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Enache, Luminita (2012) Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. [Tesi di dottorato]

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Abstract (inglese)

The main objective of this work is to increase the knowledge about corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in reducing information asymmetries. The first chapter is a review of the literature on corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. The second chapter analyzes whether board composition and voluntary disclosure substitute or complement each other in reducing information asymmetries. Finally, the third chapter analyzes the role of disclosure and governance in the biotech setting in enhancing analysts ability to forecasts earnings.
More in detail, in the second chapter, we assess the impact of corporate governance on firms’ product-related disclosure of biotechnology companies in the presence of agency and proprietary costs. In order to conduct this investigation we use regression analysis employing data compiled from 10-K forms and proxy statements. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosure – considering the approach suggested by Lev et.al. (2004) – is a function of governance structure measured by a set of independent variables based on the board of directors typology proposed by Hillman et.al. (2000) and Baysinger and Butler (1985). Our results show that corporate governance plays a role in orienting the heterogeneity of product-level disclosures provided by US biotech companies. Moreover, using biotech setting, which provides unique heterogeneity in the level of disclosure, we show that background of board members affects corporate disclosure. Specifically, specialist directors and community members exert markedly different effect on disclosure. Support specialists generally pressed for increased disclosure, unless it is against firm interest. Community influentials vote for vague disclosure but tend to disclose information early. The later may be due to the desire to prop-up their personal public profile, at the expense of shareholders.
The study further explores and provides useful insights and practical implications for corporate governance standard setters. They should consider the various competences of board members such as skills, expertise, knowledge and specific functions of individual directors in expressing the impact of corporate governance on firms voluntary disclosure.
In the last chapter, we uses US biotech firms to assess how corporate governance mechanisms, such as board composition, board size and product related voluntary disclosure, affect the information environment faced by financial analysts in forecasting earnings. Information environment is defined as forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, precision of public information, precision of private information, as in Barron et.al. (1998, 2002). We consider the methodology introduced by Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Hillman et.al. (2000) and we analyze each independent directors according to his specific background. On the relation between voluntary disclosure and analysts forecasts, we have build our own measure of voluntary disclosure index, by hand-collecting all the information specific to the biotech products that firms have into their portfolio. We measure the voluntary disclosure of biotech products based on the Business Section Analysis (part I) of the Annual Report (10-K form), precisely on the drug development programs, that provide key information about the various products under development of each biotechnology company. Additionally, we examine whether voluntary disclosure were disclosed consistently over time and we follow the path of disclosure by developing an persistent disclosure index at the firm level. Our results shows that US biotech firms with more independent directors on the board reduces the forecast dispersion. The quality of corporate governance affects information transparency and play a role in reducing the uncertainty associated with future firms’ performance by increasing the precision of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Better corporate governance mechanisms promotes transparency that benefits the users of firms’ disclosure. Forecast accuracy increases when voluntary disclosure is constant over time. Analysts forecast dispersion decreases when more independent directors sits on the board. Voluntary disclosure is fully effective to financial analysts only if the information is comparable over time. When information is constant over time it increases forecast accuracy and reduces the dispersion. Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance quality are two mechanisms that act is complement to improve the quality of information available to financial analysts

Abstract (italiano)

l principale obiettivo di questo lavoro è di quello di contribuire ad una maggiore comprensione delle politiche di comunicazione delle imprese e dei meccanismi di corporate governance, in particolare le caratteristiche dei consiglieri di amministrazione nel ridurre le asimmetrie informative.
Nel primo capitolo sono state analizzate le teorie più rilevanti dell’accountability, come la voluntary disclosure e la corporate governance con l’obiettivo di evidenziare i contributi più significativi che ad esse sono state mosse e identificando nuovi temi di ricerca.
Il capitolo secondo studia se i meccanismi di governance, quali la composizione del board è un sostituto piuttosto che un complemento della comunicazione volontaria nel ridurre le asimmetrie informative.
Il terzo capitolo sottopone a verifica empirica le asserzioni più rilevanti derivanti dal ruolo che la corporate governance e voluntary disclosure hanno sulle proprietà delle previsioni degli analisti.
Più nel dettaglio, il secondo capitolo mette in evidenza l’impatto che la composizione del consiglio di amministrazione ha sulla comunicazione volontaria riguardante i prodotti in sviluppo delle imprese biotech statunitense in presenza di alti costi di proprietà e di agenzia che li caratterizzano. Per analizzare come il board composition impattano sulla comunicazione volontaria, la ricerca distingue i componenti del consiglio di amministrazione in base al background e alle precedenti esperienze lavorative in tre categorie: a) business experts, sono gli amministratori esecutivi le cui competenze sono legate al processo decisionale; b) support specialists, si riferiscono ai esperti in ambiti specifici come finanza, diritto, ricerca e sviluppo, amministrazione e controllo; c) community influentials, si tratta di politici, membri di organizzazioni non profit che portano”knowledge, experience and linkages relevant to firm’s external environment” [Baron, 1985]. La classificazione proposta, basata sul ruolo potenziale dei singoli amministratori all’interno del consiglio di amministrazione amplia l’attenzione sulle funzioni che il consiglio di amministrazione riveste, prendendo un passo avanti rispetto alla maggior parte dei studi esistenti, e centrandosi non solo sul ruolo di monitoraggio ma anche sul potenziale contributo al processo decisionale strategico. Per ciascuna azienda biotech si è proceduto alla classificazione degli amministratori nelle tre categorie in precedenza presentate. Sono stata analizzate le biografie di ciascun amministratore dal documento DEF 14-A. La verifica empirica si è svolta considerando che la comunicazione volontaria – usando l’indice di voluntary disclosure costruito dal Guo et.al. (2004) – è una funzione della struttura di governance misurata come composizione del consiglio di amministrazione, usando il approccio proposto da Hillman et.al. (2000) e Baysinger and Butler (1985), descritta prima.
I risultati ottenuti mettono in risalto il ruolo strategico che il board rinveste e inoltre conferma come la composizione del board in termini di competenze influenza la sua capacità di monitoraggio e quindi riduca, i costi di monitoraggio che la società deve sostenere. In particolare, si evidenzia come diversi membri del consiglio di amministrazione, quale support specialists and community influentials esercitano un ruolo diverso sulla voluntary disclosure. In generale, i support specialists tendono a favorire un incremento della disclosure. Al contrario, i comunity influentials votano per una “vague” disclosure, però tendono a fornire le informazioni prima. Questo ultimo risultato può essere dovuto al desiderio da parte dei community influentials di proteggere la loro reputazione alle spese dei shareholders.
In conclusione, la ricerca condotta ha evidenziato come il problema della composizione del board deve essere affrontata superando la tradizionale classificazione degli amministratori in esecutivi e indipendenti. In tale ambito, assume una maggiore rilevanza il background, le competenze, e i legami degli amministratori. In fine, il presente lavoro porta in attenzione importante implicazioni per i corporate governance standard setters, che dovrebbero mostrare una maggiore attenzione e considerare il ruolo di ciascun membro al interno del consiglio di amministrazione nel specificare le varie direttive.
L’ultimo capitolo della tesi tratta il ruolo che la governance e la voluntary disclosure hanno nell’influire le previsioni degli analisti, analizzate principalmente in un contesto statunitense delle aziende biotech. L’attenzione del ricerca è volta innanzitutto ad analizzare il ruolo che la board composition e le modalità con cui le società forniscono le informazioni, e successivamente come tali informazioni vengono interpretate dagli analisti finanziari nel produrre stime dei risultati aziendali (EPS). Oggetto di analisi sono le proprietà delle previsioni degli analisti, come la forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, precision of public information, precision of private information (Barron et.al. 1998, 2002), usando, nominate più semplicemente information environment. Il framework utilizzato per la misurazione della disclosure è quello proposto da Guo et.al. (2004) che ci ha permesso anche di costruire un indice di consistenza della disclosure nel tempo. Questo ultimo viene calcolato come la differenza tra la voluntary disclosure nell’anno t meno la voluntary disclosure nell’anno (t-1) diviso la disclosure al tempo (t-1). Tutte le informazioni riguardante la comunicazione volontaria dei prodotti in sviluppo che le aziende biotech hanno nel portafoglio sono hand-collected usando come fonte il 10-K form, che deve essere predisposto da ciascuna società quaotata al New York Stock Exchange e depositato presso la SEC. Questo ci ha permesso di creare un database unico. Per quanto riguarda la corporate governance - board composition abbiamo presso in con il profilo degli singoli membri del consiglio di amministrazione in termini di background e competenze

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Tipo di EPrint:Tesi di dottorato
Relatore:Parbonetti, Antonio
Dottorato (corsi e scuole):Ciclo 24 > Scuole 24 > ECONOMIA E MANAGEMENT
Data di deposito della tesi:30 Luglio 2012
Anno di Pubblicazione:30 Luglio 2012
Parole chiave (italiano / inglese):voluntary disclosure, corporate governance, proprietary costs, biotech firms, board composition
Settori scientifico-disciplinari MIUR:Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/07 Economia aziendale
Struttura di riferimento:Dipartimenti > Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno"
Codice ID:5180
Depositato il:20 Mag 2013 09:16
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