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Carrara, Massimiliano - Fassio, Davide (2008) Logically Unknowable Propositions:
a criticism to Tennant’s three-partition of Anti-Cartesian propositions.
In: 3. International Conference on Philosophy, June 2-5, 2008, Athens, Greece. (Inedito)

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Abstract (inglese)

The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument that, starting from the plainly innocent assumption that every true proposition is knowable, reaches the strong conclusion that every true proposition is known; i.e. if there are unknown truths, there are unknowable truths. The paradox has been considered a problem for every theory assuming the Knowability Principle, according to which all truths are knowable and, in particular, for semantic anti-realist theories.
A well known criticism to the Knowability Paradox is the so called restriction strategy. It bounds the scope of the universal quantification in (KP) to a set of formulas whose logical form avoids the paradoxical conclusion. Specifically, Tennant suggests to restrict the quantifier in (KP) to propositions whose knowledge is provably inconsistent. He calls them Anti-Cartesian propositions and distinguished them in three kinds. In this paper we will not be concerned with the soundness of the restriction proposal and the criticisms it has received. Rather, we are interested in analyzing the proposed distinction.
We argue that Tennant’s distinction is problematic because it is not completely clear, it is not grounded on an adequate logical analysis, and it is incomplete. We suggest an alternative distinction, and we give some reasons for accepting it: it results logically grounded and more complete than Tennant’s one, inclusive of it and independent from non-epistemic notions.


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Tipo di EPrint:Contributo a convegno (Relazione)
Anno di Pubblicazione:08 Luglio 2008
Parole chiave (italiano / inglese):Knowability Paradox; Anti-Cartesian propositions
Settori scientifico-disciplinari MIUR:Area 11 - Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e psicologiche > M-FIL/02 Logica e filosofia della scienza
Struttura di riferimento:Dipartimenti > Dipartimento di Filosofia
Codice ID:1127
Depositato il:31 Lug 2008
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