Halbig, Christoph (2007) Pensieri oggettivi. [Book chapters] In: L'oggettività del pensiero. La filosofia di Hegel tra idealismo, anti-idealismo e realismo. Verifiche, 36 (1-4). Associazione trentina di scienze umane, Trento, pp. 33-60.
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Moving from a critical discussion of some background assumptions of the Hegel-Renaissance within Anglo-American philosophy, this paper focuses on some crucial points of Hegel’s theory of objective thought and on their relation to Hegel’s philosophical project. Focusing on Hegel’s theory of objective thought is essential to define the position of the Hegelian philosophy within the debate between idealism and realism. That theory determines the Concept as the system of epistemic categories and, at the same time, as the system of ontological structures. Thereby, it allows Hegel to hold that we have a direct epistemic access to the movement of reality. This movement is a process of determination carried out by the ontological structures of the Concept. This process determines states of affairs as possible contents of thought. There is no gap between thought and world. In this way Hegel’s direct epistemological realism opens the possibility that an objective-constraint (i.e., a constraint which is external to thought as a mental activity), is a rational-constraint as well. The paper gives an account of the Hegelian theory of truth as co-implication of truth in ontological sense and propositional truth.
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