sur tous ces niveaux – qu’une certaine calibration de notre perception, réalisée par des moyens variés que l’on peut analyser. Mais que ce soit l’enfant qui apprend son solfège pour *altérer* son écoute, pour former son oreille musicale, afin qu’elle devienne prête à *entendre* les sons *comme* intervalles, degrés, accords, modulations, ou que ce soit Beethoven quand il regroupe les huit sons de son thème de la Vème symphonie (sur quatre hauteurs différentes seulement), lequel seront ensuite repris comme un *ritornello* très éloquent dans la composition narrative de Kundera\(^{337}\), dans tous ces cas il s’agit d’un travail de l’altération musicale, sans lequel la musique ne peut exister.

Ce que j’appelle *musica textualis* serait une telle auto-altération du texte, qui conduit son lecteur à abandonner le mode de lecture purement littéraire et en exige (aussi) une lecture musicale, laquelle – comme dans les cas standard de musique – peut assumer formes très diverses. En d’autres termes, cette musique est doublement textuelle. (1) C’est l’interprétation linguistique du texte qui mène le lecteur à entendre le même texte comme structure musicale, musicalement interprétable en le transfigurant en musique. (2) C’est le texte lui-même qui devient chair de la musique, qui en est le matériau altéré. Je parle d’une transfiguration, car ce qui était le corps linguistique du texte devient altéré et donc transfiguré en corps musical de la pièce. Si les modalités de musicalisation possibles sont très variées, comme aussi variées sont les musiques qui en résultent – ce qui reste toujours valable est le moment de l’interprétation textuelle, qui mène à une nouvelle hypothèse interprétative – l’hypothèse de l’interprétation *more musico* – et en l’exigeant – exige aussi une auto-transformation (comme si le texte s’annonçait comme étant plus qu’un texte littéraire, aussi comme étant aussi une partition musicale). Ce qui devient matière première d’un telle altération musicale est parfois


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de nature sonore, comme le son, le rythme, la cadence des paroles qui composent la prose, mais est le plus souvent – insonore, créant une musique sublimement silencieuse, une musique qui n’est pas faite pour l’oreille de la chair, mais pour celle de l’esprit, pour le *sensus musicalis* interne. À ce répertoire des possibilités (ou *modi* de la musique textuelle) on ajoute celle offerte par l’œuvre de Krzysztof Bartnicki. Ce traducteur polonais de *Finnegans Wake* travaille sur le texte de Joyce et le transforme complètement en musique audible, en le privant de sa valeur littéraire (au moins dans ce qui en est sensiblement perceptible). Cette procédure rigoureuse (dite *réduction*) est introduite toujours à partir du texte entendu comme énoncé linguistique et seulement en deuxième moment violemment transformé en musique.

L’appel à la musicalité humaine est universel dans toutes les formes de musique ; cette sensibilité humaine, nous en sommes d’accord, est historiquement cultivée à travers l’exercice de l’art des sons, et donc également formée par les propriétés physiques des ondes sonores et physiologiques du sens de l’ouïe. Mais dans la troisième partie nous défendons l’idée que le résultat d’une telle éducation musicale de l’homme n’est pas limité à des perceptions nécessairement audibles, qu’il peut s’étendre à d’autres jeux de sensations, sans nécessairement cesser d’être musique (comme la musique après la dissolution du système tonal n’a point cessé d’être musique).

**Articulation logique de l’argument**

L’argument s’articule en trois moments (sur le plan logique, qui ne coïncide pas avec celui de l’exposition) : 1. *pars destruens*, qui argumente contre les oppositions possibles à cette inclusion des textes littéraires dans le domaine musical (argument de la *silent music* dans le Chapitre *Music Beyond the Senses*) ; 2. *pars construens*, où on souligne des aspects fondamentaux de la musique qui se révèlent essentiels pour concevoir la musique textuelle et sa place parmi les autres musiques (les deux plans fondamentaux de l’intentionnalité musicale, le caractère universel des procédés de l’altération musicale comme calibration de la perceptivité musicale et la démonstration que le phénomène de *musicalisation* étudié par W.
Wolf, E. Petermann et alii, selon la célèbre formule huxleyenne *musicalisation of fiction*, ne se limite pas aux cas de l’imitation textuelle de la musique dans la prose, mais est de même nature que toute autre altération musicale ; 3. *pars ostensiva*, où, à travers les analyses de certains exemples tirés de la littérature polonaise contemporaine – les différents *modi* possibles de cette musique sont rendu palpables pour le lecteur.

**Résumé des chapitres:**

1. Argument de la musique silencieuse (Schulhoff, Cage et alii). Résultat : le son ne fait pas partie de la définition de la musique comme un élément physique nécessairement présent dans tous les types de musique.


4. *La toccata en Do majeur* d’Antoni Libera (2013), l’auteur de *Godot et son ombre* et du roman *Madame* (titre original en français), analysée dans la complexité de ses contrapositions musico-littéraires, à partir du rôle primordial des citations et réélaborations de la partition de Schumann (op. 7) dans le tissu du texte.

5. Analyse critique du corpus des œuvres de Krzysztof Bartnicki (*travail continué*), le traducteur de *Finnegans Wake* de James Joyce en polonais. Son ouvrage *Da capo al finne* et ses autres travaux sont des interprétations musicales du texte de *Finnegans Wake* à travers sa technique de réduction. Considérations critiques et théoriques, qui l’instituent au sein de la *musica textualis* comme un modèle extrême de transsubstantiation.
du texte littéraire en texte musical (alors performable et audible). À la suite du chapitre : une annexe contenant une pièce de musique expérimentale (La ci darem la mano in FW) écrite par l’auteur de la thèse pour étyacer sa discussion de l’œuvre de Bartnicki. Il s’agit d’une réduction de deux paragraphes initiaux du texte joycien, faite en fidélité absolue aux contraintes de la méthode Bartnicki, dans laquelle on entend clairement le thème mozartien du fameux Duettino de Don Giovanni et Zerlina. La procédure suivie dans la création de la pièce est minutieusement exposée et son résultat interprété.

6. Le dernier chapitre et la conclusion apportent une précision supplémentaire sur le concept de musica textualis, enrichi par les résultats des analyses contenues dans la deuxième partie. La musique textuelle ne se prête plus aux définitions de la musique tout court, mais peut néanmoins être suffisamment caractérisée pour être un concept clair et applicable, en tant que domaine aporétique de réflexion réglé par l’idéal de la musique réalisée en matière verbale. Ce qui, pour la communis opinio, est simplement irréalisable, trouve pourtant, comme cette étude a cherché à le démontrer, ses incarnations et vit de la force de son statut paradoxal de musique hors de la musique.

**De la méthode**

Il est bien de commencer une philosophie de l’art à partir des phénomènes et pratiques artistiques déjà existants. Le philosophe suit avec sa pensée les...
propriétés caractéristiques de son objet. Dans notre cas, la pratique artistique à partir de laquelle se construit notre démarche est la recherche de faire de la musique avec les mots qu’on trouve chez certains auteurs. Il n’y a pas lieu de préjuger l’impossibilité de la réussite d’un tel projet à partir des définitions préétablies de la musique, définitions que l’œuvre littéraire ne pourra jamais satisfaire. Il s’agit de comprendre ces essais et leurs effets dans leur complexité et leur portée, d’abord esthétique, puis artistique et enfin philosophique. Là où l’écrivain veut accomplir l’impossible, il convient de devenir plutôt observateur attentif et penseur précis que de se braquer dans la posture de l’avocat acharné du bon sens.

Notre recherche se fonde partiellement sur les résultats de la philosophie contemporaine de la musique ; mais elle offre une série des résultats qui n’auraient pas pu être obtenus sur le seul champ classique de cette discipline.

Qu’est-ce que c’est la musique ? Telle est une des questions fondamentales que se pose le philosophe devant la multiplicité des phénomènes que l’on associe avec l’idée de la musique. La réponse n’est pas facile, pas plus que l’exégèse de la question en soi n’est univoque.

1) La réflexion scientifique sur la musique, dès l’antiquité, a fourni beaucoup de modèles théoriques, dont on peut en général noter la forte indépendance par rapport aux pratiques sonores effectives. Le modèle boécienn de la tripartition de la musique indique sans équivoque le statut auxiliaire, périphérique, de ce que le bon sens d’aujourd’hui appelle musique sensu stricto : l’art sonore, qui fait appel à l’oreille humaine.339 Dans la plus grande partie de l’histoire de la philosophie le sens le plus primordial et ordinaire du concept de la musique la considère in primis
comme science rigoureuse de l’harmonie universelle, et ensuite comme facteur de la paideia et de la vie politique.

2) On remarque, non sans raison, que cet écart entre la musique « réelle » et la réflexion systématique qui la prend comme objet, peut être envisagé comme compromettant du point de vue épistémologique. Et s’il y a des sens fondamentalement divers du lexème ‘musique’, il faut finalement fonder une vraie philosophie de la musique dans notre sens, une philosophie qui prend comme unique point de départ le phénomène sonore de la musique et non pas des idées abstraites, dérivées des principes métaphysiques et théologiques (Pythagore et pythagoriciens, Boèce) ou psycho-socio-politiques (Damon, Platon, Aristote). Ce postulat du retour au concret sonore de la musique a notamment dans la philosophie française sa version apophatique (Jankélévitch) et positive (Sève), ayant pour patron ancien Aristoxène.

3) Le fait que l’on réclame justement l’attention pour la musica instrumentalis ne nous oblige pas à dénoncer toutes les autres musiques comme métaphores vagues ou projections spéculatives nocives pour le véritable entendement musical. Au lieu d’abandonner les musiques inaudibles en tant que vieilles idoles, il serait plutôt préférable de savoir sauvegarder la plurivocité du terme ‘musique’ en en distinguant bien les différents sens. Il faut souligner notre assomption primordiale : ‘musique’ est une de ces paroles-fondements de la culture de l’Occident (comme aussi ‘logos’ – opposé à la musique par Philodème), dont la force et la fécondité spirituelle sont étroitement liées à sa polysémie. Bien qu’il soit inacceptable d’en confondre les différents sens, il est également déraisonnable de prétendre que le discours musical rigoureux doive renoncer à cette richesse.

4) On peut avoir l’illusion qu’il soit néanmoins possible de renoncer aux discours métaphoriques pour parler de la musique au sens primordial. Mais le développement actuel de cet art écarte cette possibilité en mettant en question tous les universaux de la musique, un par un, dans le concret de l’œuvre (d’une performance). Ainsi le retour à des musiques inaudibles semble nécessité par la praxis même.
5) Nous nous représentons ainsi les sphères de la musique et de l'audible :

en se rappelant qu'il y a des universaux de la musique qui (a) peuvent s'absenter d'une pièce particulière de la musique (b) se réaliser hors de la musique et même hors de l'audible.

6) Nous voulons bien relativiser chronologiquement non seulement nos idées sur la musique et sur son rapport aux autres arts mais aussi la constitution de la musique effective comme telle. On veut insister sur la portée théorique du fait historique de l'union de la musique (dans le sens moderne) avec la parole (soit lyrique, soit épique, soit dramatique) dans l'antiquité. Selon nous ce fait qui peut sembler banal et évident est en réalité négligé dans notre manière effective de penser et de percevoir les arts.

Une Musique hors musique

Il s'agit, dans toutes ces réflexions, de fonder la possibilité de parler sérieusement d'une « musique hors musique », d'une musique qui se réalise dans un medium autre que le plein son, sans cesser d'être intimement liée au noyau du concept de musique, et parfois même en permettant d’y accéder mieux que par l’audition. Dans le présent travail, nous explorerons la présence d’une telle musique dans le texte artistique en prose. Comment donc la musique peut-elle y être inscrite ?

Par « texte artistique » nous entendons ici toute séquence de mots dont le sens essentiel n’est pas entièrement réductible au sens « transcendant » (le sens

transcendant est celui qui implique une référence à un monde extérieur, réel ou fictionnel). Pour mieux encadrer notre intérêt, nous nous limitons à la prose, dont les cas paradigmatiques sont - en littérature - le récit (le roman, la nouvelle), mais aussi le texte philosophique. L’inclusion de ce dernier est liée au fait qu’en philosophie la méthode fait par définition toujours partie du contenu essentiel. Et ainsi la manière dont un texte philosophique est écrit, même s’il est stylistiquement humble, n’est jamais entièrement dissociable du contenu traduisible (sens transcendant). Ainsi envisagé, le texte philosophique tend à accomplir les trois conditions de l’œuvre d’art formulées par Arthur Danto (Transfiguration of the Commonplace)\textsuperscript{341}. Pour des raisons pragmatiques nous nous sommes cependant contentés de n’analyser, dans le présent travail, que des textes littéraires, tirés de la production polonaise contemporaine. Nous espérons pouvoir ultérieurement poursuivre ce travail sur des exemples philosophiques.

Un support méthodologique pour une telle démarche se trouve dans les études comparées musique – littérature. La discussion critique et la possible amélioration de cette méthodologie (dans le contexte du débat spécialisé existant entre les comparatistes musico-littéraires et les représentants de la nouvelle branche d’études nommée Word and Music Studies) était inévitable ; elle n’est pourtant qu’une question subordonnée au vrai problème philosophique (qu’est-ce qui se passe quand on fait de la musique avec des mots ?) et a donc été traitée assez brièvement dans l’Introduction. Par contre nous avons critiqué un critère de démarcation proposé pour la catégorie de multimedialité, le critère de la nécessaire \textit{présence physique de

\textsuperscript{341} Il est clair pour moi que cette thèse est discutable, surtout dans sa version forte. Par contre il est sûrement moins contestable que l’on peut parler des cas limites entre la philosophie et littérature (Platon, Lucrèce, S. Augustin, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, pour ne citer que quelques noms). Cf. „Necessary and sufficient conditions on arthood : 1. Artworks « are about something (or the question of what they are about may legitimately arise)”, A.C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, p. 124. 2. „It is analytical to the concept of an artwork that there has to be an interpretation” Ibid., pp. 147–148. 3. „[W]orks of art, in categorical contrast with mere representations, use the means of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified when one has exhaustively specified what is being represented” Ibid., p. 148. Tous les 3 conditions citées et discutées par P. Kivy, The Performance of Reading. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature..., op. cit.
signifiants typiques de plus d’un medium (“in which the typical signifiers of more than one medium are physically present”342). En effet (1) le signifiant saussurien auquel l’auteure fait référence n’est pas de nature physique et ne peut donc être physiquement présent nulle part ; (2) une simple occurrence du « signifiant typique » d’un medium n’implique pas automatiquement la multimodalité, car il est en outre nécessaire que ces signifiants soient interprétés comme tels, ce qui n’est pas toujours le cas (par exemple un fragment de notation musicale citée dans un texte peut être utilisé comme illustration générique ou ornement, et non pas comme une vraie trace de la musique notée).

Mimesis et diegesis littéraires de la musique

Il faut travailler sur ces deux concepts platoniciens en vue de la (1) musique en tant qu’objet représenté dans l’œuvre littéraire ; (2) musique en tant que structures (forme musicale) transposées en composition littéraire ; (3) musique en tant qu’effets sonores (imaginaires, dans l’oreille de l’esprit, pour s’exprimer un peu paradoxalement).

La musique thématisée (1) contient (entre autres) :

a. La pensée sur la musique (p. ex. les dialogues et lectures sur la musique des personnages de la Montagne magique de Thomas Mann343, les considérations adornniennes dans Doktor Faustus, l’avis sur la musique de Wagner que donne l’organiste dans les Buddenbrooks, les convictions sur la force nocive à la virilité de Thomas Buddenbrook, les dialogues sur la musique dans plusieurs romans et nouvelles de Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, comme Sława i chwala, Mefisto-Walc, Czwarta symfonia, Martwa pasieka etc.) ou sur sa réception (p. ex. dans la Sonate à Kreutzer de L. Tolstoï etc.). C’est un cas particulier du principe de portée générale, présenté dans l’ouvrage, selon lequel une voix portant sur un problème en débat ne perd pas sa validité hors de l’œuvre (dans l’histoire du nihilisme on cite la définition

343 T. Mann, Der Zauberberg, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2002.
qu’en donne Bazarov, alors même qu’il est un personnage fictif du roman *Pères et Fils* de I. Tourgueniev).

b. Les * descriptions* (ou autres représentations verbales – voir points (2) et (3)) des œuvres musicales *(b1) existantes* comme la sonate op. 111 de Beethoven décrite, jouée et analysée par Kretschmar ou la toccata op. 7 de Schumann décrite, citée, analysée, interprétée (soit comme telle, soit dans des diverses interprétations et enregistrements, comme celles de Cziffra ou de Richter) par le Professeur Plater, personnage de la nouvelle d’Antoni Libera, et par le narrateur-jeune pianiste ; *(b2) fictives* comme *Apocalipsis cum figuris* d'Adrian Leverkühn ou la *Sonate* de Venteuil, ou comme l’apocryphe wagnérien intitulé *Der Rattenfänger von Hameln* dans *Śpiewaj ogrody* de Pawel Huelle 344. Dans *Doktor Faustus* on trouve également un exemple de crypto-citation où la pièce décrite (et évoquée structurellement dans le sens (2) en utilisant les moyens (3)) est préexistante (le prélude de l’acte III des *Meistersinger* de Wagner) sans être identifiée comme telle dans le texte. Ces cas – ici simplement esquissés – posent de grands problèmes de nature esthétique et ontologique. L’oratorio diabolique de Leverkühn ne fait-il pas partie de l’histoire *de la musique* ?

c. L’*exécution* musicale (p. ex. le récital d’Elżbieta Szyller à Paris dans le roman *Sława i chwała* d’Iwaszkiewicz 345, les diverses exécutions de l’héroïne du roman *Consuelo* de George Sand, comme aussi d’Anzoleto et des autres chanteurs)

d. La *perception* musicale (p. ex. le concert dans le roman *Le Cœur absolu* de Philippe Sollers)

e. Les *instruments de musique* (p. ex. le vieil orgue dans *Le Salon du Wurtemberg* de Pascal Quignard).

f. Les *vies de musiciens* : *(f1) réels* *(f1.1) biographies* (p. ex. par Stendhal : vies de Haydn, Mozart, Rossini et Métastase ; de Beethoven par Adorno ou de Bach par A. Schweitzer) *(f1.2) éléments biographiques* dans la fiction : *(f1.2.1) musiciens

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344 P. Huelle, *Śpiewaj ogrody...*, op. cit.
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comme personnages dans la fiction (p. ex. Nicola Porpora, Alessandro Marcello dans Consuelo) ; (f1.2.2) musiciens comme modèles ou inspirations pour des personnages fictifs (l’ardente controverse autour de la présence de Schönberg chez Mann) et (f3) fictives (f3.1) (auto-)biographies (R. Rolland, Jean Christophe ; Mann, Doktor Faustus. Das Leben des deutschen Tonsetzers Adrian Leverkühn erzählt von einem Freunde; Iwaszkiewicz, Czwarta symfonia; ou Au piano de Jean Echenoz346); (f3.2) musiciens comme héros littéraires (Villa Amalia de Pascal Quignard.

Ces exemples sont parfois profondément engagés dans des structures musicolittéraires à la fois très complexes et artistiquement essentielles pour l’œuvre en question. C’est seulement après avoir effectué cette recherche qu’il devient possible de s’interroger sérieusement sur le statut de figures telles que la musique silencieuse de Pascal Quignard.

(2) Musique en tant que structures (forme musicale) transposées en composition littéraire.

(3) Musique en tant qu’effets sonores.

Contrairement à la thématisation de la musique dans le texte qui, étant établie au niveau des sens linguistiques, n'est pas contestable comme catégorie, les deux catégories qui suivent appartiennent (mais non pas sans exception) à un autre ordre d’interprétation. Ceci, en fait, suscite des problèmes et désaccords parmi les chercheurs. Le débat contemporain est fortement marqué par la critique méthodologique de l’abus des termes musicaux dans l'analyse des œuvres littéraires. La mode romantique et symboliste de musicaliser la réalité « hors musicale » a suscité des discours emphatiques et peu rigoureux au XIXème siècle et au début du XXème, empêchant ainsi la critique littéraire d'analyser les phénomènes effectifs de la musicalité. Aujourd'hui, avec un scepticisme modéré, on tend à accepter les deux musicalités qui suivent.
Les deux sortes de musicalité du texte (2) et (3) ne sont presque jamais autonomes l'une par rapport à l'autre : la forme musicale réalisée en paroles se sert souvent des sonorités verbales en les composant dans l'ordre temporel. Les sonorités « naturelles » des paroles acquièrent leur caractère musical à travers le travail formel. Ainsi le « son musical » en littérature est analogue dans sa structure profonde au son musical tout court. Dans les deux cas le procédé musical en se déroulant crée son propre matériel, le ton, qui parfois est physiquement identique à des sons non-musicaux de la nature et parfois est entièrement artificiel. La parole est, dans son état de nature, pour ainsi dire, sonore. Mais cette sonorité est rendue inessentielle ou même superfliue quand la fonction informative (référentielle) du langage domine ; par contre elle peut toujours être mise en jeu pour devenir « musiquée ». C'est précisément le moment où la parole littéraire dépasse le niveau descriptif pour musicaliser sa propre chair et en composer une structure musicalement sensée qui nous intéresse.

Ainsi la musicalité dans le troisième sens a ses deux moments philosophiquement bien distincts : quand elle est en puissance et quand elle est en acte. Dans notre réflexion critique sur la notion de la musicalité du texte, nous avons cherché à éliminer les usages métaphoriques et redondants par rapport aux termes bien établis de la poétique. On a recherché, plutôt en vain, un critère extérieur pour la validité méthodologique d'un tel discours (comme les indices sémantiques ou les critères d’admissibilité des termes musicaux, étudiés par Wolf). En réalité ce que l'on appelle inexactement la musicalité du langage n'est qu'une partie de son potentiel musicalisable. On peut formuler une hypothèse qui explore la cause du passage de ce potentiel de la puissance à l'acte : peut-être serait-il possible d’appliquer la notion d’altération musicale aux processus qui gouvernent la transfiguration du textuel en musical. La prose doit aussi se servir d’instruments pour produire de la musique, doit altérer le discours dans une manière qui fait la différence pour notre oreille intérieure : ceci n’est plus un flux des paroles

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347 Voir aussi le lien entre cette pensée et la notion de *ostranienie* (défamiliarisation, qui serait une manière d’altération fondamentale, soit comme mécanisme de base de l’art, soit comme effet principal sur l’auditoire).
gouvernées par la logique discursive et narrative, c’est le flux unique, inénarrable du temps durée perceptible et vivable dans l’instant de la lecture (audition intérieure).

_Doktor Faustus_ de Mann peut servir ici comme une source exhaustive, étant une espèce de _Kunst der Fuge_ dans le domaine de la musique textuelle. En principe Mann cherche une formule d’explicitation des filiations musico-textuelles intérieure (mais aussi extérieure, notamment à travers son ouvrage _Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus. Roman eines Romans_348) à la narration même. Son génie sait unir dans la même construction littéraire cette motivation musicale avec les motivations rhétorique, expressive et symbolique. Notre réflexion choisit cette œuvre comme paradigme. Sa réalité artistique ne requiert pas de corroboration _quasi-_empirique dans des autres ouvrages littéraires. Elle nous suffit comme un univers artistiquement accompli, doté de sa vérité _artistique_.

**De la fiction esthétique**

En philosophie dire le faux est intolérable, même pour le _trivialiste_349 (car selon sa position extrême et inconsistante _tout_ est vrai).

L’art, parfois, se fonde sur la création de (belles) illusions. Son moyen décisif d’agir est donc une fausseté systématique au niveau de la constitution de son objet. La narration « parle » (et même cet acte de parler n’est qu’une imitation du vrai raconter) d’événements fictifs, vécus par des personnages inventés et dans des lieux inexistants. Le trône du roi Lear est « en vérité » simplement une chaise sur la scène et le déjeuner sur l’herbe n’a jamais eu lieu. On aperçoit clairement la double fiction constitutive de ces œuvres : (1) la fiction systématique inscrite dans

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348 T. Mann, _Doktor Faustus. Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus..._, op. cit.
349 _Terminus technicus_ anglais : _est trivialism_ pour la doctrine logique la position selon laquelle tout jugement est vrai: \( \forall p \top p \).
la *mimesis* en tant que telle (critiquée par Platon pour sa fausseté par rapport à l’être véritable et pour ses reflets dans les objets), le fait que les fruits de Zeuxis ne peuvent pas nourrir les oiseaux, et que le rideau de Parrhasios ne pourra jamais être levé ; (2) la fiction des objets ou situations représentés, qui devient paradoxalement encore plus évidente quand le héros lui-même n’est pas inventé et coïncide avec un personnage « réel », comme Napoléon chez Tolstoï ou Stendhal.

L’art exige de son public la capacité de *voir en* (Wollheim) une strate de teinture vernie sur toile un visage humain ou un paysage, mais exige aussi, en même temps et avec la même nécessité, la conscience que ce visage n’est point fait de la chair chaude que l’on pourrait embrasser, ni que la pluie orageuse du paysage ne pourra nous tremper. En un mot, il semble que la fausseté soit un élément indispensable soit de l’expérience esthétique de la belle fiction, soit de la vérité de l’œuvre qui la contient.

On voit clairement que dans les deux points précédents on parle de la fausseté par rapport à deux vérités bien différentes. Il semble que la première « vérité » soit simplement la *valeur logique* et la deuxième – la *valeur artistique*, l’intégrité globale de l’œuvre, sa raison d’être la plus profonde et immanente. Mais pour ce qui concerne (I), la vérité logique, c’est la philosophie même qui délibère sur le sens de la vérité. Notamment, c’est elle (dans diverses logiques philosophiques), qui recherche une « bonne » formulation et formalisation de cette notion ; et cette délibération est riche et pluraliste (logique classique, logiques paraconsistentes etc.). La question de Pilate représente toujours un grand problème de la philosophie, toujours actuel, même si aujourd’hui on l’envisage dans des termes bien différents de ceux des logiciens médiévaux p. ex. Il en est ainsi parce que l’idée préréflexive de la vérité semble toujours subsister dans toutes les formulations systématiques de cette notion, comme un idéal régulateur qui organise toutes ces recherches. Elle est bien liée, même si les logiciens analytiques n’en seraient pas forcément d’accord, avec une notion métaphysique de la vérité en tant que principe qui conditionne et précède chaque notion de vérité particulière et qui nous dirige vers sa découverte (voire sa formulation). En tout cas, pour ne pas
retomber ici dans la polémique antimétaphysique, il nous suffit de voir la vérité dans ce premier sens comme la vérité de la connaissance, la vérité épistémique, liée à sa définition aristotélicienne par la notion de correspondance entre la réalité et le jugement (ou autre représentation des faits). Pour ce qui concerne (II), la vérité artistique se pose comme problématique en relation avec la vérité épistémique, en étant bien distincte. Roman Ingarden dans sa recherche sur la « vérité » dans l’œuvre littéraire, en distingue justement huit sens différents qui précisent la distinction générale proposée ci-dessus.

On pourrait faire l’hypothèse que la prédilection de certains philosophes pour la musique en tant qu’art sublime, pur, ontologique, au delà de l’ordre de la représentation (Schopenhauer), est liée au fait que dans sa forme absolue, purement sonore et dépouvue de sens linguistique, l’art du son est innocent : il ne ment pas, il n’use pas de mensonge. Il réussit à créer avec puissance de belles perceptions qui ne sont pas trompeuses, qui n’imitent rien de ce monde, qui ne sont point des illusions, mais le jeu actuel de beaux sons. Bien clairement, ce que nous venons de dire crée une autre menace : cet art qui se refuse à imiter ce monde nous expose au risque de suivre son charme ineffable et de nous perdre en détournant nos regards du vrai, en quête de l’au delà irreal (on envisage ici à la fois la langue musicale qui mène à la mort chez Mann, le cas de Hanno Buddenbrook, et la rancune contre la musique des Sirènes, déraisonnable et ambivalente, dont parle Jankélévitch). Ce qui est essentiel pour nous c’est que le sens musical se dévoile ici comme indépendant de la vérité logique sur le niveau constructif de l’œuvre, qui - dans le cas de la musique absolue - manque tout simplement en absence de son possible substrat (jugements).

En général on peut noter que la vérité artistique peut (et souvent doit) se servir des faussetés épistémiques en les mettant en jeu qui exclut leur réduction. Le

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350 R. Ingarden, „O tak zwanej « prawdzie » w literaturze”, op. cit.; R. Ingarden, „O różnych rozumieniach «prawdziwości» w dziele sztuki”, op. cit.
352 V. Jankélévitch, La Musique et l’Ineffable..., op. cit.
lecteur ou spectateur doit avoir la conscience de leur statut fictif en se laissant séduire par la vraisemblance de la fiction, au point de voir en, ce qui est conditio sine qua non de l’expérience esthétique des représentations artistiques.

Un des pouvoirs de l’art est qu’il est créatif. L’art sait établir de nouveaux univers, poser des entités qui n’étaient pas au monde avant leur création. On peut bien dire que dans la conscience collective l’individualité personnelle d’un Pierre Bezouchov n’a pas moins de réalité que celle d’un général Koutouzov, pour ne pas donner l’exemple d’un soldat inconnu mort à Borodino, dont l’histoire ne conserve même pas le nom. Il ne s’agit pas ici de nier l’existence aux inconnus, mais au contraire de l’accorder, d’une certaine manière, aux êtres inventés.

C’est précisément ce pouvoir créatif qui se sert de quasi-jugements, comme dit Ingarden, pour établir le schéma intentionnel qui se concrétise dans l’acte du lecteur. Les jugements exprimés par des phrases identiques dans un contexte hors-artistique, seraient-ils tout simplement faux, ayant pour référence la réalité des faits. Mais dans la forme artistique les mêmes phrases deviennent porteuses du précieux Verbum créatif, fécond, ponens. Ceci a pourtant besoin de la collaboration de l’auditoire ; si les places indéterminées de la formation schématique ne sont pas déterminées dans l’imagination coadjuvante du lecteur ou dans l’esprit et l’œil du spectateur, l’acte créatif ne reste alors qu’un tentative inaccomplie, suspendue dans le vide, dépourvue de pouvoir, exactement comme une symphonie entendue par un patient qui n’est pas physiquement sourd, mais qui souffre d’une amusie cérébrale.

L’attitude esthétique, une certaine disposition sensible et spirituelle est donc indispensable du coté de l’auditoire. Sans elle l’œuvre ne peut prendre chair, ne peut devenir création effective. La vérité artistique ne peut pas s’actualiser et donc se décompose. Voici nos hypothèses :

**H1** L’héritage réflexif de l’esthétique, de la philosophie de l’art, de la critique et des filiations intermodales dans les arts, dans la mesure où ces discours expriment certaines thèses sur l’art, son essence et ses potentialités, a toujours un rôle ambigu. D’une part, surtout dans les cas des discours rigoureux, ils visent à la vérité. D’autre
part, ils font nécessairement partie du jeu que l'on appelle art, dans le sens où ils modifient et forment des attitudes esthétiques, bien que les idées créatives mêmes. L'art, à son tour, a le pouvoir de créer des fictions esthétiques : comme il peut nous émouvoir par les péripéties de héros inexistants, il peut nous faire « comprendre » et « concrètement goûter » (voir en) les merveilles de l’esthétiquement imperceptible.

H2 L'étude simultanée du sens musical et du sens narratif peut éclaircir notre analyse de ce dernier. Il vaut la peine de prendre pour paradigme du sens artistique tout court le modèle interprétatif de l’œuvre de la musique absolue, plutôt que tenter le contraire (on en a plusieurs exemples dans le narrativisme musicologique). Le vrai sens (la vérité artistique) d'un grand roman, voici notre hypothèse, n'est pas plus déductible des vérités partielles des énoncés dont est constitué son texte, que le vrai sens d'une fugue de la vérité de son sujet et contre-sujet (sic !).

Cela ne veut absolument pas dire que l'on entend ignorer le sens propositionnel dans l’œuvre littéraire. On est bien loin d'une telle position intenable. On veut insister, cependant, sur le fait que la vérité des œuvres artistiques mérite d'être étudiée à l'abri de l'intentionalisme et du sémanticisme qui semblent régner chez quelques philosophes de l'art éminents de notre temps (P. Kivy, par exemple, qui sait bien écarter la musique de ce paradigme, mais l’accepte dans les analyses des autres arts). Tout ceci peut s'accomplir sur le champ bien étrange de la musique littéraire, qui engendre l'utopie de la musique textuelle et nous la fait « entendre » dans ses œuvres. Mais cette utopie n'est point une exception dans l’histoire des arts. Elle semble, au contraire, exemplifier un mécanisme propre à l'art comme tel.
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