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Halbig, Christoph (2007) Pensieri oggettivi. In: L'oggettività del pensiero. La filosofia di Hegel tra idealismo, anti-idealismo e realismo. Verifiche, 36 (1-4). Associazione trentina di scienze umane, Trento, pp. 33-60.

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Abstract (inglese)

Moving from a critical discussion of some background assumptions of the Hegel-Renaissance within Anglo-American philosophy, this paper focuses on some crucial points of Hegel’s theory of objective thought and on their relation to Hegel’s philosophical project. Focusing on Hegel’s theory of objective thought is essential to define the position of the Hegelian philosophy within the debate between idealism and realism. That theory determines the Concept as the system of epistemic categories and, at the same time, as the system of ontological structures. Thereby, it allows Hegel to hold that we have a direct epistemic access to the movement of reality. This movement is a process of determination carried out by the ontological structures of the Concept. This process determines states of affairs as possible contents of thought. There is no gap between thought and world. In this way Hegel’s direct epistemological realism opens the possibility that an objective-constraint (i.e., a constraint which is external to thought as a mental activity), is a rational-constraint as well. The paper gives an account of the Hegelian theory of truth as co-implication of truth in ontological sense and propositional truth.
The latter is interpreted along the lines of an identity theory of truth, i.e. as identity between the content of a judgment and the object. The Hegelian theory of truth, conceived in this way, on the basis of the identity between forms of the cognizing subject and forms of reality, and so based on the ontological notion of truth, makes possible to state within the framework of Hegel’s philosophy the ticklish question of the relation between philosophy and common sense. Unlike the retrieval of a second naivety gained by means of philosophical therapy à la Putnam or McDowell, the Hegelian philosophy proposes a rationally responsible reappropriation of our theoretical and practical relationships with natural and social reality, in the spirit of a constructive, systematic philosophy.



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Tipo di EPrint:Contributo in Libro
Anno di Pubblicazione:2007
Parole chiave (italiano / inglese):oggettività
Settori scientifico-disciplinari MIUR:Area 11 - Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e psicologiche > M-FIL/06 Storia della filosofia
Area 11 - Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e psicologiche > M-FIL/01 Filosofia teoretica
Struttura di riferimento:Dipartimenti > Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata
Codice ID:7270
Depositato il:20 Ott 2014 09:34
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