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Ipino, Elisabetta (2009) Signaling IPO quality: Evidence from disclosure and board composition. [Tesi di dottorato]

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Abstract (inglese)

The main goal of this thesis is to provide new insights on the way firms seek to mitigate the information asymmetry, around initial publi offerings (IPO), by signaling their "good quality" via diclosure and board composition.
The important function of an IPO in providing finance to companies and in providing an "exit option" for the original entrepreneur and investors would be reason enough to justify the considerable research interest. However the scale of academic research has been driven, in large part, by the existence of two anomalies: initial underpricing and the long-term underperformance. To these issues chapter 1 is devoted. It briefly introduces the study and it reviews the main theory and evidence on the IPO activity: why firms go public, why they reward first-day investors with considerable underpricing, and how IPOs perform in the long run.
Chapter 2 considers the importance of information asymmetry for firm behavior during the process of issuing new equity. Specifically, it investigates where the information asymmetry comes from, how and to which extent asymmetric information affects the IPO process (before and after the IPO date) and how it can be alleviate.
Chapter 3 aims at investigating whether forward-looking information and managerial financial forecasts are useful to reduce information asymmetries and whether they are related to the initial return earned by an IPO. Relying on information-based theories of underpricing, which assuming the existence of information asymmetries between market participant share the prediction that underpricing is related to the degree of these information asymmetries, in this chapter we investigate whether forward looking information and managerial financial forecasts are useful to reduce information asymmetries and whether they are related to the initial return earned by an IPO. For the purpose of the study we consider both narrative and financial forward looking disclosure, as well as the characteristics of managerial financial forecast (the level of precision). The sample is made up of all the Italian IPOs issued during the period 1999-2005. Several elements make the Italian setting interesting for this research. From the financial market standpoint, Italy is considered a country with low shareholder protection. From the IPO perspective, the attention towards external finance by Italian companies has become more relevant, as shown by the significant increase of Italian IPOs in the past 15 years. From a regulation standpoint, the EEC Directive 2003/71 regulates the content of the IPO prospectus and it allows issuing firms to include forecasts in their IPO prospectus in a low litigation environment. Our findings confirm the relevance of forecasting activity in reducing underpricing. Our results also indicate that forward-looking information is useful in reducing ex-ante uncertainty and that this effect does not depend on the presence or not of managerial financial forecasts. Contrary to our expectations, we find no statistically significant relation between underpricing and the precision of forecasts about EPS, while our results show a negative relation between sales and EBIT forecasts.
Finally, chapter 4 investigates the role of firm specific governance characteristics, namely interlocks between banks and industrial firms in the IPO setting. The question addressed in the chapter is why bankers sit on board of non-financial firm: to monitor, to signal or to extract rents? To address the research question, we investigate the role played by bankers on boards of non-financial IPO firms, by considering the impact that the appointment of bankers has on a company's earnings quality and cost of capital. Overall, findings are fully consistent with the hypothesis that interlocks are collusion devices to share and maintain rents. On the one side, indeed, we find that the incidence of bankers on boards is positively related to earnings management, suggesting that they do not perform monitoring activity on behalf of shareholders. On the other side, bankers on board help to mitigate information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. Results indicate that firms enjoy a lower cost of capital by having a banker in the boardroom. In summary our results, show that bankers on board act as "smooth guys": they help the firm to mitigate the information asymmetry, but once appointed they make income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions.

Abstract (italiano)

L'obiettivo della tesi è l'analisi delle modalità con cui le società, matricole in borsa, nel tentativo di diminuire le asimmetrie informative tra gli insiders ed il mercato, segnalano la loro qualità. In merito agli IPO è stata sviluppata, negli ultimi anni, una cospicua letteratura che ne ha indagato i diversi aspetti: le motivazioni alla quotazione, i costi e i benefici propri di questa scelta di finanziamento e gli effetti che la scelta di quotarsi produce sulle imprese. All'analisi di tali argomenti è dedicato il primo capitolo, dove dopo una breve review della letteratura teorica ed empirica l'attenzione è rivolta all'analisi delle principali "anomalie"connesse all'andamento dei titoli nel breve e nel lungo periodo. La prima anomalia è costituita dal fenomeno dell'underpricing: il prezzo di mercato che si registra nel primo giorno di quotazione di un titolo risulta, in media, sistematicamente superiore rispetto a quello di collocamento. La seconda anomalia, definita long-run underperformance, è connessa all'andamento del titolo nel lungo periodo: le imprese neo-quotate sembrano offrire rendimenti di medio-lungo termine inferiori rispetto a quelli dell'indice di mercato.
L'obiettivo del terzo capitolo è quello di studiare il ruolo della disclosure delle informazioni forward-looking, nel prospetto che accompagna la quotazione, e l'impatto che tali informazioni hanno nel ridurre le asimmetrie informative, misurate nell'underpricing. Quasi tutti i modelli teorici sviluppati in letteratura per spiegare il fenomeno dell'underpricing si basano sull'ipotesi dell'esistenza di asimmetrie informative fra i vari soggetti coinvolti nel collocamento (l'impresa, la banca d'investimento, gli investitori esterni). Facendo riferimento alla signalling theory si vuole analizzare se la disclosure delle informazioni prospettiche e la precisione con cui il management fornisce informazioni prospettiche di carattere finanziario aiuta la società emittente a ridurre le asimmetrie informative esistenti con il mercato e di conseguenza l'underpricing. Il campione oggetto di studio è costituito da tutti le società italiane che si sono quotate durante il periodo 1999-2005. I risultati confermano l'importanza delle informazioni forward-looking (sia narrative che finanziarie nel ridurre l'underpricing al primo giorno di quotazione. Diversamente da precedenti studi i risultati non evidenziano alcun legame tra la precisione con cui vengono rilasciate le informazioni finanziarie e il livello di underpricing.
Nel quarto capitolo si analizza il legame che esiste tra banche e imprese. Gli scandali finanziari che di recente hanno coinvolto società non-finanziarie, hanno portato alla luce una fitta rete di relazioni tra banche e imprese e hanno evidenziato come il ruolo delle banche, all'interno delle imprese, sia ancora molto controverso. Scopo del capitolo è quidi l'analisi dei legami banca-impresa a livello di composizione del Consiglio di Amministrazione (CdA). In particolare, attraverso l'analisi degli interlock bancari (dove il dirigente di una banca possiede anche una carica nel CdA di un'impresa industriale - "banker") si studia il ruolo e l'effetto che ha la composizione del board nel segnalare la qualità dell'IPO. La composizione del CdA assume un'importanza fondamentale, soprattutto per le aziende che decidono di quotarsi. Diversamente da studi precedenti, il ruolo dei bankers è analizzato osservando l'impatto che essi hanno sulla qualità delle informazioni contabili (earnings quality) e sulle asimmetrie informative (costo del capitale). Nel complesso, i risultati sono pienamente coerenti con l'ipotesi che gli interlocks servano come sistemi di collusione che permettono alle banche di estrarre rents. Da un lato, infatti, i risultati suggeriscono i bankers non svolgono attività di monitoraggio per conto degli azionisti, infatti la presenza di bankers nei CdA è positivamente correlata a politiche di earnings managenment. Dall'altro lato, i bankers sembrano contribuire ad alleviare l'asimmetria informativa esistente tra azienda e investitori. I risultati indicano che il mercato chiede un costo del capitale minore se nel CdA è presente almeno un banker.

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Tipo di EPrint:Tesi di dottorato
Relatore:Bozzolan, Saverio
Dottorato (corsi e scuole):Ciclo 21 > Scuole per il 21simo ciclo > ECONOMIA E MANAGEMENT
Data di deposito della tesi:NON SPECIFICATO
Anno di Pubblicazione:30 Luglio 2009
Parole chiave (italiano / inglese):IPO, underpricing, disclosure, information asymmetries, financial interlocks, earnings quality, cost of capital.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari MIUR:Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/07 Economia aziendale
Struttura di riferimento:Dipartimenti > Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno"
Codice ID:2150
Depositato il:10 Mar 2010 10:20
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